Tempting Armageddon: Soviet vs. NATO Nuclear Strategy

Tempting Armageddon: Soviet vs. NATO Nuclear Strategy

Tempting Armageddon: Soviet vs. NATO Nuclear Strategy

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Since the inception of the nuclear bomb, military strategists have tried to figure out how to use them best. During the Cold War, this led to two very different doctrines but on both sides of the Iron Curtain the military wasn’t sure of you could actually win Nuclear War.

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» SOURCES
Bondarenko, V.M. “The Modern Revolution in Military Affairs and the Combat Readiness of the Armed Forces”, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil - Communist of the Armed Forces, (December 1968)

Brezhnev, L. I. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 28, No. 8 (March 1976)

Bundy, McGeorge, Danger and Survival, (New York, NY : Random House, 1988)
Carnegie Endowment for Internatinal Peace, “JFK on Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation” (2003) https://carnegieendowment.org/2003/11…

Catadul, Honoré M., Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: A Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking, (Berlin : Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 1988)

Craig, Campell \u0026 Radchenko, Sergey, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008)

Holloway, David, “Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb, 1939-45”, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 11, No. 2, Theme Issue: Soviet Science (May, 1981)

Josephson, Paul R., Red Atom: Russia’s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today, (New York, NY : W.H. Freeman and Company, 1999)

Kiser, John W., “How the Arms Race Really Helps Moscow”, Foreign Policy, No. 60 (Autumn, 1985)

Malinovskiy, R. Ya. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 14, No. 1 (November 1961)

Pondrom, Lee G. The Soviet Atomic Project: How the Soviet Union Obtained the Atomic Bomb, (Singapore : World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.)

Rauf, Tariq, “Soviet Perspective on Nuclear War”, Strategic Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1985)

ertais, Bruno, “In Defense of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons”, Proliferation Papers, No. 39 (2011)



»CREDITS
Presented by: Jesse Alexander
Written by: Mark Newton
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All rights reserved - Real Time History GmbH 2023


