What Is the Risk of Disaster at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

Aug 10, 2023

What Is the Risk of Disaster at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

Content

0.44 -> From one environmental catastrophe to a potential one.

4.49 -> This is the Zaporzhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest such facility in Europe,

10.55 -> and responsible for 20% of all Ukrainian electricity production.

15.74 -> And since the second week of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it has had one more distinction:

21.769 -> a battle site.

23.48 -> Given Russia’s plans to annex large swaths of Eastern Ukraine,

27.84 -> it was an obvious target for Russian capture, which did not take long to accomplish.

33.62 -> Still the subject of drama after Ukraine had to retreat, much of that remained background

38.59 -> noise for one simple reason:

41.01 -> Russia was in control, and Ukraine was not in a position to contest

45.2 -> it.

46.2 -> The station lost external power half at least a dozen times, leading to mild panic.

52.73 -> But each time, everything came back together before a global crisis could unfold.

58.289 -> However, the summer of 2023 changed all that.

62.93 -> Kyiv began sounding a metaphorical fire alarm that Russia was planning to sabotage

68.92 -> the plant.

70.22 -> But what are the potential dangers here?

72.68 -> Today, we are going to take a closer look at the problem:

76.71 -> We will begin with an overview of the geography so you can better visualize what you are hearing

81.89 -> in the news,

83.73 -> then we will move on to the briefest of summaries of how nuclear power plants operate,

89.14 -> the motivation Russia may have to cause problems at the facility,

93.55 -> why if there is a problem it will not be as bad as the Chernobyl disaster,

98.45 -> the trouble it raises with NATO’s Article 5 provision,

102.2 -> and the crying wolf problem problem.

105.21 -> And no, that is not a typo.

107.299 -> As much fun as crying wolf will be, we start with the geography, aka nuclear power plants

114.49 -> on maps.

116.229 -> Here is southern Ukraine We have the Crimean peninsula there of course.

121.36 -> Kherson City is there.

123.479 -> The Kakhovka Dam is—or was—here and will play an important role later.

129.33 -> And if we continue upstream on the Dnipro River,

132.26 -> we eventually get to the Zaporzhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

136.3 -> It will help to zoom in.

138.44 -> The Dnipro River is now at the top of the screen.

142.26 -> This satellite image comes from May 2022.

146.05 -> This is a photo from June 15, 2023, nine days after the dam’s destruction.

152.489 -> You can see how the water level dropped.

155.16 -> And if we really zoom in, you can see the power plant in the background.

160.55 -> Then we have the cooling pond.

162.47 -> And on the right we have the city built for power plant workers.

166.48 -> But to get a real feel for the power plant itself, we need to zoom in a bit further.

172.75 -> As a starting point,

173.94 -> you have reactors one through six all lined up at the top.

178.49 -> Below that are a pair of buildings that house and treat radioactive waste.

183.47 -> Further below that are spray ponds, which look pretty but are actually critical

187.78 -> to the facility’s cooling process, again note the reactors in the background

193.62 -> makes the precise location of that photo about here,

197.23 -> to the right is dry storage.

199.39 -> In the upper left is the backup diesel generators in case of external power failure.

204.989 -> And below that is a training facility that was hit early in the war—

210.04 -> uncomfortably close to everything else of importance.

213.12 -> Alright, bank that in your mind.

215.73 -> Now we are going to move onto the second part of the overview: a ridiculously oversimplified

221.879 -> explanation on how nuclear power plants works.

225.83 -> Step 1: mine uranium out of the ground.

228.93 -> Unfortunately, less than 1% of it is suitable for nuclear reactions.

234.099 -> Step 2: concentrate it using a process known as “enrichment”.

238.709 -> This has a whole bunch of substeps we will gloss over but I have covered in an old-school

245.65 -> video.

247.06 -> Gas centrifuges are the most well-known of these substeps.

250.94 -> Rotate them around, and the uranium that you mined earlier purifies.

256.19 -> Zaporizhzhia’s reactors run on 4.26% enriched uranium, to be exact.

263.11 -> Step 3: have neutrons split the enriched uranium in a controlled, consistent manner.

270.539 -> Create heat.

271.72 -> Boil water.

273.33 -> Turn turbines.

274.889 -> Make electricity.

276.72 -> But assuming you don’t want to die, we’re not done.

281.1 -> Step 4: Keep cool water running to make sure that your reactor does not melt down.

287.84 -> Step 5: For the same reason, continue to run cool water along spent fuel well after the

294.36 -> power has stopped.

