Nuclear War Theory: Continuity and Change

Aug 10, 2023

Nuclear War Theory: Continuity and Change

A Conference on Today’s Competitive Geopolitical Landscape – in honor of Robert Jervis
February 17, 2023

Morning Session: Nuclear War Theory: Continuity and Change
Moderator: Cynthia Roberts, Hunter College; Columbia University

Panelists:

Charles Glaser, George Washington University
Scott Sagan, Stanford University
Etel Solingen, University of California Irvine
Stephen Van Evera, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Content

1.82 -> on my far left is Cynthia Roberts she's

5.16 -> a professor at Hunter College and here

7.14 -> at Salzman as a senior research scholar

9.54 -> and Adjunct professor at The salsman

11.519 -> Institute

12.719 -> she will be the moderator for those of

15.36 -> you who may not know Cynthia as well as

18.18 -> some of us here do she's a very serious

20.52 -> scholar of all things nuclear she's also

23.22 -> a Russia expert and she had a great

25.439 -> opportunity recently to go down and

27.06 -> spend some time at the Pentagon for

28.859 -> almost a year

30.24 -> to work at the J5

32.52 -> we're looking at strategy plans and

34.98 -> policies so she has a little bit of

36.6 -> insight into the whole problems we're

38.1 -> going to be talking about in this

39.3 -> nuclear panel

40.8 -> you can read more about Cynthia's

43.559 -> accomplishments again in the program as

45.84 -> well as all of our speakers I will turn

48.539 -> it over to Cynthia now to introduce the

50.219 -> speakers

51.3 -> thank you Peter

53.039 -> um I should start by saying good morning

54.96 -> nuclear weapons are back as we know once

58.199 -> again Central to International politics

60.42 -> along with renewed intensified grade

63.539 -> power competition what's more Russia's

66.479 -> aggression as Peter noted against

68.82 -> Ukraine has brought the prospect of

70.92 -> nuclear war back into the realm of

73.32 -> possibility we have a terrific panel

76.02 -> here today at Columbia to give their

78.84 -> perspectives on these questions about

80.88 -> the new multi-polar nuclear era and we

84.36 -> will anchor our discussion to the

86.52 -> seminal works of Robert Jervis

89.84 -> whose work on the nuclear age offers us

93.479 -> as you all know essential guideposts to

97.38 -> assess the continuities and change in

100.5 -> nuclear theory and this is one of those

103.02 -> fields where we emphasize Theory over

105.72 -> practice our panelists are familiar to

108.78 -> you because they've authored many of the

111 -> most

112.04 -> significant works on nuclear theory on

116.579 -> international relations International

118.02 -> Security studies since Bob penned his

121.28 -> Landmark studies they're all jervisians

125.1 -> I can say that but each in his or her

129.479 -> own way

130.879 -> so please read the BIOS because they've

134.4 -> written so many books and articles we'd

136.86 -> spent all morning just reviewing them

138.84 -> let me just introduce them to you

141.42 -> briefly starting at your far left my far

145.8 -> right is Steve Van Evra the Ford

149.64 -> international professor at MIT and I

153.36 -> think a Yankees fan Scott Sagan

157.879 -> Scott Sagan is the Monroe professor of

160.98 -> political science the Haas University

162.78 -> fellow and Senior fellow at the center

165.36 -> for International Security and

166.86 -> cooperation and Freeman spogly

169.14 -> instituted Stanford next at tell

172.08 -> solingen is the distinguished professor

174.42 -> and tyranny chair in peace and conflict

177.3 -> studies at the University of California

179.099 -> at Irvine and to my right is Charles

182.459 -> Glaser professor of political science

184.44 -> and international Affairs and

186.599 -> co-director of the institute for

188.519 -> security and conflict studies at the

190.92 -> George Washington University so let's

193.98 -> dive in

195.239 -> um Bob Jervis of course is best known in

198.18 -> this field

199.28 -> in the area of nuclear theory for his

202.14 -> book the meaning of the nuclear

204.36 -> Revolution it was a signed reading for

206.22 -> today so I'm sure you brought your notes

209.22 -> with you so let's start with Bob's most

212.58 -> important claims in this book and the

215.159 -> ones that you think hold up best in in

218.519 -> the new nuclear age in the emerging

221.42 -> multi-polar nuclear World in this

223.62 -> context perhaps for the rest of you I

227.04 -> should note that the Biden

229.58 -> administration's nuclear posture review

231.9 -> which came out last year characterizes

235.2 -> this era as unprecedented by the 2030s

240.06 -> and I quote from the NPR the U.S will

243.12 -> for the first time in its history face

246.06 -> two major nuclear Powers as strategic

249.239 -> competitors and potential adversaries

251.64 -> and then it goes on to talk about other

254.58 -> nuclear powers like North Korea and so

257.82 -> on so given this these developments um

262.639 -> uh what do you draw from Bob's work as

266.82 -> uh as the insights that most carry over

270 -> let's start with Charlie

272.46 -> okay so the main thing for Jervis and I

275.639 -> think it applies today and into the

277.259 -> future was the what the logic of mutual

279.419 -> vulnerability

280.74 -> and in fact his work didn't say much

282.36 -> about nuclear weapons outside of man

284.88 -> which is not a shortcoming at the at the

288.36 -> time the world was focused on the US and

289.86 -> the Soviet Union and we thought we were

291 -> in mad we

292.38 -> um and so I think the basic arguments

294.3 -> and I think they're familiar but it's

295.5 -> worth sort of reiterating them is that a

298.199 -> state couldn't protect itself from its

300.66 -> adversary in that situation

303.84 -> um and therefore it didn't make sense to

305.759 -> Target the other side's forces

307.919 -> or there was no value in targeting

309.66 -> forces because you couldn't protect

311.04 -> yourself

312.6 -> um

313.32 -> and then many things followed from that

315.06 -> so unlike in a world of Conventional

317.22 -> Weapons relative for size didn't matter

319.199 -> if you were in mayod and had that

321.18 -> retaliatory capability it didn't matter

322.86 -> if the other side had more weapons

324.84 -> because

325.979 -> at least except maybe at the far margin

328.5 -> it wouldn't affect how much damage you

330.419 -> could do so relative foresights didn't

332.46 -> matter the size of forces after a

334.86 -> nuclear exchange didn't matter

337.62 -> um the quality of your weapons didn't

339.12 -> matter very much at least in the in the

341.52 -> moment and this is just radically

343.259 -> different from a conventional world

345.84 -> where all those things did matter and

348.6 -> among other things his critique was that

351 -> much of nuclear thinking was was carried

354.18 -> out in conventional terms thinking about

356.1 -> relative foresights thinking about

357.78 -> complicated options but in fact those

360.9 -> were not logical

362.759 -> um conclusions

365.28 -> um he said less about what the options

367.62 -> should be

369.72 -> um but I think if you took his arguments

372.12 -> seriously and I think he follows in this

373.919 -> on and he of course gives credit to many

375.6 -> people that appreciated to him but among

376.919 -> others Thomas shelling

378.9 -> um that basically in in this world of

380.639 -> mutual vulnerability

382.259 -> um if you were going to use nuclear

383.4 -> weapons they should be limited attacks

385.8 -> there was no logic to all-out attacks

388.56 -> um and they should be

390.24 -> attacks that inflict inflicted damage it

393.12 -> was a bargaining process

395.46 -> um and it wasn't one that necessarily or

397.44 -> in fact maybe even shouldn't involve

399.479 -> attacking forces

401.46 -> one of the arguments that has currency

403.08 -> today and that Jervis um criticized as

406.319 -> from the 1970s was that well maybe

409.199 -> countries actually just there are

410.639 -> countries and it was argued by the US

412.44 -> government including the Soviet Union

413.94 -> that basically valued their forces and

416.759 -> their leadership and not so much their

419.28 -> society and their population and this

421.68 -> had the sort of rather bizarre

423.66 -> implication of turning forces into a pre

427.199 -> would be called value targets it was if

429.12 -> you wanted to inflict punishment you had

430.62 -> to attack the forces so all of a sudden

432.66 -> there was this Logic for attacking

435.479 -> forces and not bargaining

437.94 -> um or if you were a bargaining it would

439.08 -> be by attacking forces but not by

440.58 -> attacking the other things the adversary

442.38 -> might value this obviously had huge

444.3 -> implications for Force plating because

446.52 -> in in German business World there was no

448.38 -> need to Target forces and you didn't

450.36 -> want to Target forces and now all of a

451.979 -> sudden the countervailing strategy would

453.96 -> say no you need to Target forces and

455.4 -> Leadership and so this becomes somewhat

457.5 -> of a judgment call

458.88 -> um

459.9 -> it's unclear what the Deep Intel is on

462.72 -> where this value of leadership came from

465.06 -> and targeting and forces came from

468.18 -> but at least intuitively it never made

470.4 -> sense to him or to me that even if that

473.52 -> was how leaders thought about it if you

474.96 -> were essentially destroying their

476.039 -> society

477.319 -> then did it matter if the forces were

480.66 -> not destroyed like okay like what value

483.599 -> would you have on them and so anyway so

485.639 -> that's the basic I think the broad logic

487.5 -> is the you know the logic of mutual

489.36 -> vulnerability

490.979 -> um and it's sort of How It's very

492.74 -> counterintuitive to and sort of opposite

495.78 -> of traditional conventional logic

498.12 -> yes so Scott maybe you want to pick up

500.639 -> on this that how stability is really the

503.699 -> result of a shared perception that

505.68 -> crises aren't cannot escalate well I

507.84 -> want to start just by saying it's real

509.639 -> honor to be on a panel honoring Jervis

512.76 -> and his contributions and nuclear

514.44 -> strategy and even though we were told

515.7 -> not to tell too many Bob's stories I

517.86 -> can't resist just one

519.779 -> um I wasn't

521.58 -> very close to Bob I didn't go to

523.68 -> Columbia but I met him at the Council on

526.26 -> Foreign Relations because he was the

527.76 -> outside reviewer for my first book

529.92 -> Moving targets and he wrote a personal

532.44 -> note after a very

534.959 -> strong detailed analysis of the

537.72 -> manuscript that was very helpful and he

539.64 -> wrote Scott put this book to bed now and

543.66 -> get it published and get going on your

545.64 -> second book because I like this book but

548.04 -> it lacks the theoretical heft that

551.1 -> you'll need to get tenure at Stanford

555.24 -> that was a hard thing for a young

557.459 -> assistant professor to read

559.62 -> but it was absolutely true absolutely

562.14 -> true

563.1 -> and I think about that whenever I have

565.14 -> to give tough love messages to grad

567.839 -> students uh today

570.66 -> um

572.399 -> for this occasionally I went back and

574.32 -> took out my copy of this 1989 book

577.8 -> it's very important and Charlie's right

579.72 -> you know it's really about the

581.16 -> inevitability of mutually assured

582.899 -> destruction and that combining that with

585.98 -> psychological insights it meant that

588.26 -> limited uses of force are very dangerous

591.779 -> in in that world and arms racing

595.2 -> is counterproductive and perhaps

599.899 -> and dangerous at worst

603.899 -> so I went back and began reading this

606.18 -> and I

607.44 -> I think they're two real characteristics

609.12 -> I wanted to highlight one is

611.7 -> the erudition the wide-ranging quite

614.64 -> extraordinary

616.44 -> understanding and knowledge of History

620.04 -> so he's not just great on psychology but

622.74 -> he will use examples so to understand

625.519 -> unauthorized uses of force

629.04 -> you find Victor King Victor Emmanuel

632.58 -> saying when the German gunboats show up

635.04 -> in the agidar harbor during the second

637.74 -> Moroccan crisis Victor Emmanuel writes

640.2 -> on such occasions canons have a way of

643.14 -> going off on their own

645.899 -> he of course will use thucydides to

648.6 -> understand hubris

651.24 -> and to understand the dangers of people

653.94 -> getting angry

655.5 -> and doing something

657.959 -> irrational

660.36 -> Bob opens up the newspaper

662.88 -> and finds it yesterday a pedestrian was

665.459 -> stabbed to death on 42nd Street

667.86 -> when the accosted the motorist whose van

669.839 -> grazed him when he tried to cross an

672.18 -> intersection wins to say the two men

674.16 -> exchanged words the driver punched The

676.56 -> Pedestrian the Prudential punched back

678.779 -> the driver pulled out a knife and

680.1 -> stabbed the victim it looks like it just

682.74 -> got out of hand the place happened says

686.339 -> so Bob could bring both history and

688.74 -> everyday life in New York City to bear

691.26 -> on questions of International Security

694.44 -> but the second characteristic of this

696.6 -> book it's really deserves to be re-read

699.36 -> and reread again is how practical Bob

702.24 -> was he didn't approach these questions

705 -> from a ideological perspective but

708.3 -> rather from a practical perspective

711.54 -> the most obvious problem he says with

713.64 -> counter force is that we can't destroy

715.8 -> all Soviet strategic forces because

717.48 -> there are too many of them

719.04 -> they're hardened and they're difficult

720.959 -> to find

722.88 -> what about counter leadership targeting

724.56 -> well small Warheads with terminal

728.459 -> guidance might be able to hit the KGB

730.32 -> headquarters without destroying the

732.66 -> areas around it but we don't have those

734.519 -> required weapons

738.06 -> now I would posit that we do have those

740.88 -> required weapons today

742.62 -> both in terms of low yield nuclear

744.72 -> warheads and in terms of many

745.98 -> conventional capabilities

749.04 -> and why we still can't

751.68 -> Target all Russian nuclear forces

756.54 -> we can Target with nuclear and with

759.3 -> mostly with conventional forces North

761.7 -> Korea's nuclear Arsenal

763.8 -> and that poses a very different logic

767.339 -> I wish Bob was here to help us Analyze

769.86 -> That

770.7 -> and with respect to China I think the

773.76 -> Chinese were

775.92 -> Believers in Bob Jervis until relatively

778.38 -> recently

779.399 -> and it appears that the Chinese are now

781.5 -> saying yeah they're worried about their

783.839 -> nuclear forces and therefore they're

786.24 -> going to build a lot more of them

788.1 -> and we're going to have a near two peer

792.12 -> competitors and I think this is

794.519 -> particularly dangerous

796.32 -> because I think we could have a

798.54 -> conventional capability of holding off

800.7 -> one of those

802.139 -> two states without nuclear escalation if

804.72 -> Russia attacked NATO or if the Chinese

807 -> attacked Taiwan

809.1 -> but if one attacks and the other

814.2 -> takes advantage of a war what's often

816.3 -> called uh

818.48 -> opportunistic aggression

820.92 -> then we're going to be back in a world

822.36 -> where the United States is going to be

823.86 -> very interested in nuclear escalation

825.56 -> which I think does get us back to a very

828.779 -> dangerous situation

831 -> so

832.079 -> by other book on the subject which got

834.42 -> less attention in academe was the

837.24 -> illogic of American nuclear strategy and

840.42 -> in this book which we also encourage you

843.12 -> to read he recognized that the actual

845.459 -> practice of nuclear strategy diverged

849.18 -> from what his theory recommended the

851.16 -> classic problem of you know prescription

853.32 -> description explanation why were the

856.079 -> policy makers not following Bob jervis's

859.26 -> Theory and more recently uh since Bob's

863.82 -> these two Landmark studies a bunch of

866.7 -> Next Generation Scholars have found that

869.7 -> the nuclear strategies that surprised

872.1 -> Jervis were in fact the pattern not the

875.579 -> exception so they were siding with the

878.579 -> illogic argument saying No this is

880.5 -> actually logical challenging Bob's

882.779 -> arguments about the stabilizing effects

886.199 -> of mutual vulnerabilities so now we come

888.3 -> for full cycle how do you assess these

892.139 -> neck Next Generation arguments in the

895.92 -> context of the original arguments about

898.019 -> Mutual vulnerability let's turn this to

900.54 -> Steve and see

903.079 -> or should I start with Charlie oh I'll

906 -> I'll say I'll I'll tackle it

908.639 -> um

909.48 -> we were asked not to tell Jervis stories

911.639 -> here but I have to I'm going to tell one

914.339 -> uh I said a bad president

918.12 -> um I again like Scott I didn't have a

920.04 -> chance to study under Bob Jervis ever

923.16 -> um but he was my most important teacher

925.32 -> really in terms of who taught me the

927.18 -> most about International politics and I

930.12 -> used to Trail him around

931.86 -> if he was ever in a city I was in and he

934.44 -> was giving a talk I would like oh man

936 -> Jervis is giving you a thought you know

937.92 -> he's he's at Harvard let's go see what

940.079 -> he's saying and he's at the apsa or

942.12 -> whatever and uh

944.519 -> so one day he was up at Harvard and uh

947.279 -> I'm relating to Peter's comment about

949.68 -> how he his thing with suits

952.62 -> um because I don't think he fully stated

954.48 -> the realities uh

957 -> he he hated students these guys are

959.519 -> wearing suits today but I I'm in a

961.5 -> Jervis Congress I'm not going to wear a

962.82 -> suit I believe it no it's not pardon am

967.38 -> I me neither you exactly so anyway one

970.44 -> day he'd given a brilliant talk and I

972.42 -> was just like I somehow managed to latch

974.339 -> on to him and uh followed him back to

977.04 -> the uh the hotel up there across from

979.98 -> the Cambridge common and we were

981.54 -> reacting about the fate of the world and

983.279 -> you know the nuclear Revolution and the

984.959 -> security dilemma and spiral models

988.04 -> we just kept going all the way up to his

990.24 -> hotel room and uh this is cool you know

993.36 -> I hope you know you get to talk to

994.8 -> Jervis for another 10 minutes and so he

997.44 -> just went in the room I followed him in

999.24 -> and within 30 seconds I was staring at

1002.36 -> Bob Jervis in his underwear

1006.259 -> he had he had a suit on because he had

1008.66 -> he barely had you he just ripped it off

1010.52 -> [Laughter]

