Retired US General: Why I think Putin will go nuclear
Retired US General: Why I think Putin will go nuclear
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UnHerd’s Freddie Sayers meets retired US Army General Kevin Ryan.
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// TIMECODES //
00:00 - 01:09 - Introduction
01:09 - 04:22 - Who does Kevin Ryan think really blew up the Nord Stream pipeline?
04:22 - 06:29 - Why is a Russian nuclear strike more realistic than many believe?
06:29 - 10:45 - Why does Kevin Ryan believe this when other military experts disagree?
10:45 - 12:01 - Does Russia moving nuclear weapons to Belarus signal an attack is likely?
12:01 - 13:41 - Is the West just playing into a Russian narrative about the threat of nukes?
13:41 - 16:20 - Could Vladimir Putin’s Cold War experience temper his desire to use nuclear weapons?
16:20 - 17:38 - What is a ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon?
17:38 - 19:55 - What would the reality of a nuclear strike in the Ukraine War look like?
19:55 - 22:55 - Would Russia really nuke Ukraine, with all their historic and cultural links?
22:55 - 24:47 - A nuclear strike would not be armageddon
24:47 - 26:57 - What would the US/NATO response be to a nuclear detonation
26:57 - 29:00 - If we take the nuclear threat seriously, what should practically change?
29:00 - 30:40 - What would provoke a Russian nuclear strike?
30:40 - 34:41 - What would the safest outcome to the Ukraine War be?
34:41 - 35:19 - Concluding thoughts
#UnHerd #NuclearWar #UkraineWar
Content
2.06 -> Hello and welcome to UnHerd, I'm Freddie Sayers.
The question of nuclear weapons hovers over
7.98 -> the War in Ukraine, it's unanswered and threatening.
Many voices in the West pretty much dismiss
14.53 -> the possibility that President Putin would
ever deploy nuclear weapons is just sabre
19.69 -> rattling or an attempt to bully. But not everyone
is so certain. Kevin Ryan is a retired brigadier
27.53 -> general from the US Army. He's former chief
of staff for the US Army's Space and Missile
32.91 -> Defence programme. He also served as US defence
attache to Moscow so he knows something of
39.93 -> the region, and he was deputy director for
strategy Plans and Policy for the army. He's
45.74 -> now a senior fellow at Harvard, Kennedy school's
Belfer Centre for Science and International
51.29 -> Affairs. Unlike most analysts, he worries
that it is possible, even likely that the
58.21 -> Russian army might deploy a nuclear weapon.
We wanted to examine his reasoning. And I'm
63.5 -> delighted to say he joins us now. Hi, Mr.
Ryan.
67.59 -> Good afternoon.
68.74 -> Before we get into the big question of the
likelihood of a nuclear situation, could I
73.39 -> just take a couple of smaller detours, what
about the Nord Stream Pipeline? Because we've
79.23 -> had people on this show, in fact, Fiona Hill,
a former senior security analyst in the White
85.54 -> House, she was one of the first people to
suggest it could actually have been the Ukrainians.
90.52 -> Meanwhile that's dismissed by some people
in the West as propaganda. Some people even
95.59 -> think it's American propaganda. There's all
sorts of confusion over the Nord Stream question.
100.84 -> Do you have a view on that?
102.659 -> Well, I'm not privy to confidential information.
But I have been reading the papers and seen
110.7 -> the reports and leaks that allege that the
CIA, for example, had intelligence that the
118.39 -> Ukrainians were planning something like this,
that they may have gone ahead and done it.
124.77 -> Those could very well be credible. Ukraine
would benefit to some degree by closing off
132.72 -> Russian oil supplies into Germany. At that
time, if you remember, there was still debate
139.46 -> going on as to whether Europe would completely
reject Russian energy sources that would have
147.91 -> taken the debate out of their hands and made
a decision. I can believe that the Ukrainians
153.9 -> might have done this, yes.
156.01 -> So you don't think then it stretches plausibility
that they would do something against the advice
163.03 -> of their US allies and the people they rely
on most for their current offensive and take
169.661 -> a risk like that when the pipeline wasn't
even being used anyway? I don't know, none
173.48 -> of the available options seem particularly
likely but you think it is?