296.23 -> Now that we have all of that covered, the critical question, of course, is why Russia

301.539 -> might want to mess with the process.

304.97 -> The basic idea is that Russia may be pessimistic about its chances of even holding onto the

310.84 -> current territorial status quo.

313.789 -> The breach of the Kakhovka Dam provides a template for this.

317.97 -> The available evidence indicates that an internal explosion led to the failure of the Russian-controlled

324.21 -> facility.

325.36 -> Perhaps short on manpower for the front lines elsewhere,

328.97 -> Russia ordered the breach so it could send soldiers previously guarding

333.41 -> Kherson into the areas where Ukraine appeared to be focusing its counteroffensive.

339.88 -> Doing so caused an environmental catastrophe and destroyed a large hydroelectrical plant,

346.38 -> but if Russia believed its chances of holding the area were slim,

350.62 -> it was a phantom tradeoff anyway.

353.35 -> The parallels in Zaporizhzhia are striking:

357.24 -> Environmental catastrophe?

358.729 -> Check.

360.139 -> Destroyed power plant?

361.949 -> Check.

363.09 -> Pessimism about Russia’s chances?

365.46 -> The jury is still out there,

367.27 -> but the Wagner Opera began after the dam breach, so the signs there are not looking great.

373.43 -> Meanwhile, Kyiv has indeed started some sort of offensive.

378.389 -> Part of the main thrust is occurring at the crook in the river,

381.91 -> and troops may have established a beachhead opposite of Kherson City.

386.6 -> If things go wrong for Russia, Ukraine may quickly surround the power plant.

392.36 -> Thus, the broad idea is that Russia might set some explosives around the plant and cause

398.93 -> a giant headache for Ukraine.

401.4 -> The best comparison is to Iraq igniting Kuwait’s oil wells upon its retreat during the Persian

408 -> Gulf War,

409.41 -> except radiological.

410.669 -> At a minimum, it might stall Ukraine’s offensive.

415.36 -> And as a worst-case scenario for Russia, it is a basic scorched Earth policy: if I cannot

421.72 -> have it, then you cannot have it either.

424.509 -> However, the damage would have to be incredible before Ukraine completely abandons the plant.

431.37 -> By comparison, the Chernobyl disaster occurred in 1986, but the last reactor there did not

438.6 -> shut down until 2000.

441.8 -> For its part, Russia claims that it has no such plans and instead insists that Ukraine

447.83 -> is scheming up a sabotage operation.

450.92 -> The International Atomic Energy Agency is supposed to be the independent arbiter here.

457.509 -> True to that, their inspectors have been on-site since September 2022.

462.629 -> Thus far, they cannot verify any evidence that Russia is going to detonate any lines

469.349 -> to destroy the facility.

470.73 -> But at the same time, Russia is not giving inspectors access to the full site—

477.49 -> including the reactor rooftops, where Ukraine says the mines are located.

481.94 -> That might make IAEA inspectors sound worthless.

486.82 -> But the absence of information is information.

491.41 -> The inability to verify something is telling—and concerning.

496.36 -> As the IAEA hints at, if there really is no problem with the rooftops,

502.139 -> then it no reason to deny the inspectors access.

506.37 -> That is the doom and gloom for you.

509.15 -> But good news.

510.52 -> This type of sabotage operations will not cause as bad of a disaster as you might think.

516.669 -> Then again, if your expectations started here, that is hardly much comfort.

522.94 -> Going back to the satellite image, there are many places you could detonate an explosive

527.95 -> to cause problems.

529.05 -> But let’s start with the reactors as a focal point.

533.1 -> Good news here: a blast akin to an actual nuclear weapon is literally impossible.

539.89 -> Remember how Zaporizhzhia operates at 4.26% enriched uranium?

545.62 -> Well, nuclear weapons have around 90% enrichment.

550.11 -> Not even close here.

551.73 -> That is why most of the comparisons you hear about are in regard to the Chernobyl disaster.

557.51 -> Nevertheless, there are three main reasons why Zaporizhzhia would have a hard time getting

562.76 -> that far.

564.13 -> First is that the plant is in cold shutdown.

567.45 -> Chernobyl’s big problem was that the reaction fueled itself.

572.66 -> Run a nuclear reactor at full steam, and you can get a big boom.

577.52 -> Zaporizhzhia’s reactors are not currently doing this.

581.589 -> The exact details of this are conflicting because,

585.21 -> well, that is just the fun of the war, but something like this is true.