1012.92 -> and uh there's several deep meanings of

1015.62 -> this whole story

1017.38 -> in any event uh so let me comment a bit

1021.5 -> about

1022.399 -> um the new wave of thinkers who have

1024.86 -> differed with Jervis or at least they

1026.66 -> seem to have differed with them who've

1028.4 -> come along uh since uh but more or less

1030.919 -> the year 2000 or so a bunch of them went

1033.38 -> to MIT they didn't listen to anything I

1035.36 -> told them

1036.679 -> so what can I say but um

1039.74 -> I'll say four things about the nuclear

1042.439 -> Revolution and uh and the new thinkers

1044.9 -> they challenge uh his work in two ways

1048.98 -> they say I will say number one

1051.08 -> Jervis was the primary scholar who was

1055.22 -> for the first time quotable saying

1057.86 -> the nuclear Revolution is the defensive

1059.539 -> Revolution nukes nukes mean great Powers

1062.36 -> can't conquer each other anymore and to

1064.82 -> me when I look at at writing and you

1067.1 -> know the academic community and uh it's

1069.5 -> writing on what the nuclear Revolution

1070.7 -> means there's something to me kind of

1073.58 -> sad about it which is there was almost

1075.74 -> no writing about this question is this a

1078.799 -> revolution in Warfare that affects

1080.72 -> statecraft and affects the security

1083.179 -> dilemma how does it affect the ability

1085.1 -> of states to conquer each other which is

1086.48 -> a crucial question if you're then going

1087.679 -> to ask you know what should your own

1089.48 -> defense policy be do nukes make you safe

1091.88 -> or not

1092.96 -> and um Brody wrote about this a little

1095.48 -> bit in the book absolute weapon and then

1098.48 -> uh

1100.58 -> uh what's his name wrote uh there will

1102.74 -> be no time there was two books about

1104.24 -> this question that disagreed back in

1106.7 -> 1946 and then there was no writing about

1108.679 -> it all the way until I think Ken Waltz

1111.38 -> commented on it in in 1981 in an Adelphi

1115.16 -> hero he didn't really elaborate and then

1117.02 -> Jervis uh was the guy I would always

1119.6 -> cite saying finally somebody's unpacking

1121.82 -> this idea although even it's interesting

1124.16 -> even Jervis didn't

1125.9 -> um

1126.94 -> uh unpack the argument ways I would have

1129.799 -> thought he did he was kind of a Groucho

1131.539 -> Marxist in the sense that he he wouldn't

1134 -> be a member of any club he was a member

1135.559 -> of and so he wouldn't toot his own horn

1137.12 -> and he wouldn't use his own ideas very

1138.679 -> much and um the uh to me the huge story

1143.36 -> with the nuclear Revolution is it really

1144.98 -> greatly eases the security dilemma and

1148.039 -> that is a huge event in world history

1149.86 -> and uh it all relates very much to his

1153.02 -> work on the security dilemma his

1154.4 -> fantastic 1978 article on cooperation

1157.46 -> under the security level and he never

1159.38 -> uses the word security dilemma in

1160.88 -> connection with the nuclear revolution

1162.559 -> in that book he says he doesn't even say

1165.02 -> countries can't conquer each other he

1166.76 -> says you can't win Wars and he says

1169.7 -> nuclear weapons reinforce the status quo

1172.16 -> but those words get used but the word

1174.2 -> conquer doesn't come up even though it's

1176.299 -> crucial in this security dilemma doesn't

1178.4 -> get mentioned anyway still it's the most

1180.2 -> important it was the most important

1181.4 -> writing on that subject uh and uh some

1185.299 -> of the uh and his theory would then

1187.46 -> predict if you think the security line

1188.539 -> was important if you think that lots of

1190.7 -> warfare stems from the search for

1192.14 -> security and for the fact that states

1193.52 -> feel insecure and therefore uh wage war

1196.039 -> to

1197.179 -> um uh gain the resources they need to

1199.28 -> defend themselves or to reduce the power

1201.679 -> of others to hurt them then you've

1203.299 -> really changed the world uh in a huge

1205.34 -> way and one of the predictions of the

1207.08 -> theory would be

1208.52 -> um that or his views on nukes is would

1210.62 -> be that we'd have a much more quiet

1211.88 -> world uh much less great power conflict

1214.28 -> and the new guys have said well look at

1216.08 -> all the crises and look at uh you know

1218.72 -> Scott Sagan's work on how dangerous some

1221.179 -> of them have been and

1222.98 -> um uh how come we're not you know the

1225.799 -> Cold War a lot of people got killed we

1227.059 -> didn't have a general War

1229.039 -> um

1229.7 -> my view is that uh the big story on the

1233.299 -> nuclear Revolution and the cold war is

1235.52 -> that it was misperceived that neither

1238.28 -> Elite the Soviet nor Americans saw the

1240.44 -> nuclear revolution in the way the Juris

1242.6 -> talked about it uh it was my own Short

1246.02 -> history is uh the Soviet Elites came to

1250.16 -> view this as a defensive Revolution very

1252.5 -> late in the game it was the new thinkers

1253.94 -> around Gorbachev who believed it as a

1256.28 -> few people you can name like Andrew

1257.539 -> cartoonoff and others who wrote about it

1259.16 -> and it got mixed up with the Soviet

1261.7 -> adoption of the idea of non-offensive

1264.14 -> Defense which they never actually

1265.34 -> implemented but in in the mid 80s they

1267.679 -> changed their view about how to defend

1269.6 -> the Soviet Union and these new thinkers

1271.28 -> the old civilians all not military

1275.38 -> adopted the view that um we now uh live

1279.919 -> in an easier to live-in world with

1281.539 -> nuclear weapons and this was part of the

1282.98 -> reason in my view why the Cold War ended

1284.96 -> Soviet Elites decided they did not need

1286.82 -> buffer room in the west the way they had

1288.62 -> assumed in the 40s and they they pulled

1292.58 -> the end of the Cold War by pulling out

1293.84 -> of Eastern Europe they weren't pushed

1295.46 -> but that was very late in the game if

1297.44 -> you look at all the Americans sort of

1298.82 -> strategic thinking leading up to that

1300.32 -> look at the you know how American policy

1304.46 -> makers thought about nukes they did not

1306.5 -> see it as a defensive Revolution

1308.96 -> um and um my own view is this is tragic

1312.14 -> my view is the U.S had wide room to

1315.08 -> conduct a much more relaxed foreign

1317.48 -> policy in the Cold War the the

1319.58 -> widespread third world intervention the

1321.26 -> US did not only were we intervening in

1323.419 -> places where the strata where the uh the

1326 -> stakes were low and the costs not worth

1328.159 -> it and often failure was likely like in

1330.32 -> Vietnam

1331.419 -> but also we even if those things weren't

1334.159 -> true we had a we were an unconquerable

1336.919 -> country and the bottom line is

1339.5 -> uh my view of the nuclear Revolution it

1342.2 -> means great Powers will not conquer

1343.82 -> anybody anymore my view is uh this is

1347.24 -> this calls for huge change in U.S

1349.88 -> national security Grant strategy uh from

1352.76 -> former years there's been some change

1354.5 -> there should be more

1356.299 -> um and uh the the youngsters are correct

1359.539 -> to say well gee Cold War was pretty mean

1361.58 -> it was nevertheless uh we didn't have we

1366.08 -> didn't have a general war and I think

1368.179 -> and there was a lot of other things you

1370.039 -> didn't see in the Cold War for example

1371.419 -> preventive war was a pervasive part of

1375.02 -> world politics and you know great power

1376.88 -> relations

1378.32 -> um during the years up to 1945. there's

1381.14 -> been there was very little talk Of it

1383.059 -> once we got to Mad there also was talk

1385.28 -> before we got to Mad the Americans

1386.72 -> thought about it in the late 40s and 50s

1388.7 -> and the US and so it was thought about

1390.559 -> preventive war against China but this is

1392.72 -> a dog that doesn't bark in the Cold War

1394.28 -> I think it's because windows don't exist

1397.22 -> in in a Mad World anyway I'll stop with

1399.02 -> that so uh just to push this one

1402.14 -> increment further Bob wrote in the first

1405.38 -> book that if nuclear weapons have had

1408.02 -> the influence that the nuclear

1409.52 -> revolutionary Theory indicates they

1411.919 -> should have then there should be peace

1414.74 -> between the superpowers and crises will

1416.96 -> be rare and neither side will be eager

1419.48 -> to press bargaining advantages to the

1421.52 -> Limit and the status quo will be

1423.14 -> relatively easy to maintain and you know

1426.08 -> The Young Turks come and challenge most

1428 -> of these so are they are they completely

1431.559 -> uh wrong and Bob is completely writers

1434.72 -> there's some uh Middle Ground here where

1438.2 -> is nuclear theory today when we

1441.44 -> re-examine the logic of his of both his

1444.38 -> books we want to fight on that a little

1446.12 -> more okay so I would emphasize I mean I

1448.159 -> think Steve hit a very important point

1449.659 -> of what the challenge is which has to do

1451.4 -> with

1452.299 -> these claims about the political

1454.1 -> implications of nuclear weapons

1456.58 -> but a very important part of their

1458.72 -> critique actually is that mad is um that

1462.4 -> jervis's assumption as I think I said at

1464.84 -> the beginning it's like mad is real is

1466.22 -> unescapable largely unescapable and not

1469.46 -> delicate and so their argument is

1471.86 -> actually that the Cold War was much more

1475.1 -> um fragile

1478.039 -> um in the sense that the United States

1479.419 -> was much more capable against Soviet

1482.24 -> forces than we knew at the time

1485.24 -> um there are some Marines we're highly

1486.32 -> vulnerable it turned out for much of the

1487.88 -> Cold War

1489.2 -> um it sort of went in and out

1491.12 -> um their icbms like ricbms were becoming

1494.059 -> quite vulnerable by the end of the Cold

1495.26 -> War so unfortunately for the Soviet

1496.76 -> Union by the time there icbms were

1498.32 -> coming vulnerable there are some Marines

1500.36 -> were becoming less vulnerable so the

1502.46 -> argument is that we we stayed in mad but

1505.22 -> it was a much closer call

1507.2 -> and if you think it was a close call

1510.62 -> which means maybe we could have even

1512.419 -> done better

1514.539 -> then

1516.2 -> all of a sudden competition makes sense

1519.74 -> because you might be able to protect

1521.6 -> yourself

1522.679 -> and so all the arms racing that we did

1525.14 -> wasn't this futility that was explained

1528.32 -> by these sort of semi-week or very weak

1530.96 -> counter revealing strategy arguments but

1532.58 -> by sort of very basic arguments which is

1535.34 -> if you can protect yourself even

1537.4 -> partially but substantially then you can

1540.14 -> gain a bargaining advantage and plus if

1542.299 -> what happens you might be better off and

1544.22 -> so the argue part the argument then was

1546.919 -> that's the argument that a few people

1548.539 -> have made Austin long and Brenda Green

1550.82 -> in particular have laid it out Owen

1552.98 -> Hayes work at MIT is foundational on the

1555.32 -> vulnerabilia submarines but it turns out

1557.6 -> that the world we thought we lived in

1559.7 -> was not quite what we actually lived in

1561.62 -> and it wasn't we were making a mistake

1563.059 -> very interesting thing it was like

1564.919 -> according to the laws of physics Soviet

1566.779 -> the Soviet Union should have been able

1568.279 -> to make really quiet submarines but they

1570.98 -> didn't were not able to work at that

1572.659 -> they were not able to achieve that

1574.46 -> technological limit

1576.679 -> um and consequently the world that was

1578.36 -> supposed to emerge actually didn't quite

1580.52 -> emerge although we stayed in man

1583.82 -> then there's a second argument which I

1585.62 -> think is a very clever argument which

1586.88 -> Brendan green established says is you

1588.5 -> know to get bargaining leverage you

1590.659 -> don't even really have to escape man

1593.059 -> you just have to make the adversary

1594.799 -> believe that you might have escaped mad

1596.96 -> or even worse that you will have them

1600.2 -> believe that you believe it because if

1601.76 -> you believe it you will act accordingly

1603.32 -> and therefore you get that Leverage

1605.419 -> and so his argument is that um we

1608.179 -> actually got close enough that there he

1610.279 -> has a few quotes I'm not convinced but

1611.96 -> there are documents from from the Soviet

1615.26 -> files that say you know we think we in

