Top Russian Politician Reveals Why Putin Needs to Use Nukes
Aug 10, 2023
Top Russian Politician Reveals Why Putin Needs to Use Nukes
The failed invasion of Ukraine has all eyes on Russia and put serious pressure on Putin, with many questioning his ability to lead. It might not be long before Putin is desperate enough to resort to nuclear bombs to change the narrative of the failed war. Check out today’s insane new video that reveals Russian support for Putin to turn towards nukes to take down the underdog that is Ukraine. 🔔 SUBSCRIBE TO THE INFOGRAPHICS SHOW ► https://www.youtube.com/c/theinfograp … 🔖 MY SOCIAL PAGES TikTok ► https://www.tiktok.com/@theinfographi … Discord ► https://discord.gg/theinfoshow Facebook ► https://www.facebook.com/TheInfograph … Twitter ► https://twitter.com/TheInfoShow 💭 Find more interesting stuff on:https://www.theinfographicsshow.com 📝 SOURCES:https://pastebin.com/RP5MUWTL All videos are based on publicly available information unless otherwise noted. Our Secret Weapon for growing on YouTube ➼ https://vidiq.com/theinfoshow/
Content
0 -> To stop the Ukrainian counterattack, Russia
must use nuclear weapons. These are the words
5.16 -> of Dmitry Rogozin, former director
general of Russia's Roscosmos space
9.78 -> agency and deputy prime minister in charge of
the defense industry. There is no other way,
14.34 -> according to Rogozin, for Russia
to defeat the Ukrainian offensive.
17.64 -> In a 30 second clip posted to Twitter, Rogozin
states that according to Russian doctrine,
22.44 -> the nation is fully within its rights to use
tactical nuclear weapons, pointing out that
26.82 -> preventing such strategic reversals as is expected
of the counterattack is quote- why they exist.
32.34 -> This is technically true- tactical nuclear
weapons were originally developed to cause
37.8 -> large scale battlefield losses, or to deny ground
to an enemy by irradiating it. In a twisted,
43.68 -> Cold War logic kind of way, tactical nukes were an
attempt to avoid all-out nuclear exchange- because
49.44 -> if either NATO or the Soviet bloc found itself
facing a strategic defeat on the battlefield,
54.42 -> the only real recourse would be to use
strategic nuclear weapons. These weapons
58.74 -> have significantly more destructive
power than a smaller tactical nuke,
61.98 -> though officially there is no real limit
to the yield of a tactical nuclear weapons.
66.12 -> Thus, in the minds of Cold War planners, if both
sides could lob smaller nukes at each other,
71.28 -> they would avoid lobbing the big nukes at
each other's cities. In a twisted sense,
75.42 -> there's a logic. Assuming that the
side who just had their forces nuked
79.68 -> was perfectly content to leave it at
that, and there's serious doubt there.
83.04 -> Rogozin goes on to make the case for Russia's
use of tactical nuclear weapons. Simply put,
87.78 -> Ukrainians have the battlefield advantage
with better tech and training compared to
91.74 -> the Russians. According to Rogozin, quote-
They're a great leveler for the moment when
96.48 -> there is a clear disparity in conventional
forces and hardware in the enemy's favor.”
100.2 -> And again, he isn't wrong. Ukraine has most of
the advantages as it prepares for the coming
105.18 -> offensive- which may have launched by the time
you see this video. It has spirited away an
109.56 -> estimated eight to ten brigades to be trained
by NATO personnel over the last few months,
113.88 -> putting significant strain on its forces stuck
in defensive positions who have had to fight on
118.8 -> without relief. But it was all a gamble to fully
prepare troops fielding high quality NATO kit,
124.08 -> who will soon be the spear thrust into the
soft underbelly of the Russian military.
127.62 -> For its part, the Russian military is in
dire straits. Its morale crisis is ongoing,
132.36 -> especially in light of the failure of the winter
offensive that... wasn't really an offensive. The
137.16 -> meat grinder of Bakhmut has scored as much as
100,000 casualties on Russia's side, with an
141.96 -> estimated 1/3rd as many for Ukraine making it a
clear win. And on the eve of success in Bakhmut,
147.36 -> the Russian military and Wagner fell into
infighting as they both attempted to sabotage each
151.92 -> other and claim the glory of at last capturing
a completely strategically worthless town.
156.72 -> Equipment shortages have been severe as well, with
Russia's 20 to 1 artillery overmatch dropping to
162.48 -> as little as 6 or 8 to 1 during the winter. Now
both sides are facing a serious shell crisis,
168.12 -> but Ukraine has the backing of most
of the world while Russia has only a
171.6 -> few friends to call on including Belarus,
South Africa, and North Korea. Even China,
176.1 -> whom many predicted would throw its lot in
behind Russia, has been hesitant to directly
180.84 -> support Putin, and at best China has funneled
small amounts of aid via its commercial sector.
