How Many Nuclear Missiles Can the United States Intercept?

How Many Nuclear Missiles Can the United States Intercept?

How Many Nuclear Missiles Can the United States Intercept?

The United States has a missile defense system designed to shoot down any incoming nuclear missiles. But how many could it actually intercept before one hits its target? Check out today’s epic video to learn about the capability of the US military to safely guard the country against a nuclear assault.


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Content

0.18 -> Since the start of the Russian invasion  of Ukraine, the threat of nuclear war has  
4.14 -> been as real as it's been in decades. After  all, with Russian forces getting hammered  
8.52 -> each day in Ukraine, it’s no wonder that  Putin is getting pushed closer and closer  
12.3 -> to pressing that nuclear button. With a nuclear  Armageddon potentially imminent, how many nuclear  
17.4 -> weapons could the US feasibly shoot down? Before we delve into how the US can shoot  
22.08 -> down an ICBM carrying a nuclear warhead, it’s  important to understand the basics of ballistic  
27.24 -> missile defense. What makes a ballistic missile a  ballistic missile is both its range and its speed.  
32.34 -> You can break down ballistic missiles into  short-range, medium-range, long-range, and  
37.2 -> intercontinental ballistic missiles. Additionally,  most short-range and some medium-range ballistic  
42.12 -> missiles can be considered subsonic, which  means they travel slower than the speed of  
46.44 -> sound. Most ballistic missiles are supersonic,  meaning they are faster than the speed of sound. 
51.3 -> What makes an ICBM so special is its ability to  travel extreme distances with heavy payloads. With  
57.36 -> countries like Russia and China claiming their  best ICBMs can travel almost 20,000 kilometers,  
62.82 -> these are some pretty heavy and serious weapon  systems. These missiles are also extremely fast,  
67.68 -> traveling upwards of ten to twenty times the  speed of sound. Because of their weight, speed,  
72.72 -> and carrying capacity, most nuclear warheads  are affixed to ICBMs. Though some countries  
77.82 -> like Russia have other ballistic  missiles with nuclear warheads,  
81.18 -> most threats the US would face would be ICBMs. Whenever a ballistic missile launches,  
86.04 -> its flight path is broken down into three  phases. The first phase is known as the boost  
90.12 -> phase. This phase consists of when the rocket  is fired, and it begins gathering up enough  
94.8 -> speed before transitioning to its next phase of  flight. The next phase is called the mid-course  
99.84 -> phase. The mid-course phase is the part of the  flight path where ballistic missiles travel on  
104.16 -> a relatively steady plane. It’s during  this phase that the missile travels the  
108.06 -> bulk of the distance towards its target. Once the missile reaches the end of the  
111.96 -> mid-course phase, it transitions to the terminal  phase. In the terminal phase, the missile turns  
117 -> over from its mid-course portion to barrel down  on its target. With the help of earth's gravity,  
122.16 -> the missile’s speed peaks during this portion  of its flight. It’s also during this part  
125.88 -> of the missile’s flight that it deploys its  Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles or MIRVs. 
131.16 -> Regarding ballistic missile defense, the best  time to hit a missile is during its mid-course  
136.14 -> phase. During this time, the missile is the most  exposed it will ever be, and its relatively flat  
140.94 -> trajectory gives any target nation the best  chance it’ll have to shoot it down. Because  
145.2 -> the mid-course phase guarantees the highest  probability of a kill, most US systems are geared  
150.18 -> towards taking the missile out during this part. However, over the past thirty years, countries  
154.26 -> like Russia, China, and North Korea have  been developing countermeasures to prevent  
158.46 -> a successful shootdown during the missile's most  vulnerable phase. Creating missiles that can weave  
163.5 -> during flight or preprogramming ICBMs to fly to  parts of the earth where no US radars can cover  
169.62 -> like the poles makes relying on shooting down  ICBMs during the mid-course phase alone tricky. 
175.02 -> Another complicating matter is a radar's ability  to track ICBMs accurately to guide interceptors  
180.48 -> to the target. Because most interceptor  missiles do not have their own active radar,  
185.22 -> they must rely upon sea or ground-based radar  systems to help track the target. This is why  
190.68 -> the Navy developed the Aegis combat  system to help provide that coverage. 
194.4 -> Initially rolled out in the early 1980s as  part of the Ticonderoga class cruiser program,  
199.56 -> Aegis was and remains today a state-of-the-art  system. Aegis itself is a combined hardware and  
205.86 -> software system that integrates the weapons and  sensors of US destroyers and cruisers into one  
211.08 -> combat suite. By aggregating data into one  place, Aegis serves as a literal one-stop  