1618.02 -> the worst case we might only have 12

1620.179 -> survivable weapons

1622.52 -> which is not the mad world it's still a

1624.74 -> world of tremendous potential damage but

1627.26 -> the outcomes start to look very

1628.82 -> different

1630.44 -> um so in that world basically the logic

1632.36 -> of the nuclear Revolution

1634.64 -> um is out the window

1636.14 -> because the logic of the nuclear

1637.46 -> evolution is that you're in bad you

1639.44 -> shouldn't compete you shouldn't Target

1640.64 -> forces

1642.08 -> but if you can gain an advantage by

1644.36 -> targeting forces

1646.46 -> um then maybe you should do it at least

1648.26 -> and all a whole bunch of complicated

1650.059 -> trade-offs are back on the table this is

1651.679 -> not my view by the way but that's okay

1653.6 -> then of course you have to look at then

1655.76 -> there are a couple really important

1657.08 -> technological questions which is can you

1659.179 -> compete your way out of Med can you get

1661.52 -> a significant damage limitation against

1662.96 -> the adversary

1664.34 -> and then if you can since we're talking

1666.2 -> about really mad being Loosely defined

1668.72 -> as sort of destroy the ability to

1670.039 -> destroy the adversary Society how good

1672.02 -> does it have to be like if you can just

1673.279 -> protect yourself a little bit is that

1674.72 -> going to give you a bargaining Advantage

1675.98 -> like how much leverage are you going to

1677.779 -> get

1678.44 -> unless you have a very high a very

1681.38 -> effective and high confidence damage

1683 -> limitation capability

1684.799 -> and then of course if you sort of said

1686.179 -> technologically we can do it and we can

1687.919 -> do it well enough to get an advantage

1689.48 -> you would still want to look at the

1691.34 -> risks because this then becomes a very

1693.38 -> competitive world it's a world in which

1695.659 -> there are incentives to use nuclear

1697.58 -> weapons quickly and mad or not

1699.14 -> incentives to use weapons quickly

1701.779 -> um there's all the negative political

1703.159 -> effects of arms races so these become

1705.38 -> the thing I would say is unlike mad has

1707.059 -> this incredibly tight internal logic it

1710.179 -> eliminates all these trade-offs there's

1711.74 -> not a lot of room

1713.24 -> for subjectivity once you're stuck in

1715.52 -> that world with the exception of saying

1717.26 -> what the other side really values is or

1718.76 -> forces which sort of as I said turns it

1720.98 -> all on its head

1722.6 -> um

1723.559 -> once you can sort of get a damage

1725.179 -> limitation capability the world is much

1727.58 -> more complex analytically much more

1728.96 -> complicated

1730.76 -> um so then this

1732.98 -> argument then has also been extended to

1734.84 -> the Future and the argument is that it

1737.419 -> was hard to get get a damage limitation

1740.12 -> capability during the Cold War but it's

1742.279 -> getting easier

1744.44 -> and so the arguments are now it is the

1746.779 -> case that both saw any fixed site

1748.46 -> anything we can find we can destroy all

1750.799 -> fixed silos are highly vulnerable

1753.38 -> um so so including ricbm leg

1756.559 -> um so what about the other legs and the

1758.059 -> arguments are well

1759.799 -> um in the Chinese case and the Russian

1761.299 -> case they have mobile missiles but now

1762.799 -> we can we haven't done it yet but we can

1765.08 -> deploy really large constellations of

1767.059 -> small radar satellites to contract

1769.22 -> mobile missiles and if we can track them

1771.44 -> we can destroy them not not Point wise

1774.44 -> but in a barrage kind of attack

1776.299 -> so then you have to analyze who's going

1778.399 -> to win this competition between radar

1780.86 -> satellites and mobile missiles it's not

1782.84 -> queer radar will win

1784.34 -> because then you're going to have decoys

1786.559 -> and hiding and spoofing of satellites

1789.32 -> and all sorts of things but it is a

1790.64 -> different technology and the world is

1793.279 -> quite different that way and then people

1794.419 -> have made claims much looser claims

1796.52 -> about submarines than they have about

1798.919 -> mobile missiles oh that you know that

1800.72 -> we're going to have the combination of

1802.039 -> AI and autonomous vehicles and Quantum

1805.52 -> sensing and a variety of things are

1807.14 -> going to make the oceans transparent

1809.299 -> I think that's definitely not happening

1810.86 -> but people have said these things

1813.38 -> um so if you believe that then maybe the

1815.779 -> nuclear evolution is something of the

1817.34 -> past basically we're going to have a

1818.6 -> world of competing partial

1820.46 -> vulnerabilities or something like that

1823.76 -> um

1824.6 -> so that's that that's the attack it's

1826.76 -> it's partly technological but it's

1828.32 -> partly theoretical

1830.419 -> um

1831.26 -> and I I think it's an open debate at

1834.14 -> this point although there are projects

1835.88 -> ongoing to sort of look at this

1837.26 -> competition between the relevant

1838.76 -> Technologies the the anti-submarine

1841.22 -> Warfare the anti-mobile missiles that

1842.96 -> counter come into control uh missile

1845.899 -> defense people are talking about major

1847.039 -> breakthroughs of missile defense they're

1848.6 -> not going to happen either by the way

1849.74 -> but people are talking about them

1851.779 -> um so I think we have to see where that

1854.419 -> shakes out I mean my own view which is

1856.159 -> still forming is that we're likely to

1858.559 -> stay in a world of mutual vulnerability

1860.84 -> against very capable adversaries

1863.419 -> but a very important warning or maybe

1866 -> opportunity from the United States is

1867.919 -> that we shouldn't and this is something

1869.539 -> my own analysis didn't do and and Jervis

1871.94 -> didn't do he took it as sort of a given

1873.86 -> most of the stuff he was not on the

1875.179 -> technical side but it's not clear we

1877.58 -> should assume that adversaries will

1879.559 -> actually work at the be able to operate

1882.26 -> forces as the engineering and physical

1884.059 -> limit of what's possible

1886.399 -> we've been close to that at least a lot

1888.679 -> of the time but the Soviet Union

1889.94 -> strikingly wasn't

1891.74 -> if China doesn't operate its missile its

1894.679 -> mobile missiles really effectively

1895.82 -> they'll be vulnerable

1897.2 -> I think they can win that competition

1899.12 -> but they have to be really good

1901.94 -> um you say oh of course they're going to

1903.26 -> get really good Ken walls would have

1904.399 -> said you know when the high when the

1905.419 -> stakes are this High States act really

1907.159 -> really effectively but what happened to

1909.2 -> the Soviet Union I mean they did really

1910.7 -> poorly it turns out

1912.799 -> um

1913.58 -> so there's another layer which goes

1916.1 -> beyond the military technical layer

1917.659 -> which goes to the societal capacity in

1919.46 -> this competition and I think you'd want

1921.38 -> to look there both you know how how hard

1922.94 -> it is the Chinese can't do certain

1924.44 -> things yet that we do

1926.12 -> on a regular basis so will they be able

1928.22 -> to do that will they matter

1930.38 -> um that's just on the technical point I

1931.76 -> think on the competitive side it's like

1933.38 -> a much safer world to accept Mutual

1935.96 -> vulnerability doesn't compete at the

1937.34 -> margins for small advantages

1939.38 -> somebody might say but what about large

1940.76 -> advantages well large advantages are

1942.44 -> harder to to give up they matter

1945.2 -> um

1946.22 -> so I think it's where it's an ongoing it

1947.96 -> hasn't been fully engaged it's an

1949.88 -> ongoing debate

1951.38 -> um and like I say it has these you know

1953.299 -> multiple layers in it

1955.34 -> um

1956.84 -> I think it's connected to the issues

1958.82 -> that Steve was Raising but it's also

1960.26 -> somewhat logically separable debate

1961.94 -> which is how much competition would you

1964.22 -> really expect in mid at that superpower

1966.44 -> level between major powers

1968.899 -> and let's say one last thing there which

1970.52 -> is I think Jarvis did overstate some

1972.559 -> because

1973.52 -> we were so focused in the cold war on

1976.22 -> the United States and the Soviet Union

1978.62 -> that many of the things he said I think

1980.24 -> he would qualify is somebody said well

1982.7 -> how about this other diet how about

1985.46 -> um you know because if you think about

1987.08 -> the US and the Soviet Union it was a

1988.58 -> large war in the central front with lots

1990.98 -> of tactical nuclear weapons so we're not

1992.779 -> small land grabs and so on and so forth

1995 -> and so that war was pretty easy to deter

1997.76 -> with a because it was going to be a huge

2000.039 -> War the stability instability Paradox

2002.559 -> wasn't nearly as severe escalation

2004.899 -> looked likely even when we were in Mad

2006.82 -> et cetera et cetera but I think if you

2008.799 -> look at other dyads including the U.S

2011.019 -> China dyad for example and the case of

2013.84 -> Taiwan for a variety of reasons he would

2016.24 -> have been less confident but I don't

2017.679 -> know but I'm guessing

2019.779 -> um partly you know mad has this

2022.059 -> incredible deterrent potential but it

2023.559 -> also depends upon how much actors want

2025.6 -> what they want

2027.76 -> um and

2029.799 -> um so we may be in different situations

2031.72 -> that way

2032.919 -> I do think that

2035.019 -> um China is going to make it much harder

2036.46 -> they're building a really large Force I

2038.08 -> think that their dervisian be you know

2040.659 -> the large Force they're building is

2042.22 -> because they want to ensure destruction

2043.84 -> capability they didn't have one

2045.88 -> China you know a couple of decades had a

2048.159 -> totally inadequate nuclear force given

2051.22 -> the threat the United States could pose

2054.159 -> now they're going to have a very

2055.24 -> effective one how's that going to you

2056.919 -> know influence their thinking about

2058.06 -> limited aggression in East Asia

2061 -> and of course Russia following the

2063.58 -> Soviet Union's lack of Advantage

2065.859 -> technological advantages with martial or

2068.8 -> garkov so well detailed to less Gelb in

2072.399 -> a fascinating interview on this question

2074.26 -> saying we're just never going to be able

2076.179 -> to get the Technologies at the same

2078.339 -> level as you have we see Russia under

2081.339 -> Putin trying to maintain its assured

2084.7 -> destruction capability through

2086.5 -> modernizing these forces struggling to

2089.32 -> to do that as opposed to get the

2091.359 -> advantages in the same way as we have uh

2094.659 -> Ethel did you want to jump on this

2095.859 -> because I was going to turn to you on

2097.06 -> the next question no because I see the

2099.099 -> we're almost an hour into the panel and

2101.32 -> I'm supposed to give another talk yes so

2104.02 -> let me turn to the next question uh

2106.48 -> which is a wide and more States seem to

2109.54 -> want nuclear weapons or at least a more

2112.54 -> viable nuclear hedging option when we

2116.02 -> haven't seen a lot of nuclear

2117.579 -> proliferation over the years less than

2120.94 -> many initially expected at the dawn of

2123.7 -> the nuclear age but now we see notably

2126.4 -> South Korea Saudi Arabia potentially

2129.82 -> Japan potentially Taiwan Iran how can

2133.96 -> one not mention Iran and maybe even

2136.56 -> Ukraine depending on how the war ends

2139.839 -> and the post-war settlement so etzel and

2143.02 -> Scott have both made very important

2144.94 -> contributions to theories about why

2147.579 -> states are more or less likely to pursue

2150.52 -> the bomb from strategic threats to

2153.28 -> domestic politics normative symbolic

2156.52 -> Frameworks and edtel I want to turn to

2158.92 -> you because you have this very

2160.78 -> interesting theory that distinguishes

2163.72 -> between internationalists and inward

2166.619 -> oriented Nationalist regimes and their

2169.359 -> different

2170.94 -> domestic political and economic

2173.32 -> incentives to go nuclear or not so

2175.96 -> what's your take on the current ERA

2178.599 -> drawing on the very rich evolving

2182.56 -> scholarship on this question

2185.079 -> thank you and I do want to thank Karen

2188.26 -> who's not here right now and Peter for

2190.54 -> the invitation I'm very uh honored to be

2194.079 -> here I wasn't a student of bug Jervis