185.04 -> Russia's supply of precision weapons has been
at dangerously low levels since last fall,
189.6 -> forcing it to import weapons such as the Iranian
made Shaheed suicide drone. Facing the most severe
195.3 -> sanctions in history, Russia's arms industry has
struggled to produce more than a handful of cruise
199.74 -> and ballistic missiles a month. In typical Russian
fashion though, instead of saving up weapons for
204.06 -> a single, overwhelming attack, Russia's military
and political leadership have been so desperate
208.38 -> for a victory of any sort that they've attacked
Ukraine immediately upon receiving each new batch
213.42 -> of weapons. This has led to a skyrocketing
rate of intercepts by Ukrainian air defenses,
217.68 -> which now hovers between 80 and 90%. Further,
the decision to target Ukraine's sprawling
222.66 -> civilian infrastructure not only failed to
shut down the national electricity grid,
226.62 -> but failed at even keeping affected sections
down for very long. The weapons used to try
231.24 -> to destroy civilian targets could have
been better used attacking military ones.
235.02 -> Tactical disasters such as the Battle of Vuhledar
have further compromised the Russian military. In
240.3 -> the largest tank battle of the war so far, Russia
lost about 120 armored vehicles from an already
245.58 -> diminishing stockpile. And it wasn't just armored
vehicles lost in the attempt to capture Vuhledar,
250.56 -> as Russia had also broken up veteran, highly
proficient units to reinforce units largely
256.02 -> made up of green conscripts- and gotten
a lot of them killed in the process.
260.16 -> Yevgeny Prigozhin has himself stated that the
Russian military is in a state of crisis. In a
264.72 -> 17 minute long daily sitrep, Prigozhin stated on
May 13th that new Russian conscripts and recruits
270.66 -> were not receiving adequate training and instead
were being rushed to the front lines. Once there,
275.22 -> they were not being properly supported with
artillery and reconnaissance drones. Naturally,
279.42 -> Prigozhin touted the superiority of his own Wagner
troops as he railed against the Russian ministry
284.22 -> of defense and the Russian military alike,
yet on the ground Ukrainian forces claim that
289.02 -> it was Wagner units who broke and ran first
in counterattacks around the Bakhmut flanks.
293.64 -> By comparison, Ukrainian troops are receiving
ever increasing numbers of western tanks,
298.14 -> with new Leopard 1s and Leopard 2s pledged to
Ukraine. By the end of summer, Ukraine should
303.18 -> also have the American Abrams tank- albeit
without its modern, classified armor package.
308.16 -> The Abrams however is still a monster of a tank,
and far better than anything Russia is putting
313.02 -> out on the field anytime soon. The UK has also
recently pledged Storm Shadow long-range missiles,
318.24 -> enabling Ukraine to finally strike with precision
at targets deep behind enemy lines- the exact
323.34 -> capability they have been begging the US for
with the ATACMS that it's refused to send.
327.72 -> With the sheer amount of firepower
massing up against Russian troops,
330.96 -> it's easy to see why some are starting
to call for the use of tactical nuclear
334.56 -> weapons. It could work, but
what would be the consequences?
337.86 -> First off would tactical nukes even work against
the Ukrainian counteroffensive. That depends on
343.08 -> the numbers used. Armies don't operate in massive
clumped formations like in Napoleonic times,
347.88 -> and instead in order to avoid enemy
reconnaissance or bombardment, spread
352.44 -> out over large swathes of territory. The real
trick, which Russia has been unable to master,
356.94 -> is to be able to rapidly reconstitute your
forces to create penetrating fists of men
362.04 -> and armor that punch through weak points, before
dispersing once more in the enemy rear. And this
367.32 -> is exactly what Ukraine has been learning to do
from its NATO teachers for the last six months.
371.4 -> This means that Ukrainian forces simply
aren't vulnerable to tactical nuclear weapons,
375.6 -> and lobbying one at a mass of Ukrainian armor
may at best score a dozen vehicles destroyed,
381.12 -> and a dozen more disabled. Western
tanks like the Abrams was designed to
385.02 -> operate in a nuclear environment, and
while details are highly classified,
388.62 -> many estimates state that the tank itself
would survive a 15 kiloton blast 500 meters
393.9 -> away. The crew would need a bit more distance
than that to survive the shockwave effect,
398.22 -> though the tank itself would be sufficient to
protect from most of the radiation effects.
402.12 -> When you've got an offensive front spread
out across several hundred kilometers,
405.78 -> suddenly you need more than one tactical nuke
to have a real battlefield impact- and you
410.22 -> also have to remember that your own forces are
going to be subject to the effect of the nuke.
414.06 -> One Defense department source estimated that for
Russia to have a significant impact on the war,
418.8 -> it would need to use nearly 100
tactical nuclear weapons spread
422.46 -> out across the entire front. Anything less
than that and Ukraine's forces are simply
426.48 -> too widely dispersed to be affected-
just in the battle of Vuhledar alone,
429.96 -> more Russian tanks were destroyed than a single
tactical weapon could potentially destroy.