591.07 -> Soon after IAEA inspectors arrived in September, the majority of the reactors went into cold

598.31 -> shutdown—

599.779 -> that is a fancy way of saying that they were no longer producing electricity.

604.17 -> However, the fuel rods still retain heat and need constant cooling.

609.68 -> This process relies on some of the other systems, but we will get to those in a moment.

615 -> Two of the reactors stayed in a “hot” shutdown: more of the passive reactions

620.78 -> continued, generating useful heating for the facility

624.62 -> and the surrounding neighborhood, but also facilitating a full restart at a

629.85 -> later date.

631.579 -> One of those two appears to have shifted to cold shutdown in May 2023,

637.36 -> as concerns moved away from restarting full power production and to malicious destruction.

644.62 -> There are conflicting reports on the final reactor, some suggesting that it went cold

649.58 -> in June 2023

651.12 -> while others insisting that it is still hot.

655.39 -> I believe the latter is more likely true because that is what the IAEA is currently

661.88 -> saying.

662.88 -> I suspect that what is happening here is a combination of the media’s ignorance on

668.01 -> how nuclear power plants work,

670.709 -> exacerbated by Wikipedia bluntly stating that it is off.

675.74 -> Regardless, though the difference between hot and cold here is important,

681.49 -> it does not change the fact that Zaporizhzhia cannot have a runaway meltdown in the style

688.079 -> of Chernobyl.

690.32 -> Second is a lack of graphite.

693.09 -> Nuclear reactors need something to slow down neutrons.

697.04 -> That facilitates the fission process by increasing the chances that they hit other uranium atoms.

703.32 -> Graphite is one of the most cost-effective ways to do that.

708.22 -> One problem: graphite is also flammable.

712.209 -> Chernobyl?

713.75 -> Full of graphite.

715.38 -> Could not get enough of it.

717.23 -> So when it lit up, it really lit up.

720.92 -> But Zaporizhzhia is built different.

724.529 -> No graphite moderator does not mean no problem, but it does mean a containable disaster.

731.089 -> And that is the perfect segue to the third component, which is the literal containment

736.93 -> apparatuses.

738.779 -> These giant concrete buildings are part of that.

741.42 -> They could withstand a small aircraft crashing into them but are not designed to indefinitely

747.12 -> survive an endless series of bombings.

750.73 -> Inside each of those concrete monstrosities, you have a core, itself surrounded by a thick

756.45 -> metallic vessel.

758.4 -> Chernobyl’s reactors did not have these safety features, which allowed the explosion

763.98 -> to go unrestrained.

766.589 -> Indeed and ironically, a containment structure known as the sarcophagus was built after the

772.51 -> fact to make up for the deficiency.

775.08 -> Back in Zaporizhzhia, if just the concrete structure is breached,

780.75 -> literally nothing happens.

782.42 -> If just the metallic vessel is breached, the building has a problem.

787.68 -> Maybe make that one red.

789.81 -> Only if both are breached, then the surrounding environment is at risk.

795.139 -> Even then, because of the cold shutdowns, much of the radiation has already dissipated.

801.649 -> The one that might be in hot shutdown is a little more concerning but it is still not

806.79 -> that bad.

808.25 -> Outside of the reactor rooms, the obvious targets are the waste,

812.769 -> dry storage, spray ponds,

815.519 -> diesel generators, and external power.

818.36 -> Hitting the waste is basically a build your own dirty bomb.

822.17 -> The idea is the same for dry storage, except this waste is old enough that it no

827.85 -> longer needs to be cooled and is less radioactive.

832.57 -> These would likely create localized problems rather than something region-wide.

838.639 -> The spray ponds are a roundabout target.

842 -> They take warm water coming from the reactors and spent fuel systems and use sprinkler lines

848.93 -> to dissipate excess heat into the environment.

852.5 -> Once cooled, the water can cycle back into the reactors and waste processing units.

859.459 -> This recycling system is why the dam’s destruction affecting the cooling pond did not create

865.57 -> an emergency.

867.25 -> It is a reserve system meant to keep the spray ponds full, and, at least in theory, you could

873.74 -> use trucks to replenish the spray ponds.

876.519 -> The shutdown status simplifies this because cooler reactors need less water anyway.

884.009 -> Targeting the diesel backup generators or external power sources has a similar effect.

890.17 -> Basically, you reduce the power plant to a single system to run its cooling processes.

