The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Deterrence

Aug 10, 2023

The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence has been a cornerstone of U.S. defense since the end of World War II, seeking to protect the country’s security and that of its allies by threatening unacceptable damage to any country that might attack with nuclear weapons or by other means. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been able to focus on reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons and strengthening nonproliferation. But now big changes are again afoot in the global context … will Russia’s current modernization of its nuclear arsenal and China’s buildup of strategic nuclear forces threaten the viability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, including the extended deterrence the United States provides to its allies? Is arms control still possible?

China has historically maintained a “minimum” strategic nuclear deterrent but is now engaged in an unprecedented build up and diversification of its nuclear arsenal; a decade from now, it will match if not surpass the United States in deployed weapons. Russia is also upgrading its nuclear weapons, and in February “suspended” its adherence to the New START arms control treaty, which limits U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 deployed warheads each.

What are China’s and Russia’s objectives in accelerating their nuclear weapons programs? How do their nuclear policies relate to their grand strategies and other military activities, such as the war in Ukraine for Russia, and the Chinese buildup of naval forces in the Pacific, and to their perceptions or misperceptions of United States activities? What are the implications for U.S. and world security? To maintain deterrence, will the United States be compelled to match the nuclear arsenals of both Russia and China? What do U.S. allies want and need from the United States and what can they contribute to deterrence?

What are the prospects for arms control, or other strategies to place limits on this potential new nuclear arms race? Do new technologies, such as those for homeland missile defense, offer some escape from the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence?

About the Speakers

Brad Roberts is the director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he recently chaired a study group on China’s emergence as a second nuclear peer of the United States. Prior to this position, he was deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy. Dr. Roberts was also a consulting professor at Stanford University and William Perry Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Dr. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Photos courtesy the speakers.

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Content

0.466 -> Become a sustaining member of the Commonwealth Club for just $10

3.9 -> a month.

30.1 -> Hello, everyone.

31.9 -> I'm Gloria Duffy, president and CEO of the Commonwealth Club.

35.433 -> And welcome to our discussion this evening

38.5 -> of the uncertain future of nuclear deterrence.

43.366 -> Nuclear deterrence is a dangerous, nerve wracking concept

47.566 -> brought about by the development of nuclear weapons,

50.9 -> also known by the striking terms

54 -> such as the balance of terror or mutual assured destruction.

58.033 -> It's the way the U.S.

59.3 -> and Russia essentially hold one another hostage.

63.333 -> As terrible as deterrence is, it's been relatively stable

67.2 -> since World War two,

70.3 -> preventing reckless behavior

72.133 -> that could result in nuclear destruction.

76.133 -> Now, however, there are a number of new factors to consider.

81.733 -> Russia is engaging in the modernization of its nuclear forces,

85.833 -> and it has implied that it could use nuclear weapons

89.7 -> in the conflict in the in Ukraine under certain circumstances.

95.166 -> China is engaged in a major buildup of its nuclear forces

98.6 -> from a small deterrent to a large force equal to those of the U.S.

103.7 -> and Russia.

105.433 -> Many arms control

106.5 -> agreements are best way to manage the nuclear danger.

110.533 -> For the past seven decades have been abandoned.

114.5 -> Will these developments destabilize the nuclear balance?

118.4 -> And what should the U.S.

119.7 -> do in response here to discuss this

122.9 -> very challenging situation are two experts

126.133 -> on security, nuclear weapons, deterrence and China.

130.4 -> Brad Roberts and Tom Finger.

133.733 -> Tom Finger is Shorenstein, a professor at the Freeman Spogli

137.7 -> Institute of International Studies at Stanford University,

141.766 -> a China expert and career intelligence community leader.

145.5 -> He served as chair of the U.S.

147.7 -> National Intelligence Council.

150.466 -> Also with us is Brad Roberts,

152.333 -> director of the Center for Global Security Research at the Lawrence Livermore

156.233 -> National Laboratory, where he recently chaired a study group

160.533 -> on China's emergence as a nuclear peer of the United States.

165.5 -> Previously, he served as Deputy Assistant

167.666 -> Secretary of Defense for nuclear and missile defense policy.

172.2 -> Brad and

172.666 -> Tom will each make some remarks followed by discussion.

176.666 -> Please. Those who are watching tonight

179.166 -> put your questions and comments in the YouTube chat.

182.4 -> I will relay them to our guests and we'll have a good discussion.

185.966 -> So I'm going to turn first to Brad Roberts for some opening comments.

191.066 -> Gloria, thanks so much for putting this together for us tonight.

194.466 -> Thank you for the opportunity to participate.

197.7 -> I should also begin by making clear that the

201 -> personal views I express are my personal views.

203.766 -> I'm not here representing my employer or any of its sponsors.

209.4 -> As I thought about this event tonight.

212.333 -> It occurred to me that it's been a long time since we Americans

216.7 -> have had a a deep and broad conversation about nuclear weapons.

221.7 -> When the

222 -> Cold War ended, we put them on the back burner.

225.766 -> We stopped thinking about them.

227.366 -> We stop worrying about them very much.

230.066 -> There were moments of anxiety with Al-Queda

234.233 -> and Iran and North Korea, but generally they've been in the background.

238.533 -> And that's because when the Cold War ended, major changes

242.466 -> in the security environment

245.966 -> made possible big changes in our nuclear

248.333 -> policy and posture.

251.5 -> And one chapter ended and another began.

256.066 -> Well, in today's circumstances, we're we're at the end of another chapter.

261.1 -> We're at the end of that chapter that began in the early 1990s.

265.433 -> And a new chapter has begun.

267.766 -> And I think it's going to have implications, at least as wide

270.966 -> ranging for our policy and our posture

274.366 -> as the end of the Cold War.

276.666 -> The difficulty, of course, is that the Cold War made it possible

279.466 -> to do a lot of things that we wanted to do

282.933 -> and the nuclear policy around.

285.266 -> We wanted to reduce the role and number and salience of nuclear weapons.

290.033 -> We wanted to deepen the arms control process.

293.366 -> We wanted to expand the arms control process.

296.4 -> And we wanted to not spend money modernizing these weapons.

301.066 -> And we were able to do all of those things.

303.2 -> And today's circumstance, we face a number of

307.133 -> implications and challenges

309 -> that are unpleasant for us to contemplate.

313.233 -> Let me make this case a little more

316.666 -> clearly.

317.333 -> At the end of the Cold War,

319.8 -> of course, relations

321.666 -> among the major powers improved dramatically.

325.466 -> And in the 1990 as well,

328.766 -> let's put it this way, the administration of

332.333 -> President George W Bush issued a national security strategy

335.733 -> which said we were in a moment of unprecedented opportunity historically

340.5 -> to move major power relations onto a new footing of common interests,

345.333 -> common responsibilities, and increasingly common values,

350.7 -> which is that we're a long way away.

353.933 -> We've gone from partnership

357 -> to competition to rivalry

360.266 -> to outright aggression by Russia in pursuit of its revisionist

364.5 -> or a President Putin's revisionist agenda.