2197.859 -> either but I did learn so much from him

2201.94 -> I met him for the first time at a

2203.8 -> certain agency in Washington DC

2206.28 -> uh when he invited me to give a talk on

2210.4 -> some of these issues I think before

2213.22 -> before the book I think in the context

2216.28 -> of this article I had published in

2218.5 -> International Security in 1994. I'm

2221.68 -> dating myself

2223 -> that has to do with the the question at

2225.46 -> hand

2226.38 -> so regarding the drivers of uh by the

2230.02 -> way I have to say we were given 11

2232.78 -> questions to address and so I addressed

2236.26 -> mostly three through eleven

2238.68 -> uh so and we're only on uh yeah two were

2242.619 -> done so in that 1994 article in is I

2247 -> argued that the theoretical repertoire

2249.82 -> in the field had omitted what I noticed

2253.839 -> was some sort of regularity and that in

2257.44 -> brief the Inception of the

2259.54 -> non-proliferation treaty uh altered the

2262.359 -> balance of costs and benefits material

2264.76 -> and reputational uh

2267.52 -> related to the adoption of nuclear

2269.859 -> weapons or the abstention from acquiring

2272.98 -> nuclear nuclear weapons and that since

2275.8 -> the npt and I want to make clear this is

2277.9 -> a world time that is different from the

2280.839 -> first nuclear age that they drive to

2283.06 -> acquire nuclear weapons was arguably

2285.66 -> more likely notice the language because

2288.16 -> this is this is I think what Bob might

2290.8 -> have favored in terms of how we cast our

2293.28 -> uh theories that it was arguably more

2296.859 -> likely to emerge in domestic and

2299.2 -> Regional contexts that are dominated by

2302.2 -> inward looking inward looking models

2304.42 -> from the point of view of an ipe kind of

2306.76 -> perspective then in regions dominated by

2310.359 -> internationalism once so that inward

2313.119 -> looking models were defined by rejection

2315.22 -> of the global economy

2317.22 -> as much of the Middle East for several

2320.44 -> decades North Korea Etc and that those

2323.44 -> models had greater incentives and

2326.44 -> encourage fewer costs domestic regional

2330.4 -> political economic and reputational

2332.32 -> again from exploiting nuclear weapons as

2335.8 -> tools of populist nationalist

2338.64 -> protectionist policies which is what

2341.14 -> they require to survive in power and

2343.54 -> that by contrast internationalizing

2345.72 -> models oriented primarily to economic

2349.119 -> growth

2350.74 -> for them International competitiveness

2352.9 -> and Global access made the adoption of

2355.96 -> nuclear weapons less likely and that

2359.38 -> were clear synergies for

2362.02 -> internationalizers across the domestic

2364.42 -> Regional and Global pillars of an

2367.96 -> internationalizing Grant strategy

2370.079 -> because acquiring nuclear weapons would

2373.599 -> have basically foiled foiled that grand

2377.8 -> strategy I want to say that these models

2380.26 -> I thought explained several things they

2383.38 -> explained why we observe competing

2386.2 -> nuclear preferences by different actors

2388.599 -> within the same country

2390.46 -> why nuclear policies vary over time in

2394.48 -> the same country in tandem with shifting

2397.96 -> ipe models why different states vary in

2401.98 -> compliance with internationalizing npt

2404.2 -> commitments why some regimes

2407.56 -> find it convenient to spin external

2411.64 -> threats as intractable whereas others

2414.88 -> spin the same threats as tolerable

2418 -> why some states rank alliances higher

2420.7 -> than self-reliance or vice versa and why

2424.54 -> and when external coercion and

2426.839 -> inducements may be effective

2429.64 -> and finally why nuclear Ambitions

2431.859 -> surfaced where security hardly Justified

2435.52 -> them southern colony and why such

2438.94 -> Ambitions were renounced where one might

2442.119 -> have expected them Jordan or other

2444.46 -> countries so I believe there is

2446.68 -> extensive support for these regularities

2450.28 -> um I'm gonna skip because of the time

2453.04 -> but I do want to go back to a bob story

2455.38 -> because now we were told nope nobody not

2459.16 -> this panel is about Theory and so on but

2461.02 -> I do want to it in some ways it ties

2463.3 -> with that I'm skipping a lot and I'm

2465.28 -> happy to talk about the cases

2467.52 -> if you want Japan Iran whatever later if

2471.7 -> this time but I do want to say something

2474.76 -> about

2476.14 -> um

2477.52 -> Bob in the context of this argument

2480.64 -> because this is not an argument that uh

2483.82 -> Bob necessarily would have

2486.76 -> um so let me let me just say that

2489.94 -> uh a subsequent book that I uh published

2493.96 -> nuclear Logics had an endorsement from

2497.02 -> Bob Jervis I didn't I didn't request it

2499.3 -> and I was frankly surprised I wasn't

2502.48 -> necessarily doing you know cognitive

2504.82 -> bias and the theories that

2507.48 -> that were typically uh

2511.42 -> that that Bob typically concerned with I

2514.9 -> was concerned with nonetheless he said

2517.54 -> and I quote the book not only provides a

2521.26 -> cogent account of the Divergent nuclear

2524.5 -> trajectories of East Asia and the Middle

2526.66 -> East and I'm quoting but develops a

2529.54 -> powerful General explanation resting on

2532 -> whether the state's ruling Coalition is

2534.04 -> inward looking or is geared to

2535.66 -> integrating in the world

2537.16 -> with the rest of the world both in its

2540.64 -> challenge to standard views and in its

2543.16 -> strong positive argument

2545.52 -> arguments this is a study of Great Value

2547.839 -> and then he signed but I mentioned this

2550.2 -> because it says more about Bob than it

2553.66 -> does say about my book

2555.22 -> uh it speak to his intellectual

2558.28 -> generosity but also to his openness to

2561.76 -> other modes of explaining other findings

2565.079 -> other theories that not don't

2567.94 -> necessarily align with where he was

2570.099 -> toiling

2571.3 -> these are sort of the traits that I

2574 -> believe make a genuine social scientist

2576.76 -> and indeed the trades that account

2579.48 -> for uh improved predictions according to

2583.48 -> Phil tetlock and nope they're not all

2586.78 -> come Occam's razor they actually uh the

2590.56 -> kinds of theories that Bob was

2592.42 -> developing led to much better

2594.46 -> predictions uh in my view they they

2597.16 -> entail cognitive agility

2600.119 -> they entail detecting inherent

2602.859 -> contradictions uh especially with

2606.3 -> unfalsifiable theories that he was very

2608.619 -> keen on

2610.44 -> discussing in a certain publication and

2615.7 -> uh his call for assessing

2618.42 -> counterfactuals for minimizing

2620.5 -> spuriousness and endogeneity probing

2623.5 -> deeper into claims and counter claims

2625.8 -> that's Bob's Legacy I also learned a lot

2628.72 -> from you uh uh

2631.02 -> indirectly on that one but most

2633.94 -> importantly acknowledging that multiple

2637.2 -> sufficient causation okay is not only

2641.44 -> possible but frequent in the social

2643.78 -> world

2644.94 -> uh competing variables can do the job

2647.859 -> okay and indeed multiple sufficient

2651.64 -> causation is common not just in the

2654.22 -> social sciences it's you know in the

2657.339 -> Natural Sciences you have you know well

2658.839 -> this Cog will make a difference if you

2661.9 -> know this set of proteins are activated

2665.02 -> at the same time but not this they're

2667.599 -> very complex uh and so uh Bob and Jack

2671.8 -> Snyder who's at the other conference I'm

2673.66 -> supposed to leave in a minute uh they

2676.24 -> are right they are right imputing

2679.119 -> causation is hard because we are in the

2682.839 -> domain of complex systems

2685.06 -> and so the social world is even more

2687.4 -> complex than

2690.099 -> uh you know than the social sciences

2692.5 -> then the Natural Sciences and I'm going

2694.839 -> to stop there I have a lot more to say

2696.94 -> about this but so before we turn to

2699.28 -> Scott on nuclear proliferation let's

2701.319 -> just develop your one or two of your

2703.9 -> cases a little bit more we actually have

2705.819 -> more time and they're not doing anything

2707.98 -> important over there without you so be

2710.92 -> reassured

2712.359 -> um it's very interesting reading your

2715.42 -> work to note how China and Russia became

2720.16 -> more globalized economies but still uh

2723.819 -> personality pursued nuclear weapons but

2725.68 -> China is now modernizing and expanding

2728.5 -> its force in a different direction and

2730.72 -> then when we look at South Korea it

2732.64 -> really does pose an interesting puzzle

2735.099 -> this is not Iran this is a country that

2737.319 -> has clearly pursued the more

2739.44 -> internationalists so so what's the

2742.599 -> additional variables we need uh here and

2746.98 -> and either any of the cases that you uh

2749.74 -> want to talk about I think it's worth

2751.3 -> developing this a bit more well thank

2753.819 -> you for that follow-up and I I actually

2755.8 -> will

2757.18 -> um

2758.26 -> go back to the theoretical dimension of

2761.2 -> this and this is here this is exactly a

2764.26 -> place where Bob's um

2768.24 -> conceptualization of things in

2770.2 -> particular uh prospect theory did enter

2772.78 -> my uh my work

2775.42 -> so

2776.74 -> um first of all in the cases that you

2778.72 -> posted uh

2780.7 -> China and so on I've been very

2782.98 -> consistent in depicting incentives and

2786.579 -> disincentives

2788.079 -> to acquire nuclear weapons or renounce

2790.48 -> them in the second nuclear age after the

2793.18 -> npt and the reason being that the npt

2796.38 -> faced different International

2798.64 -> constraints and opportunities so it's a

2800.859 -> different world time in my um

2803.5 -> in my theory the the

2805.2 -> internationalization of the global

2806.859 -> economy Etc it was a different world

2808.42 -> time than in the middle of the early

2811.119 -> Cold War so Russia and China

2814.9 -> developed their nuclear weapons

2817.96 -> in the in the period of maoist stalinist

2822.04 -> in vintage quintessential inward looking

2825.099 -> couldn't get more than that maybe maybe

2826.96 -> we can I don't know

2829.319 -> yeah yeah and North Korea exactly

2832.54 -> so uh so neither one was in the business

2835.72 -> of engaging in globalized trade at the

2838.9 -> time uh uh and when they were acquiring

2842.38 -> nuclear weapons after Mal and under the

2845.74 -> shopping and the the others we have the

2848.68 -> shift to Global markets but let's not

2851.56 -> exaggerate China retained mercantilism

2854.56 -> controls of everything till today

2857.04 -> non-convertible non-convertible currency

2859.48 -> lack of compliance with them we can go

2861.7 -> on and on just on the China tangle but

2864.52 -> even if this trend is if Tom says yes

2868.359 -> I'm I'm good

2870.94 -> um even if this Trends were a global

2874.599 -> openness uh

2876.4 -> is is true after density of being it's

2880.359 -> not the same here I come to Bob it's not

2882.52 -> the same

2883.859 -> the incentives are not the same when

2886.3 -> you're about to acquire nuclear weapons

2888.04 -> then the incentives of renouncing them

2890.68 -> once you have them this is prospect

2892.9 -> theory at work here's what I'm uh what

2895.9 -> I'm aiming at backing down from even

2900.16 -> implicit commitments to acquire for no

2902.8 -> full nuclear capabilities may be much

2905.2 -> easier for leaders and it has happened

2907 -> in many of the cases that uh that we're

2909.7 -> talking about including South Korea for

2912.099 -> leaders in countries that have not yet

2914.2 -> achieved weaponization Right audience

2917.079 -> costs in those cases are of course

2919 -> assumed to be lower and so and so forth

2920.92 -> uh when a program is uh in the making

2925.72 -> but less than realized right and no

2929.02 -> nuclear weapons uh have been acquired

2931.359 -> but Bob's contributions here are very

2934.24 -> important because prospect theory

2936.16 -> introduces this sort of scope condition

2938.92 -> for my argument

2940.599 -> that leaders and publics value more what

2944.38 -> they already have the endowment effect

2946.599 -> than what they might or might not gain

2949.119 -> in an uncertain future and so they're

2951.76 -> more averse to losing what they already

2954.099 -> regard what they already said possess

2956.859 -> for uh potential future gains so

2959.98 -> eliminating existing nuclear weapons is