216.24 -> shop defense system both for the ship, other  nearby ships, and for land-based objectives. 
220.92 -> The heart of the Aegis system is the SPY  radar, and SPY remains the best air defense  
226.32 -> radar on the planet to this day. While its exact  parameters remain classified, there are some basic  
231.48 -> functions that SPY is great at that help US ships  complete their Ballistic Missile Defense Mission. 
236.28 -> One of the main reasons that SPY is so great is  the frequency band that it operates in. Choosing  
241.5 -> the right frequency is essential to BMD missions.  If you choose a frequency that is too low,  
246.12 -> you will not get enough fidelity to build a  coherent and accurate track. If you select a  
250.98 -> frequency that is too high, then the range on  the radar suffers greatly. Through decades of  
255.42 -> testing and development, the US has perfected  the frequency range for air defense radars. 
259.44 -> Another factor US planners had to consider  for Aegis, and any other fire control radar  
264.24 -> for that matter, is radar cross-section.  Radar cross-section or RCS is the part of an  
269.34 -> inbound contact that reflects directed radar  energy and can be seen on the screen of the  
274.2 -> operator's console. All military operations aim  to minimize RCS as much as possible. Navy ships,  
280.2 -> Air Force stealth aircraft, and missiles aim to  make their RCS almost non-existent to prevent  
285.3 -> them from showing up on enemy radar. Because of  this, fire control radars must be able to pick up  
290.22 -> on the smallest RCS, which the US has done well  with both its sea and shore-based radar systems. 
295.98 -> Regarding the BMD mission for the Navy,  the US currently has about 48 destroyers,  
300.72 -> nearly half of its current inventory, as  BMD-capable ships. What makes these ships so  
306.3 -> special is that they have a better Aegis baseline  than other ships in the Navy. Because of all the  
311.16 -> variations of Aegis that have developed over the  years, as new threats appear and new developments  
315.78 -> in software and hardware are discovered, newer  versions of Aegis get installed on Navy ships. 
320.34 -> The weapon that the Navy uses to take out  ballistic missile threats is the Standard  
324.3 -> Missile Three. The SM-3 is a relatively new weapon  in the Navy's inventory, reaching operational  
329.7 -> capability in 2014. The SM-3 was the US attempt at  creating a dedicated ballistic missile interceptor  
336.18 -> instead of just using a modified SM-2 missile  with new software that made it an SM-2 Block IV. 
342.12 -> With a dedicated interceptor, the Navy is  poised to operate almost anywhere in the  
346.44 -> world as a viable BMD platform. Since the  SPY radar and Mk 99 Fire Control Radar are  
351.9 -> all internal to the ship, the Navy can cast  a wide net for BMD coverage. Though the exact  
356.94 -> capabilities of the SM-3 remain classified, a  highly publicized test from 2020 proved that  
362.64 -> the Navy could shoot down ICBMs with Aegis. On November 17, 2020, at a remote US testing  
368.4 -> facility in the Pacific, a destroyer successfully  intercepted a live ballistic missile target with  
373.38 -> a live SM-3 missile. The destroyer also did  this while simultaneously tracking other  
378 -> inbound air contacts. The test achieved a perfect  one-for-one kill ratio and was realistic since,  
383.82 -> in an actual war, a ship would be  tracking other inbound air threats. 
387.54 -> While the test might have been successful, it’s  the only test the public has been made aware of,  
391.62 -> and the shootdown was for just one ICBM. In a  real scenario, there might be dozens or hundreds  
397.38 -> of inbound nukes. Because of this, US planners  understand the need for shore-based interceptors  
402.12 -> and have installed them both in the US and abroad. Abroad, the US has two Aegis shore commands in  
407.7 -> Romania and Poland, and these facilities are  armed with two dozen SM-3 missiles each. Should  
413.04 -> Russia ever try to shoot nukes at Europe and the  US be denied access to places like the Black Sea,  
417.9 -> Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean, the US still  have a viable option to shoot those threats down. 
422.82 -> For protecting the homeland,  the US has two more systems,  
425.94 -> both of which are owned by the Army with some  Air Force support. The primary homeland defense  
431.04 -> system is the Ground Based Mid-course  Defense system. As the name would imply,  
434.52 -> the GMD system is designed to attack inbound  threats during its vulnerable mid-course phase. 
439.5 -> First designed in the late 90s, by the early  2000s, GMD had reached operational capability.  
445.2 -> Deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg  Space Force Base, California, the two units  
451.08 -> work with the Air Force, which provides overall  command and control for the system. Essentially,  
455.4 -> GMD operates in the same way that Aegis does. It comprises a series of ground-based and  