368.133 -> And, of course, in this revisionist agenda, President Putin

372.066 -> has given a central place to nuclear weapons and nuclear war.

377 -> He considers them the primary

379.466 -> instruments of Russian national power.

382.566 -> And he he brags repeatedly about having kept

385.866 -> Russia's nuclear power powder dry during a long period

390.366 -> when Russian weakness was exploited by the West.

394.766 -> And he's developed a military strategy that involves,

400.933 -> quote, nuclear scalpels for

402.733 -> every military problem in Europe, unquote,

406.633 -> who might be employed on a limited basis

409.5 -> to, quote, sober but not enrage

413.466 -> his enemies.

416.466 -> And, of course, we've been shaken in our thinking about deterrence of Russia

420.7 -> by the miscalculations that President Putin has made over

424.4 -> Ukraine.

427.8 -> Secondly, China,

430.566 -> of course, in the 1990s,

432.633 -> China was an afterthought in the nuclear discussion.

435.6 -> China was a country

436.466 -> with 20 nuclear tipped missiles capable of reaching the United States.

441.2 -> It has a no first use policy.

443.5 -> Wasn't spending much money on modernization,

446.7 -> and the political relationship between China and the West seemed to be

450.566 -> more or less headed in the right direction, albeit slowly.

455.6 -> And of course, in today's world,

458.633 -> President Xi and Putin see eye to eye about the problems

462 -> presented to them by the world order dominated by the United States.

468.366 -> And apparently, Mr.

470.6 -> President, Xi has had

473.1 -> a change of heart about nuclear weapons because he's pursued

477.033 -> the largest peacetime build up of nuclear weapons by China.

480.866 -> It's a buildup.

482.233 -> It's a modernization.

483.966 -> It's a diversified nation building.

486.333 -> No new types of weapons for different roles.

490.933 -> And of course,

493.566 -> we don't know

495.133 -> what role these might play in a conflict over Taiwan.

498.8 -> And we don't know what President

502.4 -> Xi might consider to be enough nuclear weapons.

507.033 -> We hope that all he's motivated by is a sprint to parity.

511.533 -> But he's also talked about developing a military posture consistent with China's

516.733 -> place, quote, at the center of the world stage

520.3 -> in the dominant position.

524.066 -> A third part of the chapter that began when the Cold War ended

528.766 -> and is now ending is our optimism about nuclear nonproliferation.

533.9 -> In 1995 to great fanfare, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was

539.933 -> given a

540.766 -> new lease on life, and there seemed to be some headway among the permanent

545.7 -> five members of the Security Council in dealing with

549.733 -> the proliferation challenges.

553.2 -> And of course, in today's world, North Korea has long since crossed the nuclear

558.1 -> threshold and appears well on the way to having a small nuclear arsenal

563.133 -> of many dozens of weapons and perhaps a couple of hundreds of weapons.

567.066 -> We don't we don't know.

569.5 -> The North Korean leader expressed a commitment to a, quote, substantial

573.733 -> buildup of tactical nuclear weapons

576.9 -> in the years ahead.

581.266 -> Fourthly,

583.2 -> our allies

585.333 -> in the 1990, as our allies were newly safe and secure

589 -> and at peace with the Cold War ended.

595.333 -> Many of them don't feel that way anymore.

597.566 -> Many of them feel

599.7 -> in the nuclear crosshairs

601.833 -> of North Korea or China or Russia

605.366 -> and the objects of their strategies to try to separate

609.133 -> America's allies from each other and from America.

613.7 -> And thus we have worried South Korean allies talking about nuclear

619 -> needs of their own and European allies talking about

623.333 -> how to strengthen external nuclear deterrence.

627.466 -> So in the 1990, as many things became possible

630.533 -> because of positive developments in the security environment

634.3 -> became possible from a nuclear perspective.

637.233 -> And in today's world,

639.666 -> many things are becoming necessary

641.9 -> because of unwelcomed developments in the security environment.

647 -> And let me close with just comments on three, three points

650.5 -> about things that have become necessary.

654.333 -> One is that despite our best efforts

657.9 -> political, diplomatic and otherwise,

662.2 -> the arms control regime, as you rightly noted, Korea

666.466 -> is in collapse.

669.166 -> The bilateral US-Russian regime

672.433 -> has one one piece left in its

675 -> and Russia has essentially suspended its participation.

679.133 -> The European arms control regime that was in place in 1990 is gone.

683.8 -> And the multilateral

687.2 -> NPT, chemical weapons convention and Biological Weapons

691.166 -> Convention regime is under great stress

695.7 -> with the fact that Russia is essentially

698.5 -> a non-compliant, major power violating the treaties.

707.1 -> And so we're entering a period where the potential for arms

709.766 -> racing is clear, but where America's capacity to compete

714.3 -> is very constrained by many investment decisions already made

720.5 -> to two more points.

722.633 -> We also face the need to strengthen extended nuclear deterrence.

727.066 -> Our allies in both Europe and Asia are seeking

730.3 -> stronger nuclear protection from the United States.

734.7 -> We've tried to do this essentially on the cheap.

737.766 -> At the end of the Cold War, we brought all of our nuclear weapons home from Asia

741.866 -> and 97% of them from Europe.

744.966 -> And that that we could extend deterrence

746.866 -> to our allies with our strategic nuclear forces.

750.466 -> And they're just not assured.

753.933 -> And finally, for 30 years, we could avoid decisions

757.466 -> about whether to modernize our nuclear forces.

761.433 -> And we're in a situation today where they, the newest

764.833 -> B-52 flying the nuclear mission, entered into force in 1961.

769.8 -> The newest Minuteman missile, which was supposed to last

772.3 -> for ten years, the newest one into the ground in 1971.

777.933 -> The list goes on.

778.966 -> We we face a choice between modernizing and disarming.

784.7 -> And no one wants to make that choice.

789.266 -> And these are all politically unpopular

792.033 -> problems that we now face.

794.7 -> So with that, let we hope of help stimulate some interesting discussion.

798.4 -> Thanks so much for the opportunity, Gloria.

800.833 -> Thank you, Brad.

801.766 -> And now moving on, Tom.

803.533 -> Over to you.

805.533 -> Thank you, Gloria.

806.4 -> Thank you

807.266 -> to you and the Commonwealth Club for initiating this important discussion.

812.966 -> I will build on the points

816.166 -> that Brad has pointed to,

819.366 -> but frame it with an observation

822.266 -> that actually I'm quite sure Brad would agree with that.

825.8 -> For deterrence to be effective, it has to be based

829.233 -> on a correct understanding of those we seek to deter.

834 -> Now that

835.4 -> as we talk about the risks

838.466 -> nuclear risk posed by by Russia, China,

842.966 -> North Korea

845.1 -> and more indirectly India, Pakistan,

849.933 -> that understanding their

854.7 -> motivations and their concerns

858.4 -> has to be a part of your equation.