177.42 -> Well, it is possible, yes. Both sides in this
war if if we count two sides, Russia and Ukraine,
186.53 -> both sides of this war have their own reasons
for fighting. Russia believes it's entitled
193.33 -> to and wants to control Ukraine and create
a buffer zone. Ukraine believes it's entitled
199.14 -> to its sovereignty. They are going to pursue
those national goals, whether or not anybody
206.21 -> supports them or not. Ukraine has convinced
the West that it should be supported and I
214.349 -> think that's the right situation right now,
we are supporting them. But if we withdraw
219.379 -> that support, if we give conditions to that
support which make Ukraine give up on what
228.269 -> they consider their rights, their national
interests, I think you'll find even more disagreement.
234.01 -> Russia, was cautioned by China, allegedly,
reportedly, not to invade Ukraine. They went
241.61 -> ahead and did it anyway. They were asked by
Chinese leader to turn down the rhetoric about
247.36 -> nuclear threats. They did not, they pursued
them, and continued doing that. So yeah, I
253.61 -> think all sides are, there are a lot of things
happening right now and we don't all agree
258.23 -> on every aspect of the war effort.
261.739 -> In a way that leads us quite nicely into the
background for the larger discussion. Because
267.69 -> your assessment, and you wrote a piece that
we published in UnHerd, is that a Russian
274.259 -> nuclear strike of some kind, is much more
likely than most voices in the West give it
279.919 -> credence for? What is the basis of that assertion?
283.86 -> Well, first, let me say that I'm not the first
one to say that this is a serious threat.
290.37 -> Fiona Hill and others have called it serious
also. But not many people say it is likely
296.449 -> and if you say a threat is not likely, no
matter how serious you might try to paint
302.169 -> it, it's not urgent, and if it's not urgent,
a government certainly and a lot of people
308.44 -> will not put it in the top of their to do
pile of tasks and missions. So, my contribution
318.15 -> to this discussion is to say that actually
this is likely to happen if one critical condition
328.87 -> is met, and that is if Putin believes he is
going to lose this War. Now, what does losing
335.71 -> the war mean? To me, it means what he has
talked about, that he will defend the territories
342.49 -> that they've annexed, that includes Zaporizhzhia,
Kherson, Donbas, or Donetsk and Luhansk. So
349.48 -> if he's going to lose those, if Ukraine's
offensive would cut the landbridge, say to
355.82 -> Crimea, or take back a lot of that land, he
would believe he was losing the war and he
361.71 -> would ask his military to increase the violence
to step up, escalate, if you will. And if
369.41 -> they said 'we can't, we're already losing
to the Ukrainians.' Now, his only recourse
374.87 -> would be a nuclear weapon. And so, to me,
it seems like a very logical progression and
381.07 -> one that hinges on Ukraine's success in this
offensive, or broader in this war.
388.24 -> But why is it that you come to that conclusion
when most of your colleagues in the military
394.979 -> establishment don't? What special insight
do you have, I guess? That's got to be the
400.92 -> question. You don't have keys to Putin's mind
any more than than I do. What makes you so
408.29 -> confident that he would consider it?
409.5 -> Well, I look for indicators that this is more
than just rhetoric. Putin is either a bully
417.61 -> or a bluffer. I don't believe he's a bully.
I'm sorry... I mean I don't believe he's a
423.45 -> bluffer. I think he does bully other nations.
So what would be some indicators that Russia
432.37 -> is preparing to actually use its nuclear weapons?
One indicator was a recent change of command
441.72 -> of the operation in Ukraine. They call it
this special military operation, about the
447.56 -> war there. After cycling through about five
or six different commanding officers for that
455.27 -> war in the first year, Putin decided to assign
the Chief of the General Staff, that's a senior
462.069 -> most officer in the military, and the head
of the Ground Forces and the head of the Air
468.52 -> Forces as the three generals in charge of
this operation. That was unprecedented in
475.71 -> modern history. Not since World War II has
the Chief of the General Staff headed an operation
481.139 -> for Russia. So it underscores the fact that
Putin is claiming that they're in a fight
486.29 -> for their survival. this is the most dire
situation they've had. But more importantly,
491.09 -> those three officers-
492.09 -> To push back on that, that could equally well
just be that he's taking it very seriously.
496.639 -> It's not going as well as he had hoped. They're
suffering a lot of casualties and it's become
501.8 -> a major issue for the Russian government and
he needs his top brass on the ground. Doesn't
507.061 -> necessarily have anything to do with nuclear,
does it?