2962.38 -> expected to be much costlier politically

2964.92 -> than reversing them before you might

2967.48 -> just imagine and then reversing them

2969.339 -> before they come to fruition right China

2971.38 -> you know giving giving up or anybody

2973.839 -> else giving up nuclear weapons it

2975.579 -> happened with Ukraine we know what

2977.2 -> happened

2978.04 -> so temporary temporality and sequence

2981.3 -> matter and Bob of course was

2985.42 -> very keen on pointing that out now uh is

2989.319 -> there a particular case he wanted me to

2991.06 -> come in South Korea whichever one is

2993.52 -> then we'll

2994.839 -> yeah

2996.04 -> um you know in general terms I would say

3000 -> per uh the the my initial comments uh

3005.88 -> these waves of not these waves of

3009.66 -> um diffusion of nuclear weapons have

3012.3 -> been predicted

3013.74 -> for decades especially in the

3016.92 -> neo-realist world

3018.9 -> when we were like five decades into this

3021.66 -> sort of nptira and it hasn't happened

3024.66 -> and we can quarrel about you know why it

3028.319 -> has not now we're you're postulating in

3030.78 -> your question that this is it right I

3033.54 -> don't know uh whether that's the case

3035.94 -> but I do want to duel on a case for

3038.4 -> instance like Japan

3039.9 -> so East Asia is now the center of

3042.18 -> gravity of the global economy okay if

3044.76 -> you're expecting anything I mean this is

3047.339 -> where things are happening right now uh

3050.28 -> it also happens to be the place where

3053.76 -> the

3055.559 -> um

3056.339 -> Central actors you know the Japan's and

3058.559 -> south koreas of the world are have the

3061.5 -> best capabilities to do it if they want

3065.16 -> it to

3066.059 -> but they haven't I mean look at Japan

3067.92 -> for five decades

3070.079 -> prime ministers in Japan have not been

3072.48 -> let's say at the left political Spectrum

3075.359 -> they've been the most right-wing if that

3078.54 -> was supposed to happen

3080.099 -> it should have happened already because

3082.319 -> Japan faced not one

3084.9 -> not to

3086.339 -> but three rabid inward looking regimes

3090.18 -> in North Korea it hasn't done it uh yet

3093.8 -> uh so South Korea in somewhat of the

3097.559 -> same predicament I do realize that there

3099.599 -> is this sort of uh not new phenomenon of

3102.9 -> domestic public opinion in South Korea

3105.599 -> for nuclear weapons but that is actually

3108.66 -> also not no it may it may have reached a

3111.48 -> peak now but it's it's not a new

3113.88 -> phenomenon and it hasn't happened now

3115.559 -> where we're headed I don't know because

3118.079 -> predictions are one of these areas where

3120.24 -> Bob taught us be careful

3123.74 -> and I do have let me let me actually

3126.24 -> just say one more point about this you

3128.04 -> know predictions

3129.18 -> uh

3130.8 -> and this is where you know the Nokia

3132.54 -> Revolution the way he has the nuclear

3134.76 -> Revolution is so powerful because he

3136.5 -> said if my theory is Right ABC and you

3139.5 -> recited them will happen this is more

3141.9 -> than we get frequently in in social

3144.359 -> science today okay you need to be you

3146.339 -> need to be very clear if you're so what

3149.4 -> I did this in a book by Bill Potter on

3152.16 -> uh forecasting nuclear proliferation I

3154.38 -> don't really like forecasting but I'm

3156.059 -> pushed to do it sometimes so I so I I

3159.9 -> did this two by two Matrix uh basically

3162.66 -> with my argument and I said

3164.76 -> if these two cells if the outcome is in

3168.839 -> these two cells my theory will be wrong

3171.319 -> and if these two cells then my theory

3174.48 -> will be right and this is the kind of

3176.16 -> thing that I did learn from putting your

3180.02 -> mouth where you're not putting your

3184.8 -> putting your money I forget the money

3186.839 -> where your mouth is that Bob that Bob

3189.72 -> has done for us and that we should teach

3192.059 -> more of our students to do rather than

3194.339 -> falsifiable predictions uh for instance

3197.52 -> about the nuclearization of the cases

3199.319 -> that you've mentioned that for five

3202.079 -> decades have not happened

3205.079 -> do you want to jump in on this I do I do

3206.76 -> want to jump in I'm more pessimistic and

3208.26 -> I'm willing to make predictions I think

3209.88 -> we're in a really dangerous world right

3212.22 -> now

3213 -> in part because personalist dictators

3215.28 -> are getting nuclear weapons and have

3218.4 -> interest in getting nuclear weapons

3220.859 -> um personalist dictators are less

3222.72 -> constrained by International trees that

3225.42 -> they've signed

3226.68 -> in part because they have fewer audience

3228.599 -> costs in part because they think they

3230.04 -> can't or won't get caught

3232.74 -> versus dictators surround themselves

3235.079 -> with the Yes Men

3236.46 -> who give them bad information or tell

3238.559 -> them what they think the person wants to

3240.48 -> know think about Saddam Hussein the

3242.819 -> decisions he made

3246.359 -> I think we were in an extraordinarily

3248.94 -> dangerous situation in 2017-2018 between

3252.359 -> the United States and North Korea

3254.76 -> think about

3256.44 -> the incident you recall in January 2018

3260.599 -> in which a radar system in emergency

3265.319 -> system in in Hawaii announced everyone

3268.44 -> got the note on the cell phone that

3269.94 -> there's an incoming missile take shelter

3273.599 -> uh some people in Hawaii panicked some

3276.42 -> went outside to look which is not what

3278.04 -> you're supposed to do

3279.9 -> um but nobody in Omaha with strategic

3282.54 -> command or the NORAD headquarters in

3284.52 -> Colorado Springs or in Washington

3285.78 -> panicked wide for three reasons

3289.079 -> we had redundant

3290.819 -> centers on which said no there's no

3292.68 -> attack coming second we had professional

3295.68 -> people

3296.88 -> within minutes

3298.859 -> they start saying no there's a mistake

3301.14 -> and even started putting stuff out on

3302.94 -> social media themselves

3304.619 -> saying people don't panic we're here

3307.859 -> and third

3310.26 -> we didn't think that North Korea was

3311.64 -> about to launch a war by launching a

3313.859 -> single missile against Hawaii

3315.78 -> imagine now that that incident occurred

3318.78 -> not

3319.859 -> in Hawaii but in North Korea

3324.119 -> all three of those mitigating factors

3327 -> wouldn't exist

3328.68 -> they don't have redundant Warning

3331.02 -> Systems just have just one or two really

3333.18 -> old

3334.14 -> uh Radars uh

3337.5 -> in North Korea you don't get fired if

3340.8 -> you make a mistake like that you get

3343.859 -> killed so you're less likely to say Yes

3345.9 -> we made a mistake and report it and

3348.839 -> third

3349.8 -> Kim Jong-un did think that an American

3352.38 -> attack was likely why because Donald

3354.66 -> Trump kept saying in an American attack

3357.18 -> like if you don't stop you're testing

3359.579 -> you know you'll have fire Fury right

3361.8 -> down on you

3363 -> so

3364.859 -> the things that Jervis and others talk

3367.26 -> about about stabilizing forces

3369.839 -> people will say you have to have a

3371.64 -> rational leader

3373.559 -> well you could have a rational leader

3375.72 -> who has very bad information

3378.78 -> think about Vladimir Putin who's the

3380.4 -> elephant in the room today that we're

3381.66 -> not talking about yet but I hope we will

3383.52 -> soon

3386.099 -> and if you don't have a rational leader

3387.839 -> you need to have checks and balances

3390.24 -> that's why the very important piece that

3392.28 -> dick Betts and Matt Waxman wrote about

3394.2 -> getting the Attorney General into the

3395.88 -> chain of command or at least having Jag

3397.68 -> lawyers uh president at all points uh is

3401.4 -> so important even in the United States

3404.339 -> if you don't have a rational actor at

3405.9 -> the top you need to have checks and

3406.98 -> balances down below

3408.66 -> and I think I'll conclude there with

3410.579 -> just one comment to get us into Putin

3412.98 -> okay so two questions that will get us

3415.98 -> both of which will get us into Putin and

3418.14 -> then uh we'll we'll

3420.26 -> see if there's time for a third before

3422.579 -> we open it up to the audience so you

3424.92 -> can't have a panel uh at a conference on

3427.38 -> Bob about Bob Jervis commemorating Bob

3430.26 -> jervis's work without talking about

3432.2 -> misperception and psychological

3434.7 -> dysfunction you were sort of leading us

3436.859 -> there and and I want to take us there

3438.72 -> forcefully so one important question for

3442.26 -> us is what are the main potential

3444.9 -> misperceptions in any nuclear weapons uh

3448.26 -> in any nuclear weapon States leadership

3450.18 -> that we should fear as triggers of

3453.119 -> inadvertent or miscalculated decisions

3456.3 -> for major war between nuclear powers in

3459.18 -> the coming years thinking about Putin in

3461.94 -> Russia North Korea and XI and China as

3464.819 -> well so theorists this is interesting

3467.819 -> building on Bob's work and many of whom

3471 -> are his disciples have been also

3473.339 -> focusing on nuclear leaders emotions and

3477.599 -> constructions of reality

3479.579 -> which raises the question should we be

3482.04 -> studying and profiling uh the

3485.4 -> personalist autocratic leaders and

3487.319 -> others uh you know in this country as

3490.079 -> well their comparative belief systems

3492.3 -> their emotional types uh um those who

3496.319 -> threaten fire and fury who may be

3499.26 -> motivated uh not by strategic uh

3502.8 -> incentives but perhaps by emotions or

3506.16 -> misplaced feelings of Revenge or perhaps

3510.44 -> perceptions of imminent loss and going

3514.74 -> down that route you know who Among Us

3517.38 -> hasn't been thinking about as Scott has

3520.68 -> said a Kim Jong-un or a Vladimir Putin

3524.54 -> rashly ordering a nuclear launch with a

3528 -> haughty take this America right so how

3531.18 -> much is this a concern of ours

3535.099 -> bridging two parts of Bob's work the new

3539.52 -> clear Theory Revolution work and the

3542.64 -> work on misperception and psychological

3545.64 -> bias kind of point us in different

3547.619 -> directions

3549.079 -> you want to bite again at that or let's

3551.76 -> let me start with Charlie and then we'll

3553.5 -> we'll go down the line

3556.619 -> if I take a slightly different angle on

3558.059 -> it I have the concern that um

3560.28 -> I mean are there are these dangers that

3562.079 -> you suggest from misperception or

3563.52 -> Revenge but we need to keep in mind that

3565.26 -> there could also be rational uses of

3566.88 -> nuclear weapons

3568.26 -> and they'd be very dangerous but very

3570.839 -> dangerous isn't necessarily irrational

3572.819 -> at the beginning of the I think it's the

3574.44 -> beginning of many many of the nuclear

3576.24 -> Revolution service says there's no fully

3578.099 -> rational or no real rational nuclear

3580.14 -> strategy

3581.4 -> but then of course all these game

3582.599 -> theorists have shown that what shelling

3583.98 -> and trevoris were doing it is actually

3585.42 -> rational you know in large part rational

3587.099 -> Theory I think what Jervis meant was

3589.38 -> there's no

3591.66 -> um use of nuclear weapons it's not

3593.22 -> extremely risky

3594.78 -> but some uses could be extremely risky

3597.54 -> and rational so if Putin does so it

3600.54 -> anticipates what he understands as

3602.76 -> really large losses

3605.16 -> um he could rationally

3607.319 -> um use limited nuclear weapons to try

3609.24 -> and

3610.079 -> um push convince

3612.42 -> um bargain the the West to stop

3614.16 -> supporting Russia I wouldn't consider

3615.599 -> that to be irrational actually I would

3617.88 -> consider it's very risky

3619.92 -> um but for him the law says potential

3622.02 -> losses if you're thinking about Crimea

3624.299 -> or maybe even losing ground that he that

3627.54 -> Russia acquired or at least was fighting

3630.059 -> for after 2014 those are to him are big

3632.94 -> losses I don't think of it in terms of

3634.26 -> prospect theory I just think of in terms

3635.64 -> of that's what he values and he those

3638.52 -> would be huge losses so I'm a I think we

3640.68 -> need to be at least as attuned to the

3642.839 -> rational limited use

3646.02 -> um and there we have some control we

3648.24 -> don't want to on the one hand we want to

3651.059 -> um

3652.44 -> not allow or make it look uh Russia has

3655.619 -> been successful but on the other hand it