860.266 -> And one of the things that has

863.633 -> eroded or evaporated

865.9 -> in the years since the demise of the Soviet Union

869.9 -> is the understanding

871.8 -> that the Russians and the Chinese had of us

875.2 -> and our understanding of them,

878.733 -> that the factors that developments red identifies with sort of

883.8 -> shaking up the playing all the pieces on the game board

887.866 -> exist in all three capitals and all are responsible

893.1 -> for reconceptualize

895.866 -> and adapting to to new conditions, simply characterizing what

904.6 -> Russia is attempting to do or reputed to be doing.

909.3 -> And the same for China in accordance with the prevailing narrative

914.133 -> about the motivations in these two places, or the characteristics

918.6 -> of the regime as revisionist, for example, is really not very helpful

924.5 -> because it doesn't get at

927.533 -> what they think they are doing and why they think

930.533 -> it's necessary or desirable to do that.

934 -> So in the next few minutes, I want to

936.933 -> analyze or explain

939.3 -> in very, very brief detail

941.866 -> what I see as motivations of Russia and China.

946 -> And to explain what I think they are doing

948.6 -> is not to excuse what they're doing

951.3 -> or to denigrate its importance like that.

954.833 -> These developments cause real challenges for the United States

960.166 -> may turn first to Russian thinking

962.3 -> and developments.

965.2 -> For decades, the United States and first Soviet Union and Russia

970.133 -> had similar understanding of deterrence

973.333 -> and what the requisites are for

976.3 -> strategic stability, nuclear stability, despite vast differences

982.233 -> on other issues or shared

985.366 -> determination to avoid nuclear annihilation, and

991.566 -> our mutual

992.4 -> understanding of what the other side was worried

997 -> about was a key element of making deterrence effective.

1002.466 -> That that basis is going.

1005.633 -> And as Brad outlined, key parameters have changed.

1009.2 -> They've changed at different rates and they've changed

1011.9 -> with different consequences.

1013.366 -> And they're perceived differently in Russia

1016.533 -> and China than they are in the United States.

1020 -> And together, these changes undermine the basis

1024.1 -> and the mechanisms of deterrence.

1028.4 -> Uncertainty can be interesting,

1030.466 -> but uncertainty is not good for deterrence.

1035.9 -> In my

1037.5 -> view,

1039.366 -> among the things that have changed

1042.033 -> is the long standing assumption, I think both in Washington and Moscow,

1046.7 -> that the danger of escalation to nuclear conflict was a check

1051.8 -> on willingness to engage in conventional war.

1056.566 -> Putin's invasion of Ukraine has erased

1061 -> any confidence in that assumption.

1065.966 -> Another thing that has changed is the

1069.166 -> flip from

1070.7 -> Russian conventional super Soviet

1073.266 -> superiority and conventional forces

1076.5 -> to U.S.

1077.266 -> superiority in conventional forces.

1080.3 -> So nuclear weapons are more important

1083.833 -> to Russian thinking in Russian security calculations

1087.5 -> than they were through most of the Cold War period.

1092.833 -> How they judge that they need to deal with U.S.

1096.333 -> conventional superiority to deter us from exploiting

1100.2 -> our conventional advantages is a part

1103.266 -> of their calculus

1107 -> that Russia is now more dependent

1111.333 -> on the nuclear dimension of deterrence than it was for a long time.

1115.833 -> That makes it more dependent on its nuclear weapons,

1119.833 -> on the reliability, on the safety, on the numbers

1124 -> of its nuclear weapons, and on how we understand

1128.6 -> Russia's willingness

1131.2 -> to use those weapons.

1135.033 -> Greater dependance on nuclear weapons is part of

1138.2 -> what is driving the Russian modernization of the weaponry.

1142.566 -> But like the United States, they've got a lot of old weapons

1146.666 -> leaping ahead.

1147.466 -> Same is true of China.

1150.166 -> I would hesitate to turn it

1152.1 -> to turn on a 30 year old toaster.

1155.633 -> I'd be also very cautious about relying on 30 year

1160.266 -> old systems that haven't been updated, and that's a problem

1164.233 -> and a dimension in all three of our countries

1168.733 -> that the uncertainty

1171.4 -> about the current situation where it's heading

1176.3 -> naturally inclines

1178.866 -> Air Force planners to think they need more.

1182.6 -> If you're not sure your old weapons will work or that your modernized weapons

1187.433 -> can contend with the modernization efforts of other players,

1192.8 -> sort of one way to gain a little more confidence is to build more stuff.

1197.566 -> And the building of more stuff itself complicates

1200.933 -> everybody's calculations

1204.366 -> for Russia.

1205.5 -> They have to factor in U.S.

1208.033 -> modernization and upgrades.

1210.666 -> We know we're doing this for reliability and safety

1216.766 -> and in response to developments elsewhere.

1220.566 -> Moscow and Beijing

1222.233 -> see this as a new dimension of a problem that they have to have to deal

1227.166 -> with, have to counter and to counterbalance.

1232.166 -> Russia's calculus is also complicated by China.

1236.266 -> The steps that Brad mentioned, the expansion, the modernization,

1240.4 -> the diverse ification of China's

1242.9 -> nuclear program

1246.033 -> is a factor for the Russians.

1247.866 -> I've engaged in enough talks with the Russians recently that

1255.1 -> they understand that the old bilateral

1259.8 -> balances and control mechanisms

1264.1 -> can't work anymore because China

1267.9 -> brings new elements

1270.2 -> into every equation, and the Russians insist

1274 -> that the Chinese must be included in any arms control talks.

1277.533 -> Let me very briefly summarize Chinese thinking developments.

1281.7 -> In part, China is building more because it can.

1284.733 -> It has the capacity

1287.1 -> that it's

1289.1 -> begun to view

1290.9 -> numerical inferiority as a domestic political problem,

1296.166 -> whatever they think is necessary to counter a foreign adversary,

1300.433 -> they've got to deal with the domestic audience as well.

1304.266 -> They've also got old weapons that they need to modernize

1307.266 -> and are in a course of modernizing as they modernize them.

1310.4 -> They build better stuff, they build smaller things and can build more of them.

1315.066 -> That's all part of things that are understandable,

1319.233 -> but they're also driven

1322.366 -> by fear of the United States.

1326 -> Since give or take 2008.

1328.866 -> They see the United States as much more threatening.

1331.633 -> Happy to talk about the reasons but

1334.566 -> perceive that more is needed to deter

1338.866 -> the United States militarily, politically and economically

1343.366 -> than it was before.

1346.233 -> They're fearful that missile defense, primarily American but also Russian,

1350.866 -> degrades their deterrent by degrading

1354 -> their second strike capability.

1357.433 -> Almost certainly they exaggerate this, but I think they believe it.

1362.033 -> And domestically, they have to respond to that perception.

1367.633 -> They worry that American

1369 -> advanced conventional systems can take out their control,

1373.7 -> command and control, which is also for nuclear weapons.

1377.7 -> And that puts in question its long standing no first use commitment

1383.266 -> that China would use nuclear weapons only if attacked by nuclear weapons.