509.479 -> Well, it does in this regard. According to
Russian nuclear doctrine, those three officers
517.269 -> are the three officers who control the use
of tactical nuclear weapons once an authority
524.48 -> has been given by Putin to use them. So he
has, in fact, put in charge of this operation
530.779 -> the very three officers who would not only
know how to use these tactical weapons, but
537.35 -> they rehearsed that they, they practice it
during peacetime, and they are the most loyal
543.61 -> officers in the military. So they would be
unlikely to ignore Putin's order to use nuclear
551.6 -> weapons. So in this case, actually, they are
a big signal of the increased possibility
557.7 -> of the use of nuclear weapons.
560.12 -> Okay, what else?
562.45 -> Last fall, the Russian military was using
Kh-55 cruise missiles as part of airstrikes
573.77 -> against Ukraine. And Ukrainian observers suggested
that these cruise missiles, which had dummy
584.75 -> warheads on them, they didn't have their nuclear
warheads, they had dummy warheads on them.
589.96 -> They suggested that these cruise missiles
were being used as decoys so that Ukrainian
595.11 -> air defences wouldn't shoot down the actual
conventional, if you will, explosive warhead
601.63 -> mounted missiles being fired into Ukraine.
But that doesn't make any sense, though, for
607.4 -> a country like Russia, which is short on missiles
and cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.
615.61 -> It makes no sense at all to shoot those weapons
and waste those missiles. What does make sense
623.829 -> is if they were test firing these cold war
vintage missiles. Making sure that one of
632.29 -> the ways of delivering their tactical nukes
was tried and true, and that those systems
638.91 -> still worked. So I think he's already rehearsed
a nuclear attack on on Ukraine.
645.079 -> What about the movement into Belarus? That's
something that people have been anxious about.
649.67 -> The idea that they're moving nuclear weapons
into Belarus. Is that relevant to your argument?
654.899 -> Absolutely. It's another sign, a very visible
sign that Putin and his inner circle see these
665.99 -> weapons as something that might be needed,
something that might be used. He has access
674.81 -> to these tactical nuclear weapons throughout
his country, and he can move them right up
680.36 -> to the border with Ukraine or the Baltics.
Why would he need to move additional nuclear
688.32 -> weapons into a country like Belarus? Well,
part of it might be, if he's bluffing, part
694.911 -> of it might be to scare the West and to to
intimidate us. But Russia is not a rich country,
701.79 -> and they don't have a lot of money to spend
on bluffs and fakes and faints. When they
708.2 -> spend real money, when they move nuclear weapons,
unprecedented in Russia, since since the Cold
714.25 -> War anyway, then that also indicates that
they may have plans for these nuclear weapons.
720.839 -> How would you respond to the argument that
all three of those things are moves that they
727.95 -> would want to make, to signal that they might
use nuclear weapons? In other words, to generate
734.72 -> conversations like the one me and you are
having on this show. Perhaps we're just playing
739.66 -> into what they want here, which is 'get everyone
really anxious about nuclear weapons, it means
744.1 -> that we fold or that there's a some sort of
deal is struck or willingly.' How can we know
749.98 -> the difference?
750.98 -> Well, first of all I think you're right that
the Russians are doing this to force a conversation,
755.589 -> to signal us that they are willing to use
these weapons. That's the whole point of my
759.6 -> article. They are willing to do it. And it
is likely that they can do it, and will do
765.579 -> it. Now, would they be thrilled if the West
stepped in or Ukraine stepped in today and
771.459 -> said, 'we don't want this to happen. We don't
want that to be the way of escalation. So
777.38 -> we will come to the negotiating table or we're
willing to talk about a ceasefire.' Well,
782.81 -> then they will have avoided using a nuclear
weapon. And that would be wonderful from their
788.45 -> perspective. But I don't think they see that
that's going to happen. I don't see that's
793.01 -> going to happen. Do you believe that Ukraine
is going to stop fighting tomorrow because
799.07 -> nuclear weapons show up in Belarus? I don't
think so. In fact, I don't think Ukraine will
804.089 -> stop fighting when a nuclear weapon is finally
used. I think for the first time in history
810.019 -> we will have a nuclear battlefield where conventional
fighting continues, while nuclear weapons
817.529 -> have either been used or might still be used
in a war.