3657.299 -> is a world of nuclear weapons and they

3658.68 -> actually put constraints on us or should

3660.299 -> put constraints on the west so I know

3662.4 -> it's it's least in certain circles it's

3664.079 -> you know very unpopular to say we

3665.579 -> shouldn't fully support Ukrainian

3667.619 -> Victory which would mean you know

3669.119 -> returning to free 2014 borders but

3673.079 -> um that creates rational uses for Putin

3676.02 -> and we have to think about from U.S

3678.48 -> policy perspective whether we you know

3680.94 -> are willing to run that risk but I

3682.44 -> wouldn't cast it in terms of

3683.52 -> misperception

3684.96 -> okay so that was the second question and

3687.299 -> the rest of you can bite either way on

3689.28 -> the one hand we have problems of

3691.5 -> misperception emotion psychological uh

3694.74 -> biases on the other hand we have

3697.38 -> the likelihood that if nuclear weapons

3699.48 -> would be used it wouldn't be like in the

3701.819 -> in the Cold War massive use of limit of

3704.819 -> nuclear weapons but more limited use of

3707.46 -> nuclear weapons for coercive purposes

3710.22 -> either to end a war that you're losing

3712.92 -> uh or in making nuclear threats as Putin

3716.76 -> is doing that's exactly these are this

3718.92 -> is the trade-off and

3720.799 -> you emphasize more the rational uses as

3723.96 -> would many do any of you want to focus

3725.88 -> on the on the psychological Dimensions

3728.339 -> or do you want to stick with the sort of

3730.44 -> stability instability Paradox of

3734.099 -> um coercive use of nuclear weapons I

3736.26 -> think what Putin's doing is making

3738.68 -> repeatedly making threats in order to

3741.9 -> try to deter the west from aiding

3744.9 -> Ukraine that's was made on the very

3746.819 -> first it's a different kind of

3748.14 -> deterrence that this could escalate and

3751.079 -> therefore you don't want to uh help

3753.66 -> Ukraine don't want to get involved and

3755.52 -> it's worked in terms of not having

3756.66 -> direct involvement but it hasn't worked

3758.76 -> at all in terms of not getting in uh

3761.579 -> supporting Ukraine militarily

3764.52 -> um

3766.14 -> he after annexing uh parts of Ukrainian

3771.119 -> territory announced that that that's now

3773.339 -> part of

3775.2 -> um

3776.22 -> of Russia and that under Russian

3778.98 -> Doctrine if the sovereignty is

3780.66 -> threatened he might use nuclear weapons

3782.22 -> and they said something very important

3784.26 -> which is

3785.7 -> the United States used nuclear weapons

3787.68 -> in 1945 to end a war so there's a

3791.28 -> precedent for doing that

3793.619 -> now I don't know what

3797.4 -> Bill Burns

3800.16 -> the CIA said privately to his

3803.28 -> counterparts or what Lloyd Dawson said

3805.559 -> to Mr defense or what Tony blinken said

3810 -> to

3813.72 -> but

3816.18 -> I hope that what they said was something

3819.059 -> like the following I said yeah we did

3820.74 -> use the nuclear weapons in 1945 Japan

3822.9 -> could not strike us back

3825.66 -> we can

3827.94 -> strike you back and Ukraine can strike

3830.22 -> you back and we will ensure that Ukraine

3832.559 -> has that capability

3834.9 -> I wouldn't add anything more to that

3836.339 -> because we don't want to get committed

3837.859 -> but the way we've been thinking about

3840.24 -> this to me is is almost

3842.54 -> self-congratulatory like we've already

3844.26 -> deterred Putin

3845.94 -> from using nuclear weapons I think he's

3848.7 -> been waiting and what we know about

3851.4 -> leaders

3852.78 -> in crises

3854.94 -> what we know about leaders who sometimes

3857.16 -> try to gamble for Resurrection suggest

3860.16 -> when you're losing you might take very

3862.02 -> rash decisions

3863.76 -> so the last thing we can do to help

3866.579 -> deter that

3868.02 -> is to be telling the Russian military

3871.14 -> that the use of nuclear weapons against

3873.599 -> the Ukrainian City would be a war crime

3878.04 -> and we have a really long history

3880.68 -> of tracking down war criminals

3883.98 -> and we therefore

3888.299 -> we should try to influence people below

3890.94 -> Putin

3892.44 -> to think that if he gives such a rash

3895.14 -> order

3896.339 -> that be even more disastrous than the

3898.38 -> order he gave to invade Ukraine

3901.02 -> that they should not follow those orders

3904.74 -> and I think that's a thin Reed to have a

3907.68 -> lot of Hope on but it's still better

3910.92 -> than no read at all

3913.319 -> so both edtel and Steve I think want to

3915.96 -> jump in on this

3917.4 -> well I'll comment just to bring things

3919.7 -> uh nuke the nuclear Revolution to bear

3922.2 -> on the Ukraine and Russia uh situation

3925.94 -> uh I'm very worried about escalation I'm

3930 -> very fearful that there will be nuclear

3931.619 -> use unless this war is brought to an end

3933.119 -> for a number of reasons

3935.579 -> um one of them is that this is the first

3937.319 -> time the U.S has gotten itself into a a

3941.64 -> a conflict with another Power a nuclear

3945.059 -> power that will that that maybe does or

3948.96 -> believes it cares more about the stakes

3951.18 -> at issue than um the U.S does one of the

3954.54 -> sort of rules of nuclear State crafts in

3956.22 -> my view is don't get into a a

3958.619 -> face-to-face confrontation on issues

3961.26 -> where the other side cares as much as

3963.119 -> you do or cares more because the

3965.16 -> conflict will in the end uh assuming

3967.68 -> you're dealing with fairly uh

3970.28 -> well calculating chess players will be

3973.68 -> decided by the balance of resolve and

3976.02 -> the the way that the confrontation will

3978.359 -> play out is each side will take the

3979.74 -> measure of the other's willingness to

3981.299 -> run risks and to take losses and um and

3985.92 -> in the end uh the the player that cares

3989.16 -> more and if they realize they care more

3990.96 -> is gonna they're gonna put wmd on the

3993.18 -> table and they're if if they feel

3995.46 -> there's a something threatened that's of

3998.28 -> uh shall we say existential importance

4000.5 -> and all the report is that the Russians

4004.64 -> do think that the stakes in Ukraine are

4006.38 -> existential and for sure there if if

4008.78 -> they think that way they are they think

4011.359 -> the stakes are bigger than the Americans

4012.799 -> do which may lead to a uh kind of logic

4015.799 -> train that says well fine uh if we uh

4019.7 -> really start rocking the boat as Tom

4021.14 -> shelling would say the Americans will

4022.819 -> back off before we do

4024.92 -> um because they have much less at stake

4028.7 -> um and we've never been in a situation

4030.859 -> like this before and I always counsel

4032.48 -> like I tell the Israelis uh you need to

4034.819 -> think about your future boundaries in

4037.039 -> terms of avoiding uh nuclear

4039.2 -> confrontation with other people who care

4040.88 -> more about uh land you've taken than you

4043.7 -> do how dangerous would be for example to

4046.099 -> uh change the status quo in religious

4048.14 -> places and um and to occupy lots of

4050.78 -> territory you want to you want to you

4052.819 -> want a country that's that's

4055 -> got boundaries that you care about more

4057.319 -> than the other guys do so I'm worried

4059.72 -> about uh you know losing a contest of

4063.26 -> resolve in a situation now are the

4065.119 -> Russians correct to think the way they

4066.5 -> do I think they're wrong I think the

4068.359 -> security Stakes for Russia and Ukraine

4070.039 -> aren't small and uh uh there are voices

4074.119 -> in the Russia who who say so I don't

4076.339 -> believe that um uh having NATO on their

4079.099 -> borders would actually pose more than a

4080.72 -> really nuisance threat in terms of can

4082.339 -> they defend themselves uh but that's not

4085.22 -> how they think in fact that's not how

4086.66 -> countries think countries tend to vastly

4088.94 -> exaggerate the importance of places that

4091.4 -> are nearby the United States and we've

4093.98 -> had a long history of going completely

4095.42 -> bananas when any uh

4098.259 -> unfriendly power or Alive technical

4100.58 -> political science terms correct bananas

4103.699 -> um yes technical term ape is

4106.1 -> another one that's it a technical term

4109.759 -> um all right so go ahead that's all jump

4112.4 -> in so on this same point I don't want to

4114.259 -> be accused of being an optimist I'm not

4116.48 -> I'm not as concept I'm con as concerned

4119.779 -> about all this as everybody else but let

4122 -> me just use this so also to bring in

4125.96 -> some of some of Bob's sort of warnings

4128.359 -> about this but the games that uh that

4133.04 -> are played in our

4134.9 -> um sort of cognition

4136.64 -> as theories

4138.319 -> so this domain of uh escalation and so

4141.739 -> on shows quite clearly that it's hard to

4145.1 -> get perceptions right

4146.9 -> it's it's also the case that perceptions

4149.239 -> are dynamic

4150.679 -> in us and the other ones in the way we

4153.319 -> interpreted the others so uh We've

4155.719 -> witnessed in the course of this Ukraine

4157.88 -> war competing and evolving perceptions

4160.819 -> of what constitutes escalation

4163.779 -> uh uh and and this shifting thresholds

4168.259 -> so first

4170 -> uh Putin's first threats

4173.839 -> implicit threats popped up when NATO had

4177.38 -> was applying the the most

4181.279 -> um

4182.02 -> uh simple uh low-grade defensive weapons

4185.66 -> to Ukraine they then continued with uh

4189.679 -> the interaction of progressively more

4191.62 -> sophisticated weapons then the

4194.179 -> perception was okay uh the EU promotion

4197 -> of the Ukraine would do it you know an

4199.82 -> accession you know that's the threshold

4201.86 -> then it shifted to Sweden and Finland

4204.32 -> joining NATO that will do it then

4207.56 -> Ukraine you know was saying uh so let's

4210.44 -> give a saying to recapture the donbass

4212.66 -> uh that would Russia would consider

4214.94 -> that's Russia considers that that's

4217.28 -> their own territory that will do it

4219.86 -> uh then the Ukrainian declarations that

4222.199 -> even Crimea is not out of bounds that

4225.26 -> was another threshold

4227.719 -> and throughout all this Putin's red line

4231.5 -> was on

4232.76 -> and not just putting some of the

4234.86 -> theories

4235.88 -> amongst us was how much defeat can

4240.02 -> Russia can Putin accept this was a light

4243.5 -> Motif throughout of those warning

4246.32 -> against escalation and of course you

4249.02 -> know we should be very sensitive to the

4251.36 -> warning of uh to the threat of

4254.06 -> escalation and I think the

4255.32 -> Administration has been and has

4258.56 -> demonstrated caution and thoughtfulness

4261.44 -> but from the point of view of pundits

4264.5 -> and theories it looks like some of us

4267.32 -> need to go back to Bob's work because

4269.36 -> the three the shifting thresholds

4272.12 -> I decided

4274.94 -> um are more strongly wielded by those

4277.46 -> who opposed NATO's any NATO role

4281.239 -> whatsoever in the Ukraine

4283.58 -> uh and uh and they and they implicitly

4287.3 -> or explicitly Justified uh Putin's

4290.96 -> Invasion as if it was our old NATO's

4293.12 -> fault so this is vintage cognitive bias

4296.719 -> that Bob warns warned us against

4299.44 -> confirmation bias you know accommodating

4302.36 -> new information to pre-existing beliefs

4304.76 -> so let's just be conscious about it I'm

4308.36 -> not saying they got it wrong or right

4310.34 -> let's just be conscious of our priors

4314.44 -> next the bottom line of course we're all

4317.06 -> guessing what puts pressure of Tolerance

4320.06 -> is but uh Bob gave us again this warning

4324.02 -> against

4325.46 -> um or about assessing uh risk right uh

4330.38 -> and yet there are many times when we

4332.54 -> don't have the luxury

4334.76 -> we don't have the luxury of doing

4337.34 -> nothing in the face of aggression

4339.82 -> simply because we cannot estimate risk

4343.46 -> is not a reason for doing nothing so

4346.219 -> doing nothing is sometimes equivalent to

4348.88 -> raising the risk

4351.32 -> uh of catastrophe this is the lesson of

4355.52 -> 2014

4357.08 -> when we did nothing

4358.82 -> practically speaking and it was Putin's

4362.84 -> perception of that inaction that may

4366.199 -> well have led I say may well because I

4368.6 -> don't want to be as deterministic as as

4370.94 -> Bob said we shouldn't uh but is that

4374 -> perception of inaction that could have

4375.8 -> well led to 2022.