460.38 -> sea-based radars that provide targeting  data. The Air Force aggregates this data  
464.94 -> and feeds it to both bases in the event  of a nuclear attack. Once received,  
468.66 -> either base could fire one of forty-four of its  Ground Based Interceptors. These massive rockets  
473.7 -> are designed to launch an Exoatmospheric Kill  Vehicle (EKV) that actually takes out the ICBM. 
480.12 -> Using a variety of computers and color sensors,  the EKV guides itself to the target after being  
485.4 -> launched from the GBI. Utilizing brute kinetic  force, it rams itself into the incoming missile  
491.04 -> to destroy it. Because of this, the GBI does  not use a conventional explosive warhead. 
495.72 -> Though early developments of the GMD were  promising, their overall success rate has  
500.52 -> proven to be lackluster. Of all the two  dozen or so tests conducted, GMD has about  
506.04 -> a 52% chance of a kill using just one missile.  However, that kill percentage goes up to a 97%  
511.5 -> chance when firing four or more missiles. The services have taken steps to improve  
516.06 -> the system's accuracy over the years. In 2014  and 2018, the Air Force built impressive radar  
521.52 -> arrays in Alaska and Hawaii, respectively.  These arrays have greatly improved the  
525.72 -> range and coverage of the GMD system to  provide accurate fire control solutions. 
529.74 -> Another drawback of the GMD system is the fact  there is no east coast-based site. Congress has  
535.2 -> funded studies of an east coast site, and  the military came back with using Fort Drum  
539.28 -> in upstate New York as the best possible site.  However, the military said as of 2019, there was  
544.74 -> no operational requirement for it, so the east  coast site remains abandoned for now. Perhaps  
549.54 -> with everything heating up with Russia, Congress  will order the military to construct a new one? 
553.62 -> The last viable homeland defense system  the military can field is THAAD. Short  
558.42 -> for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD  was first developed in the mid-2000s and first  
563.88 -> reached operational use by 2008. Currently, there  are seven THAAD batteries in the US inventory,  
569.88 -> all operated by the US Army. With five  presently stationed in Texas, one in Guam,  
574.98 -> and one in South Korea, these units consist  of their own internal radars, fire control  
579.54 -> computers, launchers, and other equipment. Because these are totally self-contained units,  
584.1 -> they can easily be moved around. While they  might take several hours to several days to  
588.24 -> be fully set up, these can be placed anywhere in  the US for point defense of an area. Similar to  
593.16 -> Aegis and GMD, THAAD also employs a kinetic  warhead to destroy incoming threats. But  
597.96 -> unlike Aegis and GMD, THAAD has a much more  limited range. Sort of like Patriot missiles,  
603.18 -> but for ICBMs, these batteries are limited  in their range by their own organic sensors. 
607.98 -> But despite having a limited range, THAAD remains  the only viable option the US has in its current  
613.5 -> inventory to destroy ICBMs in its terminal phase  potentially. I say potentially because THAAD has  
619.44 -> been successfully tested in shooting down a  range of ballistic missiles, but it has not  
623.46 -> completed a publicly known intercept of an ICBM. As far as determining how many nuclear weapons  
628.98 -> the US could shoot down, that is a pretty tough  question to answer. The US Navy currently has  
633.9 -> around 500 SM-3 missiles in its inventory, and  the Army has just 44 GBIs available for launch  
640.08 -> in the GMD system. As for THAAD, each battery has  six launchers with eight missiles each. That math  
645.42 -> comes out to about 900 total interceptors that  the US could hope to throw at an incoming ICBM. 
650.7 -> Now, in a real-world scenario, other systems like  Patriot missile batteries would probably be used,  
655.62 -> but these were never meant to take on ICBMs.  However, it is possible the military would  
659.88 -> employ them in a last-ditch effort. But  for this calculation, we'll leave them  
663.66 -> out. These are also publicly identified  figures, so the US may have more of these  
668.04 -> in storage or in production that is unknown now. But for argument's sake, with a grand total of 900  
673.02 -> interceptors, a one-for-one kill ratio would  be 900 nukes. However, as previously stated,  
678.42 -> it is essential to note that almost no weapon  system has a one-for-one ratio due to factors like  
683.76 -> frequency, RCS, and defeating countermeasures.  Taking the tests for the GMD into account,  
688.92 -> in a worst-case scenario needing four  missiles for each ICBM would mean the US  
693.66 -> could take out just 225 nukes on its worst day. So, there you have it; if Russia were ever  
699.84 -> crazy enough to fire nukes at the US today, the  military could take out between 225 to 900 nukes.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9q09ibKIjkc