820.66 -> So before we come on to that nightmare scenario,
what do you say to people who... There's been
827.25 -> a lot of attempts to analyse Vladimir Putin's
personality and strategy. The few things we
835.22 -> know with certainty, one thing we do know
is that he is a creature of the Cold War,
839.279 -> he was a KGB officer, he was very much active
in the final decades of the Cold War. And
846.43 -> some people say that actually, that's one
aspect that you can rely on. That that sort
851.42 -> of terror, that sense from the Cold War that
nuclear weapons is really a zone you don't
856.68 -> go into, is likely to still be there with
him. While ironically, if he was actually
862.399 -> replaced for a younger, maybe more nationalistic,
more reckless leader, that guarantee might
870.16 -> not be there. What do you say to that?
871.81 -> Well, I think first of all, the concern that
a younger, more nationalistic leader might
876.73 -> supplant him or be the person waiting when
he steps down to take control, I think that's
882.25 -> a very real concern. Whether or not he still
has what we might call the Cold War attitude
891.24 -> toward nuclear weapons, that they are a civilization
ending step, this is really a misreading of
898.96 -> what was going on in the Cold War. While it's
true that both the Soviet Union and the United
906.56 -> States, United Kingdom and France, the nuclear
powers, all wanted to avoid a global nuclear
915.079 -> War, that is a Third World War or a exchange
of nukes onto the homelands of those nuclear
922.209 -> powers, it is not true that people thought
nuclear weapons could not be used as part
929.41 -> of a war in Europe during the Cold War. In
fact, both sides practised this. Both sides
936.81 -> had tactical nuclear weapons deployed on either
side of the inner German border. When I was
945.23 -> an officer in the military and stationed in
Germany for eight years during the 1980s.
951.23 -> We practised regularly decontaminatings, checking
for radiation, figuring out down when messages
960.069 -> and were plumes would be going. And we practice
using nuclear weapons as a way of stopping
965.85 -> the Russian hordes. So, this is not new to
Vladimir Putin. He has it in his background,
975.23 -> that these kinds of weapons might be necessary
in a conflict.
979.459 -> So, you use this phrase tactical nuclear weapon.
What does that actually mean? Because some
985.009 -> people I've heard say that it's pretty much
a fiction, it's something that people have
988.949 -> made up. That it's never really been done.
It makes it sound friendly and plausible,
993.19 -> but actually a nuclear bomb is a nuclear bomb.
995.49 -> I would agree with that 100%. It is a fiction
of sorts. It's tactical only if you weren't
1002.36 -> the target. It's strategic, if it hits your
homeland, or your capital. But there are some
1010.75 -> differences between the groupings of nuclear
weapons that we're talking about here. Tactical
1017.319 -> nuclear weapons generally have a smaller yield,
they would be weapons that would be available
1024.549 -> for use for ground commanders or naval or
air commanders in a local or regional conflict,
1032.15 -> like the war in Ukraine. Both sides recognise
that these kinds of weapons might be needed
1041.679 -> at a level below the strategic, below the
global thermal nuclear holocaust level that
1047.22 -> we were talking about. That's why the United
States keeps these kinds of weapons in storage
1054.62 -> sites in Netherlands and Germany and so on.
1057.33 -> So what is the reality then, the mini nuke?
I mean, it's still pretty maxi, obviously.
1065.02 -> What would a potential nuclear strike look
like then? What do you think the most realistic
1071.11 -> scenario would be? Where would it be detonated?
Would it be up in the upper atmosphere? Or
1075.9 -> some people have suggested to kind of warn
people off? Would it actually be on Ukrainian
1079.909 -> territory? What do you think?
1081.559 -> I personally believe that it would happen
on Ukrainian territory or maybe on territory
1087.36 -> that Russia calls annexed territories now
but Ukraine would say is occupied or seized
1096.039 -> territory from it. So somewhere within the
boundaries of what you and I would consider
1102.09 -> the authentic Ukraine, pre 2014. That's what
I think we are talking about. And then the
1111.01 -> target could be a military formation, could
be the destruction of as many Ukrainian military
1117.48 -> forces as possible. Or it could be a city
in which decision making is happening military
1123.4 -> decision making, or maybe a logistical hub.
There are many cities like that in Ukraine
1131.03 -> that don't all have to be Kyiv, but Kyiv is
one possibility. And when you drop a nuclear
1137.23 -> weapon on a place like that, the first thing
that happens is 10s of 1000s of Ukrainians
1142.77 -> are harmed and killed and hurt and there's
extreme damage. But the damage is basically
1151.1 -> within less than a five mile radius from the
impact. If we're talking about a 12 kiloton
1161.76 -> weapon, like what was dropped on Hiroshima.