1387.7 -> What is an attack on command and control

1390 -> by the US on them, by them, on our systems in space?

1393.2 -> Is that a nuclear attack justifying a nuclear response?

1397.033 -> One of these unanswered questions

1400.4 -> China appears to be expanding

1402.866 -> its nuclear and conventional systems

1407.733 -> that estimates are to get parity

1410.133 -> with the new START limits on Russia of the United States.

1415.066 -> But the way they appear to be,

1416.6 -> one of the ways they appear to be doing it is by expanding silo based missiles,

1421.533 -> which is kind of the least

1423.1 -> secure, a leg of much of a triad and a result.

1427.333 -> Why are they doing this?

1429.766 -> What's the reason?

1431.9 -> We don't have answers to that.

1436.166 -> Final point I want to make is

1438.1 -> that China has long refused and continues to refuse to participate

1442.933 -> in any nuclear stability,

1446.133 -> what it refers to as arms control negotiations.

1449.833 -> Its position is until Russia and the United States build down

1455.5 -> to trying to China's unannounced levels.

1458.7 -> It won't talk,

1460.733 -> but its refusal to talk

1463.7 -> is arguably the biggest driver

1469.166 -> of the scale of nuclear expansion.

1472.066 -> Modernization in Russia and the United States.

1475.466 -> And the biggest impediment to bringing this under control

1480.033 -> for all three of our countries, plus the allies, plus

1483.366 -> all of the third countries affected by their competition.

1486.533 -> Let me stop there.

1488.866 -> Thank you, Tom and Brad.

1490.466 -> And so I have thank you for those

1494.033 -> summary and provocative thoughts and comments.

1497.566 -> I have some questions for you

1498.966 -> and I have some that are coming in through the YouTube chat.

1502.7 -> So let me just get let's get a handle on the numbers here.

1507.433 -> With regard to China now, the U.S.

1510.833 -> and Russian forces, strategic nuclear forces,

1514.733 -> are capped at 1550

1518.6 -> warheads at this time or

1523.233 -> and the Chinese level has been

1526.5 -> what and what are they projected to get to?

1530.666 -> Just to give a sense of the the issue.

1533.966 -> Brad, you want to respond?

1534.966 -> I think you've got better numbers than I do.

1540.3 -> You muted unmute.

1547.7 -> All right.

1549.433 -> Nobody has very good numbers

1553.233 -> because China, of course, releases no information about the size of its force

1558.366 -> and the U.S.

1560.466 -> government predictions from the Defense Intelligence Agency

1566.033 -> were for for many years overly

1570.9 -> predictive of growth that didn't occur.

1574.066 -> But in the last few years,

1577.066 -> the problem has gone in the other direction.

1579.866 -> Or China's forces have grown faster.

1583.4 -> And and

1585.566 -> the Department of Defense report the two most recent indicates

1589.1 -> that by 2035, China will have something

1593.6 -> like 1500 nuclear weapons.

1597.5 -> So now there's a difference between how they deployed or not deployed.

1602.4 -> Are they are they are they counted under whatever agreement might be in place?

1607.766 -> We have 15, 150 operationally deployed accountable weapons.

1612.266 -> Under the New START Treaty, we actually have about 4500 weapons,

1616.966 -> most of them not immediately serviceable, most of them

1620.533 -> in war reserves settings.

1623.933 -> But China will be essentially a nuclear peer of the United States

1630.5 -> sometime in the next decade because it will be capable of doing

1633.5 -> all of the things with its nuclear force that we can do with ours.

1639.633 -> They're coming from a base now or recently of how many strategic nuclear weapons?

1645.666 -> I would say about 400.

1650.133 -> So that's where they are today, probably.

1653.4 -> One one thought when I when I started joining Tom

1655.966 -> and in dialogs with the Chinese back in the 1990s,

1661 -> they were they had 20 weapons capable

1663.7 -> of going intercontinental distances

1666.8 -> and their basic deterrence theory was

1669.533 -> if we had to worry that one might get through,

1672.666 -> not even certainly would, but might that would be enough to deter us.

1677.233 -> Clearly, the thinking has shifted.

1679.4 -> So they're planning to triple or quadruple

1683.3 -> their strategic nuclear force by 2035.

1687.033 -> That's the

1688.966 -> judgment of, you know, parts of the U.S.

1692.6 -> intelligence community.

1694.066 -> As Broad says, the Chinese

1696.3 -> have not provided numbers, have not provided

1699.133 -> intended intentions or targets for acquiring.

1703.566 -> It's been loose stuff like a equivalent to

1708.233 -> the U.S. and the Russians.

1709.533 -> But how do you measure measure that?

1711.466 -> And the cost of doing this, even if they aspire to it, actually doing

1715.9 -> it is going to be difficult for them.

1719.566 -> But I think there's no doubt that the numbers will go up and they're likely

1723.6 -> to go up faster, early than they are in

1727.4 -> a later stage of expansion.

1730.433 -> And what strategic threats and

1736.1 -> challenges does that present

1738.233 -> to the United States?

1742.733 -> I don't think it changes things very much

1746 -> that they have the capacity to hold U.S.

1749.3 -> bases in Asia,

1752.5 -> the United States at risk.

1758.633 -> I assume that they've got a counter

1762.033 -> value targeting cities people

1765.1 -> rather than a strictly military counter

1767.733 -> force strategy.

1770.733 -> So I think at this point,

1773.466 -> their calculus is how many do we need

1776.633 -> in order to ensure that some get through?

1782.2 -> And the judgment of

1785.2 -> how many they need is clearly increasing because of concerns about missile defense.

1790.233 -> As that concerns about the reliability

1793.666 -> of their systems.

1796.166 -> But as if the analogy is imperfect one, but with the Soviet Union, where

1804.133 -> both sides had such incredible overkill, we could destroy everything worth

1810.466 -> destroying in the Soviet Union several times over.

1814.9 -> And we realized that was crazy.

1817.566 -> The Chinese, I believe, still think that's crazy and are not attempting

1822.8 -> to match one for one

1825.866 -> either in terms of targets or number of warheads.

1829 -> They just want to

1830 -> think they've got enough to have an assured retaliatory capability.

1833.8 -> I don't think they're building for offense

1836.933 -> to start a nuclear war.

1841.5 -> Brad, your thoughts about that?

1846.133 -> Well, I don't think anybody's building nuclear weapons

1848.366 -> just to start a nuclear war.

1849.866 -> I think everybody's trying to ensure

1855.233 -> that they're capable of manipulating nuclear risks to prevent

1859.566 -> or nuclear war.

1862.4 -> And I don't I agree with Tom.

1864.166 -> I don't think the Chinese have changed views on that.

1867.566 -> I'm struck by the fact I wonder who is making the decisions

1871.233 -> in Beijing about how much is enough.

1875.533 -> For decades, it was pretty clear that the People's Liberation Army

1878.733 -> and the Central Military Commission were making

1883.4 -> decisions about how many nuclear weapons they needed

1886.333 -> based on a pretty clear deterrence logic.