Content

0 -> When the United States created the atomic bomb  in 1945, they didn’t hesitate to use to help end  
5.76 -> the Second World War. But with the Cold War came  new fears. Soviet and American planners had near  
11.7 -> apocalyptic power at their fingertips, but it was  difficult to see how they could use it without  
16.74 -> destroying the world. Many asked themselves a  fundamental question: “Can you win a nuclear war?”
33.96 -> Atomic weapons development in the  1940s fundamentally shifted the  
38.04 -> strategic and military status quo  between the great powers. In 1945,  
42.84 -> the US already showed even primitive atomic  weapons’ destructive potential. In 1949,  
48.36 -> the Soviet Union tested their own bomb  to rebalance a growing technological  
52.92 -> and military gulf between the two superpowers. After the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,  
58.32 -> US President Harry Truman was slow to adopt  a formal policy. For him the bombs were not  
64.14 -> a weapon of war, but purely a political tool to  be only used in the most extreme circumstances.  
69.9 -> As he reminded his generals, the president  had to approve the use of atomic weapons: 
76.92 -> “...you have to understand that this isn’t  a military weapon… it is used to wipe out  
81.24 -> women and children and unarmed people,  and not for military uses.” (Bundy 200)
87.84 -> Despite some reservations, the  US continued to build up its  
91.56 -> stockpiles and aircraft capable of  delivering them. Truman reassured  
95.4 -> his military staff he would not hesitate  to use the bomb again if he needed to.
101.28 -> Soviet strategy also didn’t change much  after developing their bomb. In 1946,  
106.2 -> Stalin even suggested the bomb only inspired  fear in those who lacked a strong will:
113.64 -> “I do not believe the atomic bomb to be so serious  a force as certain politicians are inclined to  
119.52 -> consider it. Atomic bombs are intended to  frighten the weak-nerved, but they cannot  
124.5 -> decide the outcome of a war, since they are by  no means adequate for this purpose.” (Catudal 40)
130.86 -> Following the US atomic bombings in 1945, Stalin  deliberately pursued an aggressive, obstinate  
136.68 -> policy to show the US he was not intimidated. Once  the Soviet Union got its own bomb in 1949, Stalin  
144.24 -> simply added them to the Red Army’s inventory. The  principles of war he developed during WW2 – the  
150.3 -> so-called “five permanently operating factors”  remained intact. These focused on the morale,  
156.12 -> quantity, quality, and support for conven tional  land forces, and the stability of the rear.
162.84 -> Then in 1953, things suddenly changed. In the  US, President Dwight Eisenhower replaced Truman,  
169.5 -> and in the Soviet Union, Stalin died and  Nikita Khrushchev, after a power struggle,  
174.54 -> became first secretary. With these leadership  changes came technological developments.
180.3 -> On November 1st, 1952, the US detonated the first  hydrogen thermonuclear weapon. Within H-bombs,  
187.62 -> a fission reaction – like in an atomic bomb –  is used to trigger the fusion of hydrogen atoms,  
193.5 -> releasing even more energy in an  explosion. H-bombs can be thousands  
198.36 -> of times more powerful than atomic  weapons, creating so-called “city  
202.56 -> killers”. Their potential was not lost  on UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill:  
209.82 -> “There is an immense gulf between the atomic and  the hydrogen bomb. The atomic bomb, with all its  
216.3 -> terrors, did not carry us outside the scope of  human control or manageable events in thought  
221.82 -> or action, in peace or war. But [with the hydrogen  bomb], the entire foundation of human affairs was  
228.78 -> revolutionized, and mankind placed in a situation  both measurable and laden with doom.” (Bundy 198)
237.06 -> Less than a year after the  US test, the Soviets tested  
240.9 -> their own hydrogen bomb – although it  was still not in a deliverable state.
245.04 -> Not only were hydrogen bombs more powerful  they were also much smaller than atomic  
249.72 -> bombs, opening up new possible  delivery methods and strategies.
259.68 -> Both Khrushchev and Eisenhower were under  similar pressures. Both wanted to reduce military  
265.2 -> spending, and nuclear weapons appeared to give  them a way to do this. Compared to maintaining  
270.3 -> huge conventional forces, strategic nuclear  weapons could achieve the same military power more  
276.24 -> cheaply. Eisenhower also felt the need to offset  the Soviet Union’s huge conventional advantage:
284.46 -> “…we knew that the Soviets maintained  something in the neighborhood of 175  
288.84 -> divisions active in Europe at all times.  The United States had twenty divisions,  
293.64 -> only five of which were in Europe. Therefore,  in the view of the disparity in the strengths  
298.98 -> of the opposing ground forces, it seemed  clear that only by the imposition of our  