So, if you put a target in the middle of Kyiv,
1169.39 -> and enter a five mile radius circle around
it, that's where all the people, all the destruction
1173.8 -> would happen. And then beyond that, there
would be some radiation, there would be some
1178.23 -> blow down, there would be some damage and
so on. But the the casualties would fall way
1184.63 -> off. So I'm not trying to make this sound
less than it is. But I'm trying to give some
1190.2 -> answer to your question, which is let me imagine
what the impact is.
1195.38 -> But both of those scenarios... So one thing
you mentioned is inside, what they consider
1200.669 -> now to be the new boundaries of Russia. That's
the rhetoric inside Russia, that this is now
1206.309 -> part of Russia. So it does seem to stretch
plausibility, that they would detonate a nuclear
1211.9 -> weapon within their own country, to wipe out
what they would now consider a Russian city.
1217.69 -> These are people who they're hoping are going
to become loyal Russian citizens. It's in
1223.419 -> defence of these people that they say they've
invaded. The idea that they would take out
1228.02 -> many, many hundreds of 1000s of them in a
nuclear weapon seems even for an illogical
1233.65 -> leader, kind of to stretch the bounds of possibility,
doesn't it? And then even Kyiv of is a major
1241.7 -> cultural centre, which Russians consider to
be an absolute core part of its history. It's
1247.78 -> got cathedrals and architecture. It would
seem extraordinary and unlikely to destroy
1257.09 -> it.
1258.09 -> Yes, you're exactly right again. I don't want
to use Kyiv as an example, but I needed something
1265.97 -> for us to talk about. I don't even want to
name possible city targets and so on, because
1273.69 -> I realised that for the people in Ukraine,
and the residents living in the region, these
1278.321 -> are not theoretical discussions like hat we're
talking about here. This is real life to them.
1286.36 -> So I don't want to needlessly alarm Ukrainian
civilians. My comments are talking directly
1295.6 -> to the political and military leaders back
in the capitals. But let me tell you some
1300.48 -> of the things Russia has done to mitigate
that. First of all, they've withdrawn and
1305.13 -> evacuated many civilians into Kherson and
Zaporizhzhia provinces, they've pulled them
1311.61 -> told them get on the bus coming back to the
east because they knew about the counter offensive.
1318.44 -> But maybe they also knew that it was possible
that the Russian military might be destroying
1324.45 -> cities in this region too, either with conventional
or nuclear weapons. So in some ways Russia
1331.63 -> has taken steps on that line. And let's remember
one more thing about the Russians. They want
1337.36 -> victory in this war. They're willing to do
a lot of things. They've already destroyed
1342.5 -> Bakhmut and then they stand on top of it and
claim it's a victory. The Russians during
1350.429 -> the Napoleonic War, burned Moscow to the ground,
to avoid the French being able to take it.
1357.89 -> If they're willing to do these kinds of things
to places that they consider their own, and
1363.87 -> I see no reason why a tactical nuclear weapon
to stop a war to prevent a total defeat, I
1373.02 -> see no reason why that wouldn't be on the
table for them.
1375.71 -> Just to stay with that horrific scenario one
stage longer. I mean, you mentioned a five
1380.82 -> mile radius. Is it not true that the radiation
would go potentially for many hundreds of
1386.45 -> miles, and many, many people would die of
radiation sickness, they would be plumes travelling
1392.1 -> across the continent of Europe. I mean, it
is pretty much the Armageddon scenario.
1398.72 -> The short answer to that question is no. it
is not Armageddon. And rather than me try
1407.14 -> to paint the mental picture for the people
who might be listening to us, I encourage
1412.59 -> people to look at a website called NUKEMAP,
M A P, like a map, you would read. And this
1420.85 -> website allows you to experiment and put a
detonation of a nuclear weapon, Any yield,
1428.32 -> air, ground or subterranean bursts. And anyplace
in the world, it can pick your hometown, if
1433.64 -> you want to have a full imagination, a full
understanding of where the damage goes. But
1441.94 -> hundreds of miles? No. People will not be
dying of nuclear radiation hundreds of miles.
1446.85 -> They won't be dying of nuclear radiation 10s
of miles from the actual target, if this is
1454.84 -> a tactical nuclear weapon. If the downwind,
in other words if you do an air burst of a
1465.701 -> nuclear weapon, you minimise the amount of
dust and dirt that you've kicked up into the
1470.95 -> atmosphere, which can then carry the radiation.