1891.5 -> When President Xi Jinping took office,

1894.033 -> he gave one of the first speeches by a Chinese president

1897.8 -> that attributed to China's nuclear weapons,

1900.8 -> a role in underwriting China's great power status.

1905.2 -> And I have the impression a little bit

1906.966 -> that there's a buildup without much of a strategy behind it,

1912.333 -> that there is a desire to signal China's

1916.1 -> arrival at the center of the world stage and the dominant position

1919.866 -> and please go build me a nuclear posture that's consistent with that

1923.9 -> without a lot of a lot of fidelity.

1926.9 -> I hope Thomas is right.

1928.933 -> I think he is right.

1929.9 -> But I but it's a circumstance that doesn't allow us

1933.2 -> to have a definitive assessment of of motives.

1936.333 -> And there there are plausible alternatives.

1939.466 -> And one other way to answer your your your question, Gloria,

1943.966 -> you know, about the strategic implications of China's nuclear growth.

1949.7 -> Is having two nuclear pairs

1956 -> creates a set of problems?

1958 -> We don't we didn't have before.

1961.666 -> One is a

1962.133 -> problem for arms control,

1965.966 -> figuring out how to cap a three way competition in a manner

1970.2 -> that all three deemed fair and acceptable pretty darn challenging.

1975.6 -> And another implication of two nuclear

1978.7 -> pairs is for extended nuclear deterrence.

1982.666 -> Right now, we we basically promise

1985.633 -> our allies in Northeast Asia that if it came to it

1989.3 -> and we needed to bring nuclear weapons back to the region,

1993.4 -> we would do so by bringing them from Europe.

1997.133 -> But in a two pair world, if there's a crisis over Taiwan, that's

2001.033 -> just the moment that President Putin is likely to see opportunity.

2005.166 -> The pressure naito.

2008.033 -> So we're

2010.5 -> our global extended deterrence posture is likely

2013.866 -> under some growing stress and in a two tier world.

2018.433 -> So I agree with Tom's basic argument about China's nuclear

2021.466 -> modernization doesn't change all that much in the US-China

2024.966 -> strategic military relationship, but I think it does.

2029.2 -> The emergence of two, the second pillar

2032.9 -> brings with it

2033.666 -> a set of challenges which are novel.

2037.533 -> And 11.2 to that.

2040.6 -> And that's how even a small nuclear

2043.733 -> state like North Korea makes a difference

2047.066 -> with the allies that that think quite

2049.533 -> literally often that if the U.S.

2052.666 -> has X number of weapons devoted to China

2057.4 -> and to Russia, does it have enough for North Korea?

2062.166 -> And if you're South Korea, that's what you care most or worry most about.

2066.733 -> So the pressure on the United States from allies that

2072.533 -> understand or interpret

2075.5 -> that a weapon that is dedicated

2078.9 -> to countering one particular adversary is probably

2084.2 -> not available to counter a adversary or a different set of circumstances.

2090.533 -> So they think we ought to have more.

2092.733 -> And some of that addition should be dedicated to the allies.

2098.533 -> I want to

2098.966 -> come back in a bit to potential U.S.

2102.1 -> approaches and responses, but let's get to some of the audience questions.

2106.9 -> Here's one.

2109.133 -> Hypersonic missiles.

2111.1 -> Do they give China and Russia strategic advantage?

2116.7 -> Hypersonic weapons?

2119.033 -> Well, it depends.

2121.066 -> It depends on on the role they give them.

2125.8 -> If if

2130.7 -> if these are just

2133.7 -> put into the forces, one more way to deliver

2137.4 -> nuclear or non-nuclear weapons on to the American homeland.

2140.8 -> It doesn't really change much in the balance of power.

2144.566 -> So it's unpleasant, but

2147.833 -> doesn't change anything substantial.

2150.833 -> If, however, these are capabilities that they deploy to go after our command

2155.866 -> and control systems, or are our leaders in a time of crisis?

2160.933 -> And if they believe that in doing these things,

2163.666 -> they can create a decisive advantage

2166.2 -> without running the risk of nuclear retaliation

2168.666 -> because they've used a conventional weapon in that role,

2172.966 -> then then this increases the instability of a crisis because

2178.066 -> their temptation to

2178.966 -> go first would be very strong.

2182.066 -> So the answer to the question,

2184.433 -> I'm afraid, is it depends on the choices that they have not yet made or appear

2189.1 -> not to have made about how to deploy them.

2193.233 -> Is that how it looks to you?

2194.533 -> Yes, I have exactly the same.

2196.733 -> And the only thing I would add is that it is

2201.8 -> these are not new systems.

2204.866 -> It's a new incarceration for the Chinese.

2207.766 -> It's new.

2208.133 -> We and the Russians had this some time ago,

2212.7 -> but determined not to go ahead with them, in part

2216.133 -> because it was just it didn't add that much,

2219.166 -> but it was a way to reduce the costs, to reduce uncertainties.

2224.366 -> This is a good example of the Chinese coming in as that third

2229.3 -> layer that complicates greatly.

2235 -> Another audience question.

2236.566 -> I had a history professor once who said no world power

2239.9 -> has ever built up huge weapons systems and then not use them.

2243.633 -> Comments

2251.4 -> like this would sound cute, but

2256.3 -> over what period of time?

2259.3 -> That we had a tremendous nuclear

2262.366 -> arsenal and advantage

2265.366 -> for decades after we use them

2268.7 -> in Japan at the end of World War Two.

2271.566 -> And we didn't use them.

2273.533 -> The Soviets had an even bigger arsenal

2277.4 -> that they chose not to use, except as a deterrent

2281.866 -> that the conventional arsenals that we've had, I don't

2285.733 -> think, is the motivation for the conflicts that we have entered into

2291.7 -> in the years since World War Two.

2294.5 -> It wasn't we have all of these toys.

2296.2 -> What are we going to do with them?

2297.6 -> So, I mean, I understand the point being made.

2299.9 -> The more you have, the much authority you have, the greater

2304.033 -> the danger of a political decision to use them.

2307.8 -> But I don't think there's an automatic city from having a weapon

2313.466 -> forces you to use it, use it or lose it logic.

2316.5 -> But right now I think I have nothing to add.

2320.2 -> That's the most long answer.

2323.733 -> Another audience question.

2325.3 -> In your opinion, if the U.S.

2327.1 -> would officially take our first strike option off the table,

2330.3 -> would this be a catalyst for genuine disarmament talks

2333.333 -> with the Russians and Chinese?

2336.9 -> No. You know, my short

2338.7 -> answer is the saying no.

2342.733 -> But I put to elaborate the extended deterrence

2347.633 -> that that the

2349.933 -> whole refusal

2352 -> to give up the potential for first use

2356.6 -> is a key element of assurance

2359.466 -> to our allies that that's what the nuclear umbrella is.

2362.8 -> An attack on them could could trigger a nuclear response,

2367.433 -> not would but could by the United States.