303.6 -> nuclear weapons could we promptly stop a major  Communist aggression in that area.” (Bundy 248)
310.26 -> But Eisenhower also inherited some of Truman’s  opinions on nuclear weapons. To him, victory  
316.2 -> and defeat in nuclear war were essentially  the same, as he told a group of advisors:
322.14 -> “the only greater possible  tragedy greater than winning  
325.08 -> a [nuclear] war would be losing it.” (Bundy 253)
328.86 -> So in October 1953, Eisenhower developed a  New Look policy. He publicly stated he was  
335.22 -> ready to use nuclear weapons just as any  other munitions, but his true intention  
339.9 -> was deterrence. The United States would use  its nuclear weapons as part of a doctrine of  
345.12 -> massive retaliation, not as a first strike.  If the Soviets attacked the US or its Allies,  
350.88 -> an American nuclear response would make any  Soviet useless. The US also developed more  
357.6 -> diverse delivery systems, like submarines  and hardened silos. These ensured that even  
362.7 -> if the Soviets struck first, the Americans  could respond with “assured destruction.”
368.52 -> Eisenhower gambled in the belief that Soviet  leaders, despite their ideological differences,  
373.62 -> were still rational men and did  not want to provoke Armageddon.
378.78 -> While the US relied on a potential nuclear  response to prevent war, the Soviet Union took  
384.18 -> a different approach. Some experts suggest the  English meaning of “deterrence” does not have an  
389.76 -> exact Russian language equivalent, and that Soviet  nuclear strategy was rooted in the Red Army’s  
395.64 -> offensive tradition. So the Soviets developed  plans to not only fight a nuclear war but win one.
402.78 -> For the USSR, war was a  social and political contest,  
407.4 -> as well as a military one. That meant Soviet  military science was subordinate to political  
413.1 -> doctrine and had to operate under the same  Marxist-Leninist principles. These state,  
418.08 -> among other things, that war can be a vehicle  for great social change and any contest between  
423.54 -> capitalist and socialist nations will  always result in a socialist victory.
428.34 -> With these principles in mind, an un-winnable war  as envisioned by Eisenhower simply cannot exist.  
435.06 -> However, Soviet political doctrine  also stated that only imperialist,  
440.22 -> capitalist states start wars...but at  the same time it was clear the side  
445.2 -> who attacked first in a nuclear  war would have a huge advantage.
448.74 -> To escape this dilemma, the Soviets  concentrated on pre-emptive strikes.  
453.36 -> Only when they were sure a US attack was  imminent would they launch their nuclear  
458.64 -> weapons. The objective was to eliminate  enemy military forces – including nuclear  
463.86 -> weapons - disorganise their rear areas and  suppress the will to resist. As destroying  
469.5 -> 100 percent of the enemy’s strategic nuclear  weapons was unlikely, Soviet authorities relied  
474.66 -> on strong civil defence measures to minimize  damage from an American retaliatory strike.
480.36 -> This approach required permanent strategic  nuclear forces that were always on high alert.  
485.4 -> In 1961, Minister of Defence Marshal  Rodion Malinovsky made this clear:
492.72 -> “A realistic assessment of the picture would  lead one to believe that what the imperialists  
497.58 -> are preparing is a surprise nuclear attack on  the USSR and the socialist countries. Hence  
503.58 -> Soviet military doctrine regards it as the most  important, the pre-eminent, the first-priority  
509.64 -> task of the armed forces to be in a state of  constant readiness for effectively repulsing  
515.22 -> a surprise attack by the enemy and thwarting his  criminal designs.” (R. Ya. Malinovskiy, p. 20)
520.62 -> The Soviet Union’s new Strategic Rocket  Forces would be responsible for thisc,  
524.88 -> decisive strike. Initially, strategic bombers like  the Tu-20 Bear and M-4 Bison were the primary arm,  
532.02 -> but the US was simply too far away to rely on slow  bombers. Happily for the Soviets, throughout the  
538.44 -> 1950s, they’d made huge advances in rocketry,  as illustrated by Sputnik’s launch in 1957. 
544.92 -> That same year, the Soviet Union developed their  first intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM.  
557.16 -> Competition between the US and USSR, and  especially concerns about a potential  
562.14 -> “missile gap”, led both sides' to build  more and more nuclear weapons. By 1960,  
567.96 -> the US had a clear superiority with  
571.8 -> 18,000 bombs to the Soviet Union’s 1,600. It is important to note – as some US analysts  
577.98 -> did – that saying nuclear victory is possible  is not the same as saying it’s desirable. Any  
585.12 -> Soviet nuclear victory would be pyrrhic and  involve devastation beyond comprehension. Soviet  
591.18 -> doctrine must be seen from the perspective  of their experience in the Second World War,  