If you minimise that the downwind plume is
1479.69 -> not very dangerous, it's certainly not dangerous
to the areas that are upwind from that explosion.
1487.09 -> In your estimation, what would the US/ NATO
response be to such a detonation?
1493.46 -> Well, we've been pretty clear with Russia
that we will not respond with a nuclear weapon.
1504.76 -> And the United States anyway has said, we
will not have American soldiers killing Russian
1511.3 -> soldiers. So with those two very clear policy
statements made by the US President and other
1521.961 -> senior leaders in the government, you have
to pick and choose from the remaining responses,
1531.68 -> things like sanctions, things like increased
support to Ukraine and so on.
1537.87 -> Do you not feel like in the real world scenario
of that actually happening, those statements
1542.549 -> might crumble pretty quickly. If there's a
nuclear bomb detonated on European soil, you
1548.151 -> feel like there will not be... Commitment
to earlier statements might not matter so
1554.1 -> much. We'd be in a whole new world.
1556.6 -> What I think would happen, since we're doing
the 'what if' game, is that the United States
1565.659 -> would change its policy going forward, but
would not respond to the first tactical nuclear
1573.36 -> weapon with a nuclear response. I think it's
possible that the United States and the West
1578.96 -> would be shocked and alarmed, to the degree
that they would say, 'okay, we know we have
1588.39 -> been cautious up to now, but if you do this
again, Russia, then our responses will change.'
1598.419 -> All things will be on the table. We probably
won't try to commit to one or the other. But
1603.62 -> we will say things like, some people have
suggested destroying the Black Sea Fleet.
1609.24 -> Well, that's a great thing to put on the table
and Russia would take that seriously. but
1615.72 -> it's not on the table right now.
1617.36 -> So different listeners will have different
responses to this, probably a good number
1622.059 -> of them will be sceptical, but for those of
them who take it more seriously, what do you
1627.71 -> think the practical implication of this should
be? How would you like US or Western policy
1635.36 -> to change, if you take the nuclear threat
more seriously? Put it that way.
1639.961 -> I just want to be clear that I believe that
many people can take this threat seriously
1646.049 -> and not agree with me. And I don't want to
belittle their positions or their beliefs
1650.85 -> at all. What I'm saying is that it's likely
and therefore urgent that we be doing something.
1658.08 -> So you're asking the very most important question
here. So, what is that ? What is it that we
1663.299 -> should be doing? First, we should be preparing
our military to operate and to be stationed
1668.89 -> and survive on the nuclear battlefield. We
have those skills, we can resurrect them.
1675.01 -> We are doing some things already, but we need
to do more. and we need to make it more a
1681.5 -> more frequent part of our training. The second
is we can do many things to prepare for damage
1687.63 -> from this and the harm that such a strike
would cause. We need to increase the kinds
1693.63 -> of medical support and specialise after the
explosion kinds of steps that will be needed
1702.179 -> by the civilians, not only the military, but
by the people who have been affected by this.
1707.39 -> And we need to revisit our policy, you hit
on this earlier. And I'm saying that the US
1714.14 -> has made it clear, it's not going to fight
in World War Three but after the bomb goes
1718.65 -> off, and after we see what's happening, we
need to be flexible enough to revisit our
1723.6 -> policy statements and make sure that this
one or two tactical nukes that might be used
1730.51 -> in a war now don't escalate into something
bigger for Ukraine, and certainly bigger for
1738.28 -> Europe.
1739.73 -> What are the scenarios you think are most
likely to lead to this threat? You mentioned
1745.98 -> pretty much if Russia feels like it's losing
but that puts Ukraine and the West is in a
1750.58 -> bit of a difficult situation, because victory
by your calculus is the most dangerous thing.
1755.92 -> So what do you want to see happen? If not
victory?
1759.26 -> What I believe is going to happen- I don't
want any of this to happen. But what I want
1766.46 -> is not the point here. What I think is going
to happen is that if Ukraine has success in
1775.1 -> taking back large parts of the land that Russia
has taken from it, if Ukraine could threaten
1781.149 -> to take back large parts of Crimea, or the
entire area, this would be a red line for
1790.029 -> Russia, that Putin would not... It would take
some drastic step before those things fully
1796.78 -> happened, as they were happening, he would
try to influence the situation so that they
1801.48 -> did not happen. And the only way that he could
do that now is to say to his military leaders,
1808.669 -> I want you to escalate the violence, escalate
the fighting, do a better job, win this war
1814.74 -> on the ground, and they would say, 'we're
trying, but we can't and so Mr. Putin, our
1819.991 -> only other option is to use a nuclear weapon'.