2374.2 -> And that is also a key pillar of our nonproliferation policies.

2380.333 -> Allies that are

2381.233 -> fully capable of developing nuclear weapons.

2384.233 -> You don't have to because you can rely on us.

2389.533 -> Another audience question.

2391.8 -> Do our allies contribute financially

2394.033 -> to our nuclear forces, given that they are protected by them?

2397.3 -> If not, should they contribute.

2401.033 -> Or our European allies

2403.6 -> participate in the NATO's

2406.6 -> sharing arrangements, at least some them do.

2410.033 -> And what does that mean?

2411.1 -> That means they host a few U.S.

2414.366 -> nuclear weapons on their territory

2417.666 -> and they own operate the aircraft that would deliver them in time of war,

2422.3 -> but only under the authority of the American president.

2426.5 -> This means they do share in the cost of maintaining NATO's nuclear deterrent.

2432.7 -> We don't have sharing arrangements with our allies in East Asia.

2436.9 -> The South Koreans would like them,

2439.966 -> but we don't have sharing arrangements

2442.266 -> and we provide nuclear protection with our strategic forces

2446.666 -> and we don't there's

2448.9 -> there's never been a question about whether they should share in the cost

2452.7 -> of our strategic forces, which

2455.466 -> which we would have in any case.

2458.7 -> So from my perspective, the practice of a burden,

2465.033 -> nuclear burden sharing is fair and appropriate in the circumstance.

2471.033 -> The one addition I would make is

2474.633 -> the money is ultimately fungible

2479.5 -> and our allies,

2481.366 -> referring to the East Asia, Japan and Korea,

2484.166 -> would pay a substantial portion

2486.8 -> of the cost of

2489.5 -> our bases, maintenance of U.S.

2492.133 -> forces, equipment in East Asia

2495.566 -> or that frees up money

2499.6 -> that we can use for other things.

2501.4 -> We could use it presumably for preschool education, but we use it

2506.166 -> to fund other parts of the defense to budget budget.

2511.3 -> So I'd like to return to the central question here,

2514.4 -> which is we're looking at, well, while numbers of nuclear weapons

2519.166 -> in the world have declines substantially since the

2525.1 -> since the Cold War ended, there were at the height,

2528.366 -> I think, something like 70,000 nuclear warheads.

2532.133 -> And we're down to limits

2535.866 -> of deployed warheads anyway of

2539.2 -> around 3000 or so between the U.S.

2542.266 -> and Russia and and smaller numbers by other countries.

2546.366 -> So we are not in the situation.

2548.8 -> We were at the end of the Cold War during the Cold War.

2552.5 -> However, we are looking at potentially a doubling of the strategic nuclear forces

2559.066 -> that unfriendly countries

2561.466 -> have deployed against the US.

2564.3 -> And I'd like to look at a range of responses

2567.066 -> to that developing situation.

2570.266 -> So number one, the U.S.

2573.166 -> matches the increase in Chinese

2577.666 -> nuclear forces in a numerical way.

2581.666 -> Good idea, bad idea, necessary, unnecessary.

2587.4 -> You've worked on it officially.

2589.266 -> And Brad, go ahead.

2591.866 -> Well, I haven't worked on it.

2592.7 -> Well, I worked on the a long time ago.

2595.233 -> And in my Pentagon role.

2596.9 -> But but this was one of our study group topics this past year.

2601.466 -> And so that's that's right.

2606.1 -> In the in the period

2607.133 -> that the current arms control treaty, the New START treaty has been in force.

2611.933 -> So since 2010, the U.S.

2616.6 -> has reduced its ability to strike at other countries, while

2620.566 -> the number of nuclear weapons that can be delivered on to the United States

2624.466 -> with long range missiles has essentially doubled.

2628.3 -> And what do we do about that?

2631.3 -> There's there's one one argument says

2634.666 -> we don't need to do anything

2636.8 -> because there is no prospect.

2639.166 -> There is zero prospect that we would face a simultaneous crises crisis

2644.133 -> with two nuclear armed adversaries.

2646.9 -> One would get out of the way if the shooting started

2651.533 -> at the other extreme

2653.2 -> is we need to build a one for one increase

2657.3 -> to keep to keep pace.

2662.233 -> There's there's a third option in discussion, which is

2666.833 -> we should see this as an opportunity to opt out of the arms

2669.5 -> race at all and retire or one of the legs of the triad,

2674.2 -> the intercontinental ballistic missiles,

2676.733 -> and just put all of our eggs into our our submarine force

2680.966 -> and let the Russians and Chinese race,

2683.833 -> if they want to do some meaningless destination.

2688.033 -> But the the course of action that I think makes the most sense is one

2692.333 -> where we we recognize the possibility

2696.233 -> not of fighting nuclear war simultaneously against two countries,

2700.6 -> but of trying to deter two countries,

2703.533 -> at least two, possibly three at the same time in a crisis,

2707.9 -> because the incentives to exploit the crisis in a different region

2712.633 -> to advance their own objectives could be significant.

2717.233 -> This this isn't a

2718.1 -> strategy that requires a one for one

2721.333 -> match, but it requires some growth in our capability

2726.1 -> in order to be able to credibly say,

2728.366 -> if you cross these red lines, we're going to do unacceptable damage to you.

2732.9 -> And so I want one one further point on this.

2736.233 -> The argument for doing nothing, I think, runs counter to set aside

2744.166 -> all of the military calculations of a political calculus.

2749.4 -> President Putin and Xi appear to hold to the idea

2752.4 -> that America is a country in decline and retreat,

2756.2 -> and this makes them willing to test our limits and our resolve

2760.8 -> and to threaten our and coerce our allies.

2765.666 -> To not respond in any way to China's build up would be red,

2769.6 -> I believe, at least Beijing and probably Tokyo and elsewhere, as

2775.766 -> proof of

2776.766 -> this, an unhappy proposition about us.

2780.766 -> I don't think we're a country in decline and retreat,

2783.466 -> but I think we need to demonstrate that that

2786.266 -> so on this occasion

2789.266 -> and to.

2790.3 -> I agree with what Brant has said.

2793.1 -> And those two points are

2795.466 -> there is an argument

2797.833 -> that we can afford a race

2802.166 -> that Russia and China cannot.

2804.833 -> And part of this, in my view, is a misreading of the end of the Cold War.

2808.6 -> The Reagan era

2812.2 -> drowned them in a sea of red ink.

2815.8 -> But there is a school of thought that we can use our superior economic

2822.033 -> power to weaken the competitors.

2825.566 -> The other point is

2827.9 -> worth introducing into the discussion, and that's changes

2830.833 -> in American public attitude that all of us sort of grew up.

2834.6 -> When the idea of nuclear war was anathema, that, you know, coming grown

2840.1 -> up in the fifties and sixties with action, painting and hiding under our desks and

2845.633 -> that doing anything

2847.666 -> to avoid nuclear conflict

2851.466 -> was part of public sentiment that got reflected in

2856.233 -> politics and national policy.