595.14 -> where poor preparation resulted in horrendous  losses when Germany attacked. Nuclear weapon  
601.5 -> expert Tariq Rauf suggested the Soviet approach  acted as a different kind of deterrent: 
608.28 -> “The Soviets do not need a direct [language  equivalent] of [deterrence] to practice it.  
612.78 -> The leaders of the Soviet Union realize that  nuclear war would be an unprecedented disaster  
618.18 -> for socialism. The Soviets, however,  have always believed that the best way  
622.8 -> to deter war is to prepare to wage it,  in case deterrence fails.” (Rauf 85)
628.44 -> Regardless of real Soviet intentions, the  pre-emptive strike strategy was extremely  
633.48 -> dangerous. Miscommunications,  misinterpreted intelligence,  
637.14 -> or technical glitches could all potentially  become triggers for a Soviet pre-emptive strike.
648.84 -> So, through the late 1950s and into the 1960s,  both the US and USSR had developed some kind of  
655.86 -> nuclear strategy – America’s based on overwhelming  response and the Soviets’ on pre-emption. However,  
662.46 -> Cold War tensions and new technologies soon  sent planners back to the drawing board.
668.64 -> The early 1960s brought a series of crises  which severely tested the US and USSR’s  
674.64 -> resolve and strategies. The 1961 Berlin Crisis  and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis pushed both  
681.6 -> sides uncomfortably close to implementing their  war plans – with likely catastrophic results. 
688.08 -> Luckily, cooler heads prevailed, but on  both sides of the Iron Curtain there was  
692.64 -> a realisation that their post-WWII strategies  were fairly inflexible. Nuclear weapons had not  
698.52 -> ended US-Soviet conflict - they had simply  pushed it elsewhere, like Cuba and Vietnam.  
703.5 -> Politicians and generals needed more options. In coordination with Secretary of Defence  
709.38 -> Robert McNamara, President John Kennedy developed  flexible response, a series of diverse strategies  
715.26 -> which included conventional military,  political, economic, and nuclear options.  
720.48 -> The hope was this would allow western forces in  the NATO alliance to conduct operations without  
725.58 -> necessarily provoking direct nuclear retaliation  by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. Nuclear weapons  
732.54 -> were still on the table, but they would be  initially limited to “demonstrative use” or  
737.88 -> against purely military targets. In 1962 McNamara  stated the US would not target Soviet cities,  
744.72 -> if the Soviets agreed to do the same. Given that  most military installations are near cities,  
750.42 -> such statements were more  optimistic than practical. 
755.58 -> At the same time, the US developed its  strategic triad – ICBMs, strategic bombers,  
761.58 -> and submarines – to make it clear to the Soviets  that a pre-emptive strike would be useless.  
767.46 -> Some kind of US nuclear capability  would survive a Soviet first-strike. 
772.92 -> Attitudes were also shifting in the  USSR. First secretary Leonid Brezhnev  
777.96 -> also began to downplay the possibility of  winning a war, and shifted more attention  
782.94 -> to conventional forces, an approach he called  “speak-softly-while-you-are-carrying-a-big-stick".  
789.72 -> In 1968, the Communist of the Armed  Forces stated the Soviet view: 
796.68 -> “The point is that the new possibilities  of waging armed struggle (meaning for  
801.3 -> using conventional forces)  have arisen not in spite of,  
804.54 -> but because of, the nuclear missile  weapons…” (V.M. Bondarenko, p. 29)
810.9 -> Technology once again played a role in changes  in the 1970s as well. By the early 70s,  
816.24 -> ICBMs equipped with multiple individually  targetable thermonuclear warheads greatly  
821.94 -> increased even a single ICBM’s  destructive potential. The USSR  
826.62 -> had also caught up with the US and by 1975  had 20,000 nuclear warheads to the US’s  
834.6 -> 27,000. Soviet leaders now considered it unlikely  the US would launch an unprovoked attack against  
840.18 -> the USSR, rendering their pre-emptive  strike strategies obsolete. Instead,  
845.46 -> with financial pressures also playing a role, the  1970s brought discussions on arms limitations.
851.22 -> In 1972, the Strategic Arms  Limitation Treaty I was signed,  
856.32 -> allowing both sides to complete  launchers and warheads currently  
859.62 -> under construction but not to build new  ones. By 1976, Brezhnev was optimistic:
868.2 -> “Although world peace is still by no  means guaranteed, we have every reason  
872.82 -> to say with confidence that the improvement  in the international climate is convincing  
877.74 -> evidence that the achievement of lasting  peace is not merely a good intention  
882.12 -> but a realistic aim.” (L . I . Brezhnev,  CDSP vol. 28, no. 8 (March, 1976), p. 8)
885.84 -> The 1972 arms treaty brought hope,  but the reality was not the same for  
890.4 -> everyone. Limitation treaties largely applied  to intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons  