4378.44 -> I I want to say one more thing about

4380.42 -> this escalation uh I have little little

4383.54 -> doubt that one main driver so I spent

4387.08 -> uh for my sins

4389.9 -> um I was invited to Berlin for the first

4393.199 -> half of 2022 and I spent the war the

4396.32 -> outbreak of the war and so on uh in

4399.38 -> Berlin and I can tell you it was very

4401.6 -> palpable in all of these sort of

4404.239 -> uh context and private context how how

4409.4 -> much fear there was

4411.8 -> in the upper echelons of Berlin's

4415.76 -> society and politics about a nuclear and

4420.199 -> nuclear response by Putin so I've little

4422.9 -> doubt that another main driver of this

4425.42 -> fear of escalation is Germany's Schultz

4429.5 -> uh Schultz with his Titan vendor

4433.179 -> notwithstanding uh he's very still very

4437.36 -> aware of alienating Putin that I think

4441.26 -> has to do with his political ties to the

4444.5 -> apparitions of German industry and so on

4447.14 -> so forth and labor industry and labor

4449.6 -> but it's also uh because of a sort of

4452.96 -> popular fear of of uh Russian

4457.42 -> Russian news of a tactical nuclear

4460.159 -> weapon

4462.08 -> um I'm gonna stop there I have more on

4464.6 -> that but before we open it up let me

4467.179 -> just take the chairs prerogative to

4469.1 -> offer two of my views on this one is and

4472.58 -> they both go back to Bob jervis's

4475.04 -> insights as well one is Bob taught us if

4478.28 -> nothing else to think about thinking and

4481.699 -> uh in this respect it doesn't matter

4484.94 -> what Putin thinks I doubt he's even made

4487.699 -> up his mind is he going to use nuclear

4490.219 -> weapons kinetically or not he's already

4492.8 -> been using them and here I completely

4494.659 -> agree with Scott from the very beginning

4496.46 -> as a coercive tool to set some red lines

4500 -> which have been moving and to deter us

4503.12 -> from getting directly involved in this

4506.54 -> fight and to a large extent it's worked

4509 -> although the red lines keep moving

4511.82 -> um so here's a lesson about thinking

4514.159 -> about thinking we don't need to know

4517.159 -> what Putin thinks but we he needs only

4520.46 -> for us to believe that he thinks this

4522.739 -> and you can get that reality the second

4525.32 -> point that I would suggest is that yes

4527.84 -> it's true that Putin went out of his way

4530.239 -> to blame the United States for setting

4532.4 -> the precedent to use two crude nuclear

4534.98 -> bombs to end a war of aggression started

4537.92 -> by Japan

4539.659 -> um but he's also said other things that

4542.179 -> feed into another great Bob Jervis

4544.219 -> Insight going back to the nuclear

4546.26 -> Revolution which is that what's very

4549.56 -> interesting about nuclear leaders

4551.3 -> including the personalist autocratic

4553.88 -> dictators although he didn't use that

4555.62 -> term is that they don't tend to press

4558.88 -> bargaining advantages to their extreme

4562.219 -> level the way we would expect them to in

4564.62 -> a firon kind of sense so there might be

4567.56 -> something to it in this sense of the

4570.38 -> nuclear Revolution and mad having an

4573.199 -> impact limiting this and that reminds me

4576.02 -> how Putin has said other things for

4579.679 -> example it surprised me when he said

4581.719 -> that he didn't think Stalin would have

4584.42 -> used nuclear weapons if he had had them

4587.42 -> in 1941 as a student of 1941 and a

4591.32 -> student of Stalin I totally disagree

4593.659 -> with Putin he would have absolutely used

4596.6 -> them but the fact that Putin was trying

4598.76 -> to make the opposite point that we need

4601.58 -> to be cautious tells us we need to be

4604.04 -> careful about taking Putin quotes and

4606.679 -> and drawing firm conclusions anyway if

4609.8 -> it's all right with the panel I will

4611.239 -> open it up to the audience for questions

4614.86 -> Peter please tell us are there going to

4617.719 -> be microphones that go to them yes so if

4621.26 -> you raise your hands here's your chance

4623.78 -> to ask our distinguished Scholars a

4627.08 -> question yes I think I see Barry Posen

4629.48 -> if I could ask um

4631.76 -> if you're asking a question please

4633.56 -> identify yourself where you're from and

4635.719 -> direct your question to the panel

4640.94 -> oh no it's not

4643.1 -> Gideon Rose oh actually making the

4644.9 -> opposite point from Barry because

4645.92 -> Barry's on the other side of this for me

4647.48 -> uh Gideon Rose Council on Foreign

4649.219 -> Relations I all of you know much more

4651.86 -> have written much more are much wiser

4653.54 -> than I am on this but I'm much more of

4655.52 -> an optimist on nukes than you guys are

4657.92 -> and I'm curious what evidence

4660.62 -> what more evidence of non-use across so

4664.46 -> many different contexts across so many

4666.5 -> different Generations whatever convince

4668.719 -> you to be more optimistic rather than

4670.76 -> less because I mean I've heard the

4673.159 -> arguments about accidents my entire

4675.32 -> career I've heard the arguments about

4677.3 -> potential use through our entire career

4679.28 -> we've heard Putin's Bluffs the entire

4681.679 -> War as he's gone well as he's gone badly

4684.32 -> as every single other red line has been

4686.48 -> crossed what would it take if this war

4689.48 -> ends without nuclear use and something

4692.06 -> resembling a Russian defeat would we

4694.699 -> accept that this is a highly unlikely

4697.1 -> situation and change our views about the

4699.98 -> risk going forward

4703.4 -> that's not for me so

4706.64 -> yeah for me absolutely all right go

4709.4 -> ahead Scott and then Charlie I'd say two

4711.62 -> points to get in one is if that's the

4714.26 -> case and he loses

4716.179 -> then I think that means that some of the

4718.52 -> proliferation risks that we're talking

4720.32 -> about will be less

4722.78 -> um less widespread if he uses nuclear

4726.02 -> weapons

4726.98 -> and he wins because of that

4729.44 -> that I think will be something that

4732.14 -> would increase the likelihood that South

4734.36 -> Korea Iran and Saudi Arabia will get

4736.82 -> nuclear weapons so to me this war in

4739.52 -> Ukraine is not just about the future of

4742.1 -> democracy and the future of sovereignty

4744.739 -> in the U.N Charter it's also about the

4747.739 -> future of the nuclear world that we

4749.78 -> might live in so I think this is going

4752.42 -> to be uh if what you posit that he loses

4755.659 -> does not use nuclear weapons and Ukraine

4758.6 -> wins I think that will be a very good

4760.64 -> thing for for the spread nuclear weapons

4766.219 -> the next time he invades

4769.159 -> yeah I mean that's that's the big ger

4771.199 -> now that Ukraine is facing is if they

4773.42 -> have a ceasefire

4774.8 -> it's just going to give the Russians a

4777.02 -> chance to build up again and that's why

4778.82 -> I think um you know the ukrainians are

4781.46 -> right to say this uh winter and spring

4784.699 -> it's really important for us to keep

4786.44 -> fighting and not give the Russians a

4788.54 -> chance just to rebuild if there is some

4790.219 -> kind of Peace settlement it has to be

4792.199 -> something that would create zones of of

4795.4 -> demilitarization on either side of the

4797.54 -> Border that potentially could get Putin

4800.12 -> to say oh look I won because the

4802.58 -> ukrainians are no longer as big a threat

4804.32 -> to us but the real reason to do that is

4806.48 -> to get Russian forces away from the

4808.219 -> Ukraine to him there is sort of a second

4811.76 -> order effect

4813.26 -> uh and the issue of proliferation again

4816.92 -> pops up oh this is it you know this is

4819.56 -> the next wave is Over the Horizon but

4822.739 -> there is a second order effect of even

4825.8 -> without use

4827.14 -> that is sort of

4830.38 -> reverberating out there that has with

4833.36 -> the Ukraine war and that is the fact

4835.52 -> that the Ukraine was this one country

4838.58 -> along with other two that renounced

4841.1 -> nuclear weapons uh through the 1994

4845.6 -> uh memorandum memorandum Budapest

4848.6 -> memorandum with the specific

4852.219 -> commitment of the Russian Federation and

4857.179 -> the U.S and the UK

4859.94 -> and eventually even China and France not

4863.42 -> to attack the territorial country that

4865.76 -> renounced nucleus

4867.38 -> but then we know what happened next

4869.78 -> first 2014 nothing was done now 2022. so

4874.58 -> some are arguing out there that a second

4877.159 -> order effect might be the others are

4879.02 -> saying well what the hell you know what

4880.88 -> are these agreements good for uh I'm not

4884.78 -> necessarily wedded to uh you know again

4887.78 -> we've had waves of predictions and they

4890.36 -> haven't materialized but this is

4891.98 -> actually one might you might say

4894.56 -> legitimate concern of countries that

4896.54 -> haven't done yet that haven't actually

4899.08 -> realized their nuclear weapons the

4901.34 -> potential because some you know

4903.679 -> some have it

4905.239 -> let's say 30 40 countries have it okay

4907.96 -> the so-called hedging uh doesn't mean

4911.06 -> too much for me as a concept because

4912.92 -> many many could if they wanted to but

4915.44 -> they haven't

4916.58 -> so anyways that's that's sort of also

4918.98 -> another pessimist if you will kind of uh

4922.4 -> carry over from what we're witnessing in

4925.28 -> in the Ukraine

4927.08 -> do you want to jump it two quick points

4929.54 -> getting one so Putin hasn't lost badly

4932.179 -> yet there have been many things that

4934.159 -> haven't gone well and so I don't take

4936.679 -> too much confidence

4938.54 -> in the fact that he hasn't escalated the

4941.12 -> fact that if he would lose badly or to

4943.58 -> defeat um still has a chance to do well

4945.86 -> he would wait so I think there's some

4948.14 -> evidence to think we could continue to

4950.36 -> push but the other thing I would say is

4952.34 -> though

4953.9 -> here you can be look at this as

4955.46 -> optimistic or pessimistic if I said to

4957.26 -> you I think there's a 90 chance even if

4959.6 -> he loses Crimea he won't use nuclear

4961.46 -> weapons you could say God that's great

4962.78 -> 90 but or you could say

4965.54 -> if that happens and is a 10 chance it

4968.06 -> uses nuclear weapons you think that's

4970.52 -> really bad and we shouldn't try that at

4972.86 -> all and on top of that if he uses

4975.08 -> nuclear weapons we don't quite know what

4976.94 -> happens next like one possibility is we

4979.1 -> say fine

4980.12 -> you know Crimea is yours or another is

4981.92 -> we say we're going to launch a large

4983.12 -> conventional Invasion or we're going to

4984.8 -> use tactical nuclear weapons in other

4986.84 -> words his limited use could lead to a

4989.42 -> really bigger

4990.56 -> nuclear war so it's like 10 percent

4994.159 -> doesn't sound so good and then if you

4996.02 -> think that 10 could be way some fraction

4998.42 -> of that goes really badly it's just like

5000.4 -> are those Stakes we want to compete for

5002.92 -> so in that sense it's not light

5004.78 -> necessarily an absolute judgment about

5006.82 -> yes or no it's about the risk given that

5009.76 -> and once again this is sort of not

5010.96 -> really a nuclear revolutions argument

5012.28 -> but it's a nuclear weapons argument is

5013.84 -> the world's really dangerous and so you

5015.4 -> have to

5016.36 -> low probabilities may not be worth

5018.28 -> accepting so be more in that sense I'm

5020.32 -> not convinced he's going to use nuclear

5021.88 -> weapons even if he faces the largest

5023.56 -> losses

5025.9 -> questions about the risk I I think we

5028.54 -> have to add that this is complex

5031.179 -> adaptive systems he's already using

5034.3 -> nuclear weapons for coercive purposes

5038.34 -> if he were I know I understand that but

5040.719 -> if he were to Prevail in his Russia were

5044.199 -> to Prevail in its objectives think then

5047.679 -> if China modernizes continues to

5050.44 -> modernize its systems as it is right

5053.8 -> will China learned the lesson that

5056.44 -> nuclear weapons can be used this way as

5059.26 -> a shield

5060.699 -> uh for further aggression and will North

5063.159 -> Korea learn that lesson will others so

5065.26 -> there are consequences from even this

5067.84 -> non-kinetic use of nuclear weapons that

5070.36 -> maybe are not as optimistic Gideon as

5072.699 -> you think all right did Steve I want to

5075.52 -> say uh responding to Gideon's thought I

5078.34 -> had several thoughts one is um

5080.98 -> just decline of Yogi Berra ISM uh I mean

5083.62 -> this is a reverse bara-ism things

5086.14 -> haven't happened till it happened that's

5088.12 -> like until it's over uh well peace ain't

5091.42 -> over till it's over either but then it's

5093.04 -> over so you only need one and uh you're

5096.52 -> you're your comment reminds me of the

5099.46 -> appendix to uh Ned lebow's book on uh

5102.76 -> peace and War he's a little paperback

5104.62 -> thin book but I can't remember the name

5106.659 -> anymore but at the back he quotes

5109.719 -> um predictions about war it's just he's

5111.52 -> just got a whole bunch of predictions

5112.719 -> and I'm and most of them I mean they're

5114.88 -> all over the map but there was quite a

5116.56 -> few people in 1913 who said oh we've

5118.84 -> been hearing about this trouble with the

5120.4 -> Germans and the danger of problems in

5122.32 -> the Balkans and probably give me a war

5124.3 -> they'll never be a war just stop talking

5125.98 -> about it I think the president of

5127.48 -> Stanford Leland Stanford I remember he

5129.1 -> made this comment 1913 uh you know

5132.239 -> it's been 43 years I mean people have

5134.98 -> learned not to do this stuff I mean

5136.36 -> we're we're past it all

5139 -> um my empirical way of answering your

5140.86 -> question that would be to say I do think

5142.06 -> it's useful look at the Cold War and ask

5143.679 -> how close we came

5145.239 -> and uh that's a sort of interesting test

5148.06 -> and um uh I believe we did come very

5151.239 -> close to 1962 and I commend people this

5154.659 -> new book by Sergey ploki uh he's a

5157.54 -> historian at Harvard and he has a book

5159.94 -> that's just a couple years old I think

5161.98 -> and he wrote it with sort of the theme

5164.199 -> being let me focus on the things that

5166.6 -> were scary

5168.04 -> um and uh it's a it's a I think an

5171.46 -> excellent book people should all read it

5172.9 -> if you want to understand how dangerous

5174.34 -> was things and his picture he paints a

5176.56 -> he changed my mind I did not think

5178.42 -> things were as dangerous as I now think

5180.159 -> they were

5181.42 -> um uh I also should read Scott Sagan's

5183.94 -> book on uh

5185.76 -> uh limits of safety yes pardon the

5189.52 -> second book yeah second book okay

5194.219 -> yeah it's a terrific book and it's not

5196.78 -> read enough and it's just it's so

5198.639 -> important on this whole issue say a

5200.26 -> third thing though about nuclear weapons

5201.52 -> and wmds my view is my scariest thought

5205.3 -> about wmd in the human race is not major

5208.48 -> power use I think it's it could happen

5210.76 -> and if we have the wrong kind of leaders

5213.04 -> or if misperception comes to dominate

5214.84 -> the way societies look at each other I

5216.76 -> mean I Believe by the way the offense

5218.02 -> has the advantage in terms of

5219.159 -> misperception now the Liars are taking

5221.5 -> over the world the enlightenment is in

5223.06 -> danger because of the new media and the