So I think when we see Ukraine having tremendous
1826.899 -> success in this region, this is the time to
be most watchful for a nuclear weapon, because
1834.241 -> I think that will be Putin's go to.
1837.48 -> In which case, I didn't mean, what do you
want, personally, obviously. This is a very
1839.306 -> unhappy situation but what do you think the
safest, medium-term outcome is then? What
1842.62 -> should we be wishing for if the safety of
the world is the main objective? Is it frozen
1845.54 -> conflict, as some people talk about where
there's not much movement either way? Is it
1849.76 -> some kind of deal? Where should the US go?
1855.299 -> I think in this case, we're not talking about
a nuclear event for the rest of the world.
1864.38 -> We're focused really on Ukraine, and what
happens there and the United States has said,
1874.019 -> and I believe it's the right policy that we
want Ukraine to ultimately get its territory
1880.58 -> back, either by military means or by negotiation.
The United States has said many times to President
1890.6 -> Zelensky, 'we will support you if you choose
to negotiate, we are ready for you to negotiate
1898.76 -> if that's what you want to do'. But we're
not in a position and neither do we want to
1906.269 -> as a national policy dictate to Ukraine, when
that time comes that they would negotiate,
1913.37 -> or when that time comes that they would stop
the fighting from their side and say, 'this
1919.19 -> is enough, we're finished with with the killing
and the fighting and we want to talk now'.
1927.22 -> So I think we're waiting for Ukraine to get
to that point. Russia, I think is at that
1933.45 -> point. I think Russia for all its size and
power, they are ready to take a ceasefire.
1940.28 -> They would be happy. They would be they would
be ready to accept the status quo right now.
1950.22 -> Having taken essentially 20% of Ukraine and
created a landbridge etc, etc. I think Putin
1956.86 -> and others would be okay with that. Shoigu
the Minister of Defence has said that.
1962.1 -> But the Ukrainians would not.
1964.26 -> No they would not and that's the reason that
the Russians cannot-
1965.94 -> It's their country as they see it, which has
suddenly been invaded and fair enough, they
1971.67 -> don't want to just say, 'okay, keep it'.
1973.82 -> Fair enough
1974.91 -> So the question has to be, if you're right,
in this very speculative world, if you're
1982.389 -> right that the nuclear threat is at least
higher, significantly higher than people are
1986.38 -> giving it credit for, how should that alter
Western strategy? Or maybe it doesn't? What
1992.66 -> would your message be to NATO leaders for
what do we do tomorrow? What do we do in a
1997.889 -> week's time?
1998.889 -> My message to them is that the era of no nuclear
weapons being used on a battlefield may be
2010.75 -> over. And we should start thinking about all
of our responses in that context. We should
2019.399 -> be thinking, 'okay, yesterday, a nuclear weapon
was used in Ukraine, and this happened and
2028.61 -> this was destroyed and this many people died.'
And today, Ukraine is facing its question,
2037.75 -> what to do going forward. So NATO, what should
we do going forward? How should we change?
2049.77 -> Some people will will argue we should settle,
we should seek peace with Russia. We should
2058.169 -> 'force' quote-un-quote, Ukraine to quit its
war, or its defending itself. Other people
2068.22 -> will take the other side. Which is right?
What is the right way forward? That's not
2076.22 -> for me to say, but that's certainly for NATO
to start thinking about.
2081.22 -> Retired brigadier, General Kevin Ryan, thank
you so much for your time today.
2084.579 -> Thank you very much.
2086.47 -> Well, I certainly hope he's wrong, and that
we never find out either way. For the record,
2091.84 -> I have no idea how plausible such an attack
might be. My instinct is that when you start
2096.42 -> to spell out the real world implications,
it does not seem possible, no matter who the
2101.579 -> President of Russia is, but we want to get
all perspectives on this channel, particularly
2106.01 -> those that are not well represented elsewhere.
And Kevin Ryan certainly has the CV that demands
2111.81 -> at the very least, to be taken seriously.
Thanks for tuning in. This was UnHerd
2116.07 -> Transcribed by https://otter.ai
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OzwMGOGEPqA