895.56 -> aimed at nuclear states, the non-nuclear  states of Europe were still worried.
901.14 -> First, treaties were difficult to monitor, and  the superpowers still didn’t trust each other.  
905.76 -> The US pulled out of further talks following the  Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the discovery  
911.1 -> of Soviet troops in Cuba. Similarly, the US,  Britain and France refused to reciprocate a  
917.16 -> Soviet “no-first-use” policy, considering it  Soviet propaganda. Some scholars suggest the  
923.34 -> Soviets wanted to use the no-first use pledge  to support conventional operations. After all  
929.22 -> it was unlikely the Soviet Union would need to  use nuclear weapons during a conventional attack.  
934.68 -> Soviet restraint would limit a NATO  response to weaker conventional forces.
939.12 -> But military figures on both sides  still clung to nuclear weapons,  
943.68 -> and NATO knew conventional forces alone  would not be enough to deter Soviet attack.  
948.66 -> UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher  once reportedly reminded her allies:
955.38 -> “There is a monument to the failure of  
957.84 -> conventional deterrence in every  French village.” (Tertrais 127)
962.7 -> The reduction in the size of nuclear warheads  allowed for tactical nuclear artillery,  
966.96 -> intermediate range missiles, and  nuclear land mines. NATO planners in  
971.82 -> Europe would especially rely on these  to stop a Soviet attack through the  
976.2 -> so-called Fulda Gap in West Germany – the  expected site of any Warsaw Pact invasion.
981.78 -> NATO forces consistently trained in  Nuclear-Biological-Chemical protective  
986.52 -> gear in expectation of a nuclear battlefield,  
989.28 -> and both sides developed radiation resistant  equipment, like hermetically sealed tanks. These  
995.22 -> developments showed a nuclear battlefield  was not only theorised but anticipated
1000.68 -> The Soviet Union also likely planned to use a  nuclear barrage in a European-wide conflict.  
1005.9 -> Several plans were developed throughout the  period, but a Soviet invasion simulation  
1010.28 -> of West Germany, dubbed ‘Seven Days to the  Rhine’, opened with nuclear strikes on Italy,  
1015.26 -> West Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and  Belgium – while some plans even called for  
1020.36 -> strikes on neutral Austria. Their goal  was to disrupt NATO rear areas and ports,  
1025.64 -> while capitals were largely spared  to pressure governments to surrender.  
1030.2 -> Conventional Warsaw Pact forces would then occupy  the devastated nations and push to the Rhine.
1036.74 -> The Soviets planned to spare France,  the US and Britain of nuclear strikes,  
1041.3 -> likely to avoid nuclear retaliation and provide  a basis for a negotiated peace. Of course,  
1047.06 -> it’s very possible a Soviet strike against any  NATO ally would provoke a response from all.
1052.82 -> However, it is worth noting, that the Soviets  envisioned this plan as the response to a NATO  
1058.46 -> nuclear first strike in Poland and Czechoslovakia  as the prelude to a NATO invasion of East Germany.  
1064.76 -> There is also debate about how  serious these plans really were,  
1068.3 -> although the Soviets did distribute  them to Warsaw Pact members.
1072.38 -> As the world entered the 1980s,  neither side had been able to develop  
1076.1 -> a working strategy. Mutually assured  destruction provided no flexibility,  
1080.78 -> but flexible responses provided too many  unknown variables, and the possibility for  
1086.24 -> uncontrollable escalation. It was now patently  clear a general nuclear war was unwinnable,  
1092.18 -> but military planners still needed to  attempt to develop strategies capable of  
1097.1 -> bringing victory. US Ambassador to NATO Harland  Cleveland commented on these paradoxes in 1983:
1105.26 -> “Nuclear weapons have turned out to  be ‘ultimate’ in an unanticipated  
1109.34 -> sense of the word. No nation’s military  planners have been able, in 38 years,  
1114.44 -> to think up a way to use such huge explosions  with such pervasive aftereffects in ways that  
1120.5 -> are clearly advantageous to their side.  This may be the most important thing about  
1125.48 -> nuclear weapons in the 1980s: that they  are militarily unusable.” (Catudal 114)
1131.9 -> 1983 also brought more tension and  two more close calls. In September,  
1137.24 -> the Soviets shot down a Korean Air passenger  plane, which had veered into restricted  
1141.86 -> airspace. Later that month a malfunction in  the Soviet early warning system showed five  
1147.26 -> US ICBMs heading for the Soviet Union, even  though there were none. The engineer on duty,  
1153.14 -> Stanislav Petrov, decided not to follow  protocol and did not trigger the alarm,  
1157.82 -> which would have guaranteed a Soviet  nuclear response. He soon discovered  