5225.4 -> fact that we no longer have vetted

5226.9 -> information that controls how public see

5229.06 -> things Facebook and Fox News are a

5231.94 -> threat to peace

5233.739 -> um and uh we we we're gonna we've

5236.739 -> invented technology that really does

5238.12 -> threaten the Enlightenment and and to me

5240.1 -> without the alignment you're going to

5241.179 -> have a lot of trouble okay we've got two

5242.8 -> more questions here um let me just say

5244.84 -> the the the the scary scenario that

5247.78 -> people should think about is the spread

5249.76 -> of wmds to non-deterbil actors uh the

5253.6 -> root by Martin Reese

5255.4 -> um uh uh our final hour which is a now

5258.699 -> 20 year old book but very important book

5260.38 -> on his fear that the world of science is

5262.719 -> very bringing to the four

5265.199 -> more wmds and the next phases the new

5269.38 -> wmvs will be much more dangerous than

5271.6 -> nuclear weapons

5273.04 -> because they're going to have the

5274.42 -> characteristic that they can proliferate

5275.92 -> out to individual Psychopaths terrorists

5278.639 -> nuclear weapons or

5280.8 -> pretty much the possession of States on

5282.94 -> States alone the next wave

5285.659 -> bioengineering Nano engineering crispr

5289.08 -> interestingly but Tom Clapper Define

5292.84 -> crispr as a threat to U.S national

5294.34 -> security a few years ago crispr being

5296.44 -> great medical stuff but

5298.199 -> we need a book on is Rhys right in other

5301.179 -> words is the world in fact going toward

5303.28 -> a new wmd regime where there are more

5305.679 -> such things and they can disperse more

5307.12 -> easily and they can reach the hands of

5308.5 -> non-deterable actors the only way we

5310.6 -> know how to prevent use of nuclear

5311.98 -> weapons is deterrence by definition when

5314.8 -> wmd is get in the hands of non-deterbo

5316.659 -> actors we are in real trouble okay Steve

5318.58 -> we're going to get a couple more

5319.96 -> questions like Professor Doyle I like

5321.699 -> Chris Michael Doyle Colombia this is a

5323.98 -> wonderful panel thank you so much I have

5326.62 -> two worries that your the panel didn't

5328.96 -> quite assuage me about about the dangers

5331.9 -> of a nuclear war and Ukraine

5334.38 -> one I thought Scott's comment that we

5338.56 -> should convey to the Russian military

5341.02 -> that the use of nuclear weapons would be

5344.199 -> an extreme War crime and they should

5346.42 -> contemplate the policy well only if used

5348.34 -> against the city and refused on the

5350.5 -> battlefield it would not be a workaround

5351.82 -> okay if you used against the city

5353.139 -> against civilians large numbers all of

5355.239 -> those fish I think that is a a great

5357.699 -> idea and I hope that's been conveyed I

5359.98 -> have no idea whether it has My worry is

5362.98 -> that my friends in the U.N right now are

5365.62 -> very busy documenting the existing war

5369.699 -> crimes that the conventional forces of

5373 -> Russia and Wagner and others have

5376.239 -> inflicted on Ukraine we have a list is

5379.36 -> being made with names attached to it and

5382.48 -> so if they're going to be prosecuted

5383.98 -> anyway I'm afraid that some of them

5386.26 -> might not take as seriously as I hoped

5389.44 -> they would the threat that you just I

5392.02 -> think very important importantly pose so

5394.239 -> that's one word the second worry I'd

5396.46 -> like to get the views of the of the of

5398.86 -> the panel of whether uh Putin thinks

5403.96 -> that if he did use nuclear weapons in

5407.56 -> Ukraine there would be a nuclear

5410.139 -> response by the United States many of

5413.08 -> many of my friends in in Europe are very

5416.98 -> skeptical as they were as their fathers

5419.56 -> and mothers were about extended

5421.12 -> deterrence and some think it would be

5423.58 -> even more difficult in this case and so

5426.52 -> mighty think he could get away with uh

5429.04 -> let's call it a minor use of nuclear

5431.98 -> weapons in Ukraine and not face a

5433.96 -> nuclear response

5435.639 -> who wants to jump in first on that one I

5438.58 -> I could um great set of questions

5441.159 -> Michael

5442.659 -> um first I think that there really is a

5445.36 -> dilemma of accountability for war crimes

5447.58 -> and ending a war

5449.32 -> and

5451.42 -> that they can be at Cross purposes

5454.12 -> I'd remind everybody in the audience

5455.98 -> that we originally in the unconditional

5460.719 -> surrender demand

5462.6 -> uh let the Japanese know that they're

5465.04 -> going to be war crimes trials and

5467.38 -> Hirohito was on the list

5471.4 -> even though people didn't focus on it so

5473.92 -> much right after the war

5475.9 -> we ended up

5477.58 -> cutting a deal

5479.139 -> and told in Secretary Burns sent a

5482.32 -> letter to the Japanese government saying

5483.88 -> that the future role of the emperor will

5486.52 -> be determined by the Japanese people and

5488.199 -> it was that that God Hirohito to join

5490.78 -> the peace party

5493.12 -> and then we started painting this

5495.28 -> peaceful picture of him which was not

5496.96 -> true uh at all so I think that's a

5499.659 -> really important question and on

5502.06 -> response I don't think I hope this

5504.76 -> Administration will not use nuclear

5507.4 -> weapons in response to a Russian nuclear

5510.699 -> use because conventional capabilities

5512.26 -> could do a lot

5514.12 -> so in 2016 there was a war game in the

5518.679 -> White House in which the deputies were

5521.56 -> presented with the scenario not Ukraine

5523.84 -> but an attack a Russian attack on the

5526.48 -> baltics

5527.86 -> and when the attack was not doing well

5531.28 -> the Russians used nuclear weapons

5532.96 -> against a single NATO base military base

5536.38 -> the deputies discuss what they should do

5539.32 -> and came up with the idea we should

5540.88 -> respond with Conventional Weapons

5543.04 -> escalating the war by attacking into

5545.199 -> Russia for the first time but using

5547.9 -> Conventional Weapons only to destroy the

5549.34 -> base from which the nuclear forces had

5551.38 -> come

5553 -> the principles then did the same war

5555.4 -> game the next day

5557.139 -> and they said we've got to respond with

5558.639 -> nuclear weapons

5560.26 -> that's what deterrence is all about

5563.199 -> they're told by the red team that uh

5566.739 -> well if you use nuclear weapons against

5568.36 -> Russia they'll know it's from the United

5570.04 -> States and therefore they

5572.44 -> retaliate against the United States so

5574.96 -> he said well no we use nuclear weapons

5576.58 -> against Belarus even though Belarus

5578.56 -> wasn't in the scenario

5581.62 -> who were the deputies who I think made

5584.02 -> the right choice

5585.34 -> Colin Carl and Avril Haynes today's

5588.42 -> guest and according to Fred Kaplan

5591.52 -> Haynes made t-shirts saying the deputies

5593.62 -> had it right

5596.139 -> so next

5598.12 -> um genre gueno and then Tim Frye so Jean

5602.32 -> Marie can we get a mic over here

5604.179 -> yeah

5606.46 -> well my question actually was just

5608.139 -> following on on that discussion is in

5610.719 -> the case of a nuclear use by Russia what

5615.4 -> would you see as the best response and

5618.94 -> what would be the implications for the

5621.46 -> for the U.S European strategic

5625.179 -> relationship

5628.239 -> once once

5630.04 -> somebody that deals with some of the

5631.84 -> same question

5633.179 -> I I hear that concern and it's also not

5638.02 -> a no concern with the very concept of

5640.96 -> extended deterrence it's all it's been

5643.12 -> asked not just throughout the Cold War

5646.06 -> more recently you know

5648.219 -> visually North Korea right

5652.179 -> Kim Jong-un was threatening L.A I lived

5656.44 -> there

5657.639 -> um

5658.54 -> sorry actually he they said La wouldn't

5661.3 -> be a Target because of his friendships

5663.639 -> with some basketball players but

5668.1 -> but more seriously more seriously it's a

5671.86 -> long-standing concern will the U.S risk

5674.56 -> this city or that City for uh Seoul or

5677.86 -> whatever

5678.659 -> but the point is going back to sort of

5682.659 -> Bob's

5683.82 -> conceptualization of this problem and

5686.98 -> shellings it's just there's leaving

5690.88 -> something to chance

5693.04 -> that in the minds of those that think

5695.739 -> well they might not uh they might not

5698.44 -> respond but the issue of sort of the

5701.8 -> chancy uh you know the odds that it

5706.179 -> might actually be

5707.8 -> it might actually work

5710.139 -> may or may not be enough but uh the

5714.52 -> probability that it will have some

5717.159 -> residual effect uh is there but I hear

5721.12 -> you're a concerned especially in in

5722.86 -> Germany I I witnessed that kind of very

5726.94 -> very high concern with will the US

5730.42 -> actually stand by by its commitments uh

5733.48 -> with respect to and the same in Japan

5735.52 -> and South Korea and so on

5739.3 -> just a couple other points on this one

5740.8 -> is we don't have an extended returns

5742.3 -> Community Ukraine which is important

5745 -> um two the real issue in the Cold War

5747.34 -> was the United States and NATO using

5749.26 -> nuclear weapons first your question this

5751.06 -> issue is actually about using nuclear

5752.679 -> weapons second which is different and so

5755.44 -> I just put those two Basics on the table

5757.12 -> I think I'm going to point out two

5758.86 -> things one is I think Scott's right that

5761.02 -> me and

5762.58 -> um that maybe the best option would be

5765.12 -> conventional invasion but to also need

5768.76 -> to keep in mind that that's the Russians

5770.8 -> still hold their all their nuclear

5772.6 -> weapons and that also is greatly raising

5775.239 -> the stakes so a conventional

5777.46 -> support for Ukraine or even you know

5780.04 -> threatening to take territory in Russia

5782.92 -> um

5783.699 -> is not escalatory in the sense that

5786.04 -> you're using nuclear weapons but it

5787.54 -> could easily lead to a much larger

5788.98 -> nuclear war

5790.54 -> and so it sounds better because you're

5792.159 -> not using nuclear weapons but it's not

5793.659 -> clear that it gets you to a better

5795.52 -> outcome and or it could actually oddly

5797.56 -> lead to a worse outcome

5800.26 -> um particularly if you're taking Russian

5801.34 -> territory but the other thing I would

5802.96 -> say and it's very unpopular but Steve I

5804.82 -> never raised it at the beginning which

5806.08 -> is there's

5807.639 -> the questions suggest that of course we

5809.86 -> should respond

5811.96 -> but he said if you're in a nuclear

5814.42 -> situation where the other side might

5816.159 -> care more

5818.02 -> they're likely to Prevail if you get

5819.76 -> involved in nuclear bargaining

5821.86 -> and if that's the case here

5823.96 -> is not popular and I'm not saying this

5825.639 -> is what I would do but in the sense of

5827.26 -> all of what we're hearing about thinking

5829 -> about thinking and thinking it through

5830.38 -> is sometimes not responding could in a

5833.08 -> nuclear world could be the right option

5836.08 -> and that's something we would have to

5837.46 -> decide for ourselves as well because

5839.26 -> this is a bargaining you know it's a

5841.54 -> competition and risk-taking and when

5843.159 -> Putin escalates he's saying um I care

5846.4 -> enough to risk a nuclear war

5848.62 -> we don't know how large the nuclear war

5850.36 -> and we have to ask ourselves given the

5852.76 -> stakes do we want to risk that larger

5855.159 -> nuclear war

5857.08 -> so just one go ahead no so I'm just

5859.659 -> saying but I think that's just all part

5860.92 -> of the analysis as a footnote to this I

5863.679 -> would all encourage you to read our

5866.26 -> other colleague dick betts's wonderful

5868.12 -> piece on this question in foreign

5869.92 -> affairs that makes the opposite argument

5872.139 -> that we cannot do nothing and there are

5875.38 -> no good options they're all bad options

5877.48 -> and responding in some way requires uh

5881.8 -> us if we're going to continue extended

5884.199 -> deterrence which was a whole other topic

5886.239 -> we didn't get to because we need another

5888.159 -> hour and I don't think our share is

5890.62 -> going to allow it but you want to give

5891.82 -> Tim price I want to give Tim fry the

5893.56 -> last question since he was patient here

5895.12 -> a lot of pressure to ask the last

5896.92 -> question but uh thanks a lot this has

5898.96 -> been really a tremendous panel I had a

5901.3 -> question about a topic near and dear to

5903.88 -> Bob's heart about communication during

5906.659 -> crisis bargaining and you know there are

5910.48 -> obviously incentives to

5912.96 -> use talk that the war is existential uh

5917.739 -> for Russia as cheap talk

5920.5 -> um so what are the things that we should

5923.26 -> be looking about Beyond uh Putin's

5926.26 -> statements

5928.12 -> um to kind of understand what his next

5931 -> steps might be and are there things that

5933.46 -> Putin can do to credibly Signal about uh

5937.659 -> his intentions uh perhaps to use nuclear

5940.659 -> weapons what are the the things Beyond

5942.9 -> uh uh you know just his statements that

5946.36 -> we should be paying attention to

5949.06 -> so we all know them you want to jump in

5951.34 -> I'll throw them out if you want to well

5953.86 -> I I'd say two things one is

5956.02 -> look at the status of Russian forces

5958.12 -> right Putin declared on National

5960.639 -> Television a state of high alert and

5963.52 -> nothing happened

5965.56 -> that said something to us about how

5968.44 -> seriously to take it and and that's

5971.139 -> important and Leslie I don't think

5973.84 -> many Russians think that this is an

5975.94 -> existential Ukraine post an existential

5978.219 -> risk it poses an existential risk of

5981.28 -> Vladimir Putin because a successful

5983.56 -> Ukrainian democracy in the Civil War

5985.6 -> could be a threat to his regime and to

5988.96 -> me this war will end either when the

5991.48 -> Ukraine's win militarily or more likely

5993.34 -> if Putin thinks the losses of Russian

5997.42 -> soldiers and Russia equipment poses an

6000.48 -> even more risk

6002.82 -> to his regime than

6005.28 -> ending a war that's going poorly

6008.159 -> so domestic

6010.26 -> folk you would look for mating taking

6012.48 -> the WarHeads out of storage where

6014.88 -> they're still securely and start mating

6017.699 -> them with the short range or the

6021.12 -> intermediate range forces that would be

6023.82 -> the next serious signal to say you know

6027.12 -> we don't like what's happening and back

6029.159 -> off

6031.86 -> um we're we're ending but I told you can

6033.9 -> have the last comment uh it's actually

6035.88 -> not even a comment but even if something

6038.219 -> that uh

6039.78 -> kind of evolved

6041.82 -> actually end up getting uh predictions

6045.06 -> right in some sense but not the complete

6048.48 -> story as Bob you know would always

6050.639 -> caution uh caution us against and that

6053.76 -> reminds me of the story in 1939 of

6057.3 -> a journalist that saw it coming 1939

6061.52 -> this this is going to be a catastrophe

6064.52 -> I'm I'm out of here

6067.26 -> and he looked at the map and he said

6071.159 -> I'm going here and disappearing until

6074.28 -> this is over and he picked guadal canal

6078.78 -> ah

6081.42 -> hard to get it right and happy note

6084.62 -> please join me in thanking our wonderful

6087.719 -> panelists

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EF1Etr4fuuI