2858.266 -> But our colleagues, Scott Sagan, has done some systematic

2863.833 -> polling of American attitudes

2867 -> and our fellow citizens today are far more willing

2872.233 -> to use nuclear weapons for what

2874.966 -> arguably are low threshold

2879.166 -> kinds of reasons.

2880.666 -> And that is a part of the political atmosphere

2884.8 -> within which decisions are going to be made.

2888.566 -> And it arguably responses build more stuff to demonstrate resolve.

2894 -> But if you build more stuff and there's more pressure to use,

2897.833 -> you might actually have to do something you don't want to.

2904.233 -> Just chiming in with one of the comments from the chat from online.

2910.033 -> Could some modernization take place to keep systems safe and secure

2913.766 -> without spending trillions of dollars?

2918.133 -> Probably not.

2920.5 -> Well, where were they?

2924.4 -> First of all, we avoided modernization

2928.533 -> for a very long time.

2933.233 -> The newest nuclear weapon

2935.333 -> built in 1990, the newest

2938.8 -> delivery systems much earlier.

2942.333 -> And so it might have been less expensive at this point

2947.9 -> if we hadn't pushed everything off to the last possible minute.

2952.433 -> Secondly, the force we're talking about modernizing

2956.8 -> is the small is smaller than the one

2959.3 -> that was in place during the Eisenhower administration.

2964.1 -> Yes, gigantically expensive to modernize.

2968.666 -> But in the end, they a grand scheme of things,

2971.933 -> the grand scheme of things being the defense budget.

2975.033 -> This is about 6% of the defense budget in any given year

2978.266 -> for about 3 to 4 years at the peak of a modernization wave.

2982.866 -> That's a lot of money, but it's also affordable

2987.233 -> to. Protect

2989.8 -> ourselves through missile defense.

2992.9 -> We rejected that in the 1980s as destabilizing, saying

2997.6 -> technically not capable to expensive

3001.533 -> or potentially provoking

3004.133 -> more offensive weaponry, deployed us.

3008.9 -> More of an option now.

3010.166 -> Has technology developed to the point that we can defend ourselves,

3014 -> our homeland, our

3017.766 -> other sites and interests

3020.033 -> in the world through missile defense?

3023.4 -> Well, we've we've been of two minds on this since the Missile Defense

3028.2 -> Act of 1999,

3030.9 -> where we've said that we we can have missile defense

3035.333 -> that's big enough and effective enough to negate

3039.033 -> whatever threats rogue states

3042.6 -> so regional challengers might make against the United States.

3047.4 -> But we don't seek a missile defense so large,

3050.6 -> and it's beyond our reach, technically and financially,

3054.233 -> that we would negate the strategic deterrence of major

3056.833 -> powers like Russia and China.

3059.7 -> And the and this this sort of set of ideas

3063.366 -> has carried our missile defense policy for two decades.

3068.833 -> And it's it's being questioned today,

3072.366 -> when one day

3075.8 -> when we're more worried about the missile

3077.466 -> threats from Russia and China than we were before.

3080.6 -> And when North Korea's missile force is growing

3083.6 -> at a more rapid rate than our ability, then we can grow our defense

3087.366 -> and our defenses are darn expensive.

3090.533 -> So, yes, the technology has changed.

3095.733 -> It may be still improving.

3098.4 -> It's certainly improved relative to the Cold War,

3101.4 -> but missile defense still comes with a lot of complications,

3105.6 -> including the reactions of Russia and China, who don't believe that

3109.566 -> we're just after a missile defense that's big enough to negate the rogue states.

3115.1 -> When you add something to.

3115.8 -> That, no, I have nothing to add to that.

3120.2 -> Arms control.

3123.6 -> How would we approach Russia, China, both of them

3128.966 -> in a way that would mitigate the threat to us

3132.9 -> and make the world safer and engage them?

3137.4 -> What what path ahead do you see for arms control?

3142.566 -> You know, start after.

3146.233 -> I think under

3148.333 -> the current situation of the relationship between

3152.433 -> Moscow and Beijing, that

3157.666 -> the Russians

3158.4 -> have a greater chance of enticing the Chinese

3161.4 -> into the stability talks

3165.066 -> than we do.

3168.8 -> My interaction with

3171.133 -> official Russians fairly recently,

3175.1 -> they're very reluctant to do that, in part

3178.966 -> because they think they'd fail

3185.266 -> going from 2 to 3,

3187.866 -> which is, as we've discussed in this hour, that's

3192.433 -> the most important set of countries.

3196.066 -> Probably this would need to be a a P5.

3202.666 -> Know the Americans deliver the

3204.666 -> the British and the French in the talks and the Chinese agreed to join

3211.533 -> with the

3214.066 -> potential

3216.166 -> complicating of the Chinese

3218 -> wanting the Indians in or the Indians wanting to be in or what.

3222.2 -> Why don't we use this to try to get at North Korea at the same time?

3226.7 -> And if it's really complicated to go from 2 to 3, it's

3230.666 -> impossibly complicated to go up to five

3233.9 -> or six or seven

3237 -> countries in this.

3238.933 -> But again, I would if I was writing the script right now,

3244.6 -> I would try to have the Russians

3247.166 -> bring the Chinese in, but we're not in a position

3250.4 -> to ask the Russians to do that or to indicate that we're prepared

3254.2 -> to cooperate or pay the trade offs that they would want to do this.

3258.633 -> Right.

3261.366 -> Yeah, I agree.

3262.066 -> I agree with everything you said.

3264.266 -> And I think the the

3267.966 -> the arms control, interregnum we're entering has everything

3270.933 -> to do with choices and perceptions made in Moscow and Beijing.

3277 -> That said, I think we've been much clearer with China

3281.366 -> about why it's in our interest that China join arms control regimes

3285.566 -> and why it's in China now. Exactly.

3288.9 -> And I think we have been reluctant to take on the message from Russia

3293.5 -> that the hipbone really

3296.066 -> is connected to the new bond, that in other words,

3299.533 -> that we can't just say strategic stability is something that exists between

3303.633 -> the strategic nuclear forces, the two big countries,

3307.1 -> when they've also got missile defenses and hypersonic strike

3310.233 -> capabilities and secret underwater torpedoes

3314.433 -> and nuclear weapons that might orbit in space, etc..

3319.8 -> So there needs to be some

3323.1 -> modernization of American thinking about arms control strategy.

3327.766 -> And I think it has to begin with.

3330.8 -> For the last

3332.3 -> 30 years, we've thought of arms control as an instrument of disarmament

3337.433 -> for good reason.

3338.766 -> We and the Russians were both willing to shed nuclear weapons

3342 -> from our arsenals if we could do so together.

3345.533 -> But that wasn't the traditional of arms control.

3347.933 -> The traditional function of arms control was more about making sure

3351.8 -> that the deterrence relationships to our adversaries were trying to create

3356.1 -> work on stable.

3358.833 -> And we don't really know what the new military problems

3363.633 -> are for which arms control might be the relevant solution.