1162.32 -> the warning was a glitch, and likely prevented  a nuclear exchange and the deaths of millions.
1168.26 -> Then, in November 1983, NATO carried  out an exercise named Able Archer,  
1172.16 -> which simulated a nuclear attack in  Western Europe. The Soviets suspected  
1176.66 -> it was really a ruse for war and  equipped their nuclear force for  
1180.2 -> imminent retaliation. NATO commanders decided  not to respond to the Soviet military activity,  
1185.48 -> and eventually the exercise  was concluded without incident.
1189.44 -> Although no nuclear weapons were launched,  such incidents showed that deterrence’s  
1193.76 -> stability was not always guaranteed,  especially in times of heightened tension.
1199.4 -> The realisation that deterrence wasn’t foolproof,  
1202.16 -> combined with large conventional and nuclear  forces’ growing expense, signalled a further  
1207.68 -> shift. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR  underwent economic and social reforms  
1213.14 -> designed to open Soviet society. Coinciding  with this, was a renewal of arms limitation  
1218.96 -> agreements. Under Gorbachev, the official  TASS news agency signalled the changes:
1225.74 -> “A nuclear war is impermissible.  There can be no victors. Mutual  
1230.96 -> understanding on this question has  been recorded on the summit level.  
1234.5 -> Practical conclusions should be  drawn from it.” (Catudal 122)
1239.36 -> Growing public concern regarding nuclear  weapons help push policymakers further  
1244.04 -> away from considering nuclear war.  Films and books portrayed nuclear  
1248.3 -> weapons apocalyptic potential in a  new way, presenting nuclear war as  
1252.74 -> a general catastrophe for all peoples  regardless of their political beliefs.
1257 -> The 1986 Chernobyl disaster further highlighted  the dangers of unbridled nuclear forces,  
1263.24 -> and likely sped up the Soviet Union’s eventual  demise. Just before the collapse in 1991,  
1269.24 -> the US and USSR signed the Strategic Arms  Reduction Treaty, the most comprehensive to date.  
1275.54 -> The two countries pledged to reduce  stockpiles to 6,000 nuclear warheads  
1279.98 -> each, which meant that by 2001, 80% of  nuclear weapons had been decommissioned.
1285.5 -> The stability of deterrence is still a matter  of heated debate. Supporters claim deterrence  
1291.68 -> prevents another great power war, while  critics suggest this benefit is by no  
1296.3 -> means guaranteed in the future, especially as  new actors, weapons and crises emerge. There  
1302.08 -> is also an important moral aversion  to concepts of mutual destruction,  
1305.72 -> spurred by globalisation , climate catastrophe  and international tension. This is not entirely  
1311.9 -> new though. As early as 1962, President  Kennedy claimed nuclear weapons gamble  
1317.18 -> today’s security against the future’s, and  create a pessimistic geo-political world:
1324.26 -> “World order will be secured only when the whole  world has laid down these weapons which seem  
1330.02 -> to offer us present security but threaten the  future survival of the human race... The vast  
1336.08 -> resources on this planet are being devoted  more and more to the means of destroying,  
1341.12 -> instead of enriching human life  but the world was not meant to be  
1345.8 -> a prison in which man awaits his  execution.” (Carnegie Endowment)
1350.78 -> More recently, new powers have obtained,  or are close to obtaining, nuclear weapons,  
1355.88 -> and powers like North Korea and Russia  have openly threatened to use theirs.  
1360.2 -> The so-called “nuclear club” currently has nine  members, and with possession comes new policies  
1366.14 -> and strategies for their use. For most members,  including North Korea and Israel, nuclear weapons  
1371.72 -> provide coercive power and protection from real  or perceived existential threats. But nuclear  
1377.96 -> proliferation also increases deterrence-based  relationships across the globe and the resulting  
1383.12 -> risks. Whether a future nuclear war can be  won remains an open and a menacing question.
1390.26 -> The energy from nuclear fission is not just for  military use of course. During the cold war, both  
1395.96 -> the West and the Soviet Union started utilizing  nuclear power for civilian use. Soviet scientists  
1401.72 -> even dreamed of “Nuclear Powered Communism”. A new  young and optimistic generation settled down in  
1408.26 -> so called Atomgrads around the USSR. I am sure you  have heard of one of these atomic cities at least:  
1413.72 -> Pripyat just north of Kyiv and next to the  Chernobyl reactor. If you are interested to  
1419.24 -> learn more about the Soviet nuclear program from  its origins in WW2 to the Chernobyl disaster and  
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1482.18 -> do it without you. I am Jesse Alexander, and  this is a production of Real Time History,  
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Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rkCMD715-NE