434.34 -> The real value may be in using tactical nuclear
weapons as a show of force and to deny ground to
439.92 -> the Ukrainians. However, this would require
Russia to detonate multiple nuclear weapons
444.18 -> at ground level, causing massive radiation
plumes. In normal airburst configuration,
448.74 -> nuclear weapons blow most of their
radiation upwards and into space,
452.04 -> and create very little fallout. Contrary to
popular opinion, ground zero of an airburst
457.02 -> detonation would be accessible without
protective gear within days of detonation.
460.98 -> But in a groundburst configuration, nuclear
weapons create a lot of nuclear fallout,
465.9 -> and this fallout would be exactly what Russia
would want to show off. During the Cold War,
470.16 -> the UK had a similar idea and even toyed with
the idea of deploying nuclear land mines in
475.08 -> west Germany- if only briefly. These nuclear
weapons would cause massive irradiation of the
480.12 -> countryside, denying access to the enemy
who would be forced to seek an alternate
483.78 -> route that could be more easily defended.
Eventually the UK got nervous about East
487.74 -> Germany's reactions to discovering their
absolutely insane plan to irradiate half
491.82 -> their country in order to defend it and
canceled its nuclear land mine program.
495.96 -> Fun side fact, because during winter there was a
concern that the mine's components would freeze,
501.12 -> the British designed the mine so that a
live chicken could be stored inside of it
504.96 -> with enough food and water for a week.
The chicken's body heat would keep the
508.26 -> landmine operational until it died. At which point
we're guessing if Armageddon hadn't kicked off,
512.94 -> the British would simply dig up the
mine and replace the dead chicken.
515.82 -> Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons to
create large swathes of irradiated territory
520.2 -> and deny it to the Ukrainians. However,
once more Russia would need to use dozens
524.46 -> of weapons to achieve its desired effect, and
then there's the problem of fallout. Russia, as
529.56 -> most people with a map know, borders Ukraine. The
prevailing winds over Europe blow west to east,
535.14 -> earning them the name of the 'westerlies'. That
means that the fallout from nuclear detonations
540.12 -> in Ukraine isn't going to remain in Ukraine
much longer, and instead end up irradiating
545.64 -> huge swathes of Russian territory. With winds
right now also blowing south, it'll move a
550.32 -> lot of fallout high up in the stratosphere onto
Turkey and Africa or the Middle East beyond it.
555.06 -> If Russia is a pariah state now,
wait until it's responsible for
559.08 -> irradiating large parts of eastern Europe,
northern Africa, and the Middle East.
562.86 -> Then there's the political consequences of using
nuclear weapons. First, the US has warned that
567.54 -> there would be “catastrophic consequences”
if Russia used nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
571.26 -> President Biden sent a delegation to speak
with the Russian ambassador to lay out the
575.52 -> exact consequences in private, though the public
remains in the dark. It has been postulated that
580.32 -> the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine by Russia
would prompt an immediate conventional military
584.4 -> response by the United States against Russian
troops in Ukraine and/or an attack on the Black
589.32 -> Sea fleet itself to impose a crippling punishment
on Russia. At this point, Russia has few illusions
594.72 -> about its ability to defend its troops in Ukraine,
or its Black Sea fleet, from a US military attack.
599.88 -> The US isn't the only nation Russia has to fear
though, as the use of nuclear weapons would force
604.86 -> China to pull any remaining support. With China's
no first use policy on its own nuclear stockpile,
609.9 -> Russia's offensive use of a nuclear weapon would
earn it immediate condemnation. To not condemn
615.06 -> Russia's use of nukes would risk turning China
into a fellow pariah state- precisely when it's
619.56 -> trying to prove to the world that it's a major
political power by brokering a peace deal between
623.76 -> the two warring sides. With its own desire to
invade and annex Taiwan, China is already finding
628.86 -> itself put into a very uncomfortable position
by Putin's unexpected and disastrous invasion.
633.54 -> But without nuclear weapons, there's likely
a lot of truth to Dmitry Rogozin's assessment
637.92 -> that Russia cannot beat the pending Ukrainian
offensive. And even if the Ukrainian offensive
642.3 -> only has modest gains, is a failure, or is an
outright catastrophe, both sides have more than
647.7 -> enough manpower to keep the war going for a
very long time indeed. Unlike Russia though,
652.2 -> Ukraine has the ongoing support of a global
coalition that seems to expand every day with
656.76 -> new members willing to give arms to Ukraine.
Russia's only real remaining advantage is
661.44 -> its vast manpower pool- but there are already
signs of dissent within the Russian population,
665.58 -> and a full mobilization or significant
number of additional casualties may end
670.02 -> up breaking the Russian war effort before
Ukraine can inflict a military defeat.
673.86 -> Now go watch How Would US Respond
If Putin Attacked First? Or click
678 -> this other video instead before Vlad nukes it.
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=55c9hPlycsM