3367.6 -> We're exploring these things, and there's a lot more room for good

3371.5 -> exploratory work to lay the foundations for for a future arms control regime.

3377.4 -> One when Russia and China grow weary of competing.

3383.033 -> Yeah.

3383.3 -> Just one sentence I realized at the end. And that's

3387.133 -> we're exploring it

3389.066 -> without talking to the Russians because of Ukraine.

3393.833 -> And we're exploring it with the Chinese

3396.066 -> continuing to refuse to talk to us about it.

3399.6 -> So there is a one hand trying to clap

3403.466 -> element of what what we face.

3409.066 -> Though we are getting towards the end.

3410.8 -> But we have about 5 minutes or so left.

3413.1 -> And I'd like to turn to questions of what

3416.833 -> our fellow citizens can do in this area.

3420.6 -> I was one of those kids doing the duck and cover

3423.1 -> drills under my desk in the fifties and early sixties and,

3427.033 -> you know, frightened by the Cuban missile crisis and so on.

3430.6 -> And often people feel paralyzed or overwhelmed by the thought

3435.233 -> of the nuclear threat and the situation we in the world are in in this area.

3440.933 -> And what what can people do to learn

3444.6 -> more be become involved in some way, engage in activities

3449.3 -> that might help, help with the issues, help

3452.3 -> with the problems.

3457.633 -> Go ahead.

3458.4 -> You're ready to go, Brad?

3460.5 -> Well, I am.

3462.466 -> I would suspect we're headed of the same destination, Tom.

3465.466 -> Which is which is

3469.7 -> being getting smart about these new issues.

3474.233 -> Things that are alien to us and dark and gloomy

3477.5 -> and seen from a distance or can be scary.

3483.566 -> I have colleagues who argue that

3486.866 -> we'd be much better off if America's leaders spoke in

3489.8 -> a very direct way to the American public about new nuclear threats.

3494.066 -> I don't think we need to engage in threat mongering.

3497.866 -> I don't think it's a good thing to have the American public

3500.833 -> deeply, you know, building bomb shelters again.

3504.633 -> I don't think the problem is that bad.

3508.2 -> But there are many options to to become better

3513.1 -> educated about the problems we face.

3515.866 -> Lots of different NGOs with

3518.033 -> with good, good work available for people to engage with.

3522.7 -> And I think

3526.733 -> and, moreover, to understand the nuclear problem,

3530.433 -> you have to begin with the geopolitical problems and understand what's happening

3534.8 -> in political relations among the major actors.

3537.9 -> And, of course, that's a giant

3541.4 -> mystery and vastly entertaining story.

3543.6 -> And there are lots of opportunities to engage there as well.

3547.6 -> Well, you you raise a very important point.

3550.2 -> The way we would likely get to a nuclear crisis is through

3556 -> a conventional war, a crisis going on somewhere

3559.333 -> in the world that would escalate to the nuclear level like Ukraine.

3562.733 -> So anything people can do to help address the situation in Ukraine

3568.7 -> and any other regional conflicts that could lead to nuclear

3573.466 -> use threats

3575.666 -> is productive towards the ultimate goal.

3579.9 -> Indeed.

3580.466 -> And a significant part of that story is strengthening our alliances,

3585.566 -> since we we

3586.9 -> we may again elect an American president who is not committed to alliances,

3591.733 -> doing everything we can to strengthen them now and ensure their longevity.

3596.733 -> This is this is the essential ingredient

3599.366 -> of a stable and peaceful security environment.

3603.5 -> You know, I read a very excellent recently in the current issue

3608.566 -> of Foreign Affairs by Eric Schmidt, the former chairman of Google

3613.066 -> and of Alphabet, titled Innovation Power.

3616.466 -> And there is a lot that our technology sector

3620.5 -> can do with smart ideas to protect the U.S., whether it's from

3627.4 -> cyber warfare or in the nuclear field.

3630.6 -> So those who work in technology

3633.766 -> can contribute in this area through, again, smart ideas.

3638.2 -> I also just want to say there are many organizations

3641.833 -> from which one can obtain more information and even get involved in this field.

3647.733 -> The Arms Control Association,

3650.466 -> the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Plowshares Fund.

3653.7 -> The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and that's based at Stanford, the William J.

3660.2 -> Perry Project, which you're probably aware of, Tom.

3663.233 -> Oriented towards younger people, founded by former Secretary of Defense

3668.266 -> Bill Perry to help educate and engage younger

3670.833 -> people in dealing with the nuclear threat and the nuclear problem.

3673.733 -> So I recommend looking into those organizations.

3677.666 -> But, Tom, I didn't mean to cut you off there.

3680.9 -> I don't know. I. I don't have

3685.066 -> better ideas.

3686.066 -> I, I think this has got to be bottom up,

3690.033 -> much as I would like to have political leaders

3695.033 -> that's spoke out in a sensible

3698.666 -> and a consistent way on

3702.866 -> the range of perils that we face

3706.566 -> where nuclear

3711.066 -> competition, nuclear systems, nuclear deterrence

3714.566 -> kind of fit into that.

3718.666 -> Right now, I think the temptation

3721.6 -> to use the Russian and the Chinese boogeyman

3726.766 -> as justification for a whole range of other things

3730.333 -> to include strengthening of the alliance.

3732.133 -> I absolutely agree with Brad, but the

3737.366 -> if we have these

3739.733 -> real adversaries, we'd make them up or have to make them up

3744.6 -> to justify contentious and costly expenditures.

3749.633 -> And I think this is one where the public education

3752.833 -> and the NGOs and writing letters

3756 -> to editors are a pressing

3761.233 -> appointed officials and

3763.5 -> political candidates to get smart on these issues.

3768.366 -> As we were speaking just before, we went live here,

3772.033 -> there's a back to the future character to this that all of us that started

3777.3 -> almost 50 years ago, all

3779.833 -> with a tremendous educational effort

3784.033 -> that achieved, I think, a high degree of success.

3787.066 -> But it's got to be done again for new generations of people.

3793.466 -> Yes. Time to time to engage on this one and see

3796.733 -> more coverage, debate and discussion and learning about the issue.

3802.066 -> So we are at the end of our time.

3804.766 -> Thank you so much to Tom Fingar of Stanford University,

3807.866 -> Brad Roberts of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

3811.766 -> This is a difficult topic.

3813.366 -> It's a difficult discussion.

3816.2 -> I wanted us to have this at the Commonwealth Club to help start

3820.4 -> more discussion in the public arena on these issues.

3824.866 -> So thank you for being our guides and leaders

3827.4 -> and for stimulating this discussion.

3830.366 -> Thank you so much to those who were online for this conversation.

3835.433 -> There were some really good questions, really engaged a group online.

3839.866 -> Thank you so much.

3841.066 -> This is the end of our program on the uncertain future of nuclear deterrence

3845.266 -> at the Commonwealth Club.

3846.4 -> Thank you all for joining us and here now.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T9yVwpNMBuU