897.14 -> Regardless of how the cooling system breaks, if it does,

901.1 -> then you are racing the clock against the possibility that

904.26 -> radioactive materials melt through their protective plating,

908.74 -> thereby risking neighboring watersheds.

911.63 -> Given that the power plant is on top of a major river that flows into the Black Sea,

916.899 -> that should be concerning.

918.579 -> Anyway, if I had to guess what Russia might be trying to do here, a catastrophic problem

924.37 -> is unlikely.

925.98 -> That is because they would have to fire up a reactor again, and then intentionally run

930.82 -> it past its capacity while disabling built-in safety measures.

935.779 -> How the nuclear physics behind this would work is

939 -> unclear because—and I know this will come as a surprise—nuclear scientists spend little

945.16 -> time researching how to deliberately cause accidents.

949.959 -> Doing so would make it impossible to pin the responsibility on Ukraine.

954.38 -> The disaster would unequivocally be Russia’s fault.

958.389 -> At that point, Russia may as well just use a regular nuclear weapon.

963.639 -> The only way Russia would try this is if Putin really does not care about the consequences

968.74 -> from the West, or China,

971.18 -> or India.

972.319 -> Basically, we are reaching the point of a Mythbusters episode where they try to make

977.22 -> something work despite their disbelief.

980.889 -> A more plausible strategy would be to set charges on a concrete building

985.519 -> and inside a reactor room.

988.1 -> How far the damage would go from there depends on the artificial explosive power used.

994.019 -> However, the most likely sabotage scenario is to just do a single thing.

999.67 -> If Russia really wants to render the power plant’s generation inoperable,

1004.54 -> soldiers could place charges on one to six vessels.

1008.66 -> The problem with this is that, because they are on the inside, Russia would have to claim

1014.269 -> that Ukraine had infiltrated the facility.

1016.62 -> And the more Russia destroys, the less plausible that is.

1022.04 -> The other options have better plausible deniability.

1025.9 -> You could blow one hole in one rooftop and claim it as evidence of Ukraine’s recklessness.

1032.8 -> Or do something similar to the diesel generators Or the spray ponds.

1037.62 -> This would not cause an immediate environmental crisis but would force Ukraine to divert resources

1043.37 -> to solve the problem before it turns into one—

1047.03 -> perhaps exactly what Russian soldiers are looking for to cover their broader withdrawal

1051.2 -> from the region.

1052.42 -> It would not provide the same clear benefits as expanding a river like the dam situation,

1058.7 -> but it is still something.

1060.82 -> To summarize the concerns, there is a reason why the American Nuclear Society

1066.27 -> has concluded that the risks to the public are low.

1070.02 -> Perhaps Russia could do something incredible in terms of deliberate sabotage,

1074.919 -> but this would be transparent to monitors, raising the question of why Russia would choose

1079.89 -> that option when they could do other things.

1082.95 -> Still, you might wonder about possibility that we end up in an Article 5 situation.

1089.03 -> You will recall that Article 5 is the provision of the North Atlantic Treaty

1093.74 -> that declares that an attack against one member is an attack against all members.

1098.71 -> Well, let’s take a look at a map— and maybe start drawing some lines.

1104.58 -> Recall that Zaporzhzhia is here.

1106.85 -> Turkey is here.

1108.4 -> Bulgaria is here.

1110.38 -> Romania is here.

1111.58 -> Hungary is here.

1113.35 -> Slovakia is here.

1115.25 -> Poland is here.

1117.15 -> This is a rough estimate of where the average radiation would be significant assuming a

1123.24 -> worst case scenario—

1124.64 -> that is, the reactor is on, and it blows through the vessel and concrete containment, probably

1130.77 -> because they’ve been sabotaged.

1133.44 -> Thus, Poland, Slovakia,

1135.6 -> and Hungary look pretty safe here.

1137.98 -> But Romania, Bulgaria,

1140.12 -> and Turkey we need to worry about.

1143 -> The exact problem locations depend on weather factors like rain,

1147.97 -> wind direction, and wind speed.

1151.11 -> Anyone want to place wagers on which way the wind flows on the day that Zaporizhzhia blows?

1156.29 -> Indeed, the winds in that region are unpredictable, making it difficult for Russia to guarantee

1162.08 -> that it will avoid hitting a NATO country.

1164.85 -> By the same token, it also makes it difficult for Russia to avoid hitting Russia.

1170.33 -> Also note that these are averages.

1172.9 -> In practice with shifting winds, Romania might get really hammered

1177.53 -> while Russia feels very little.

1179.96 -> Again, though, this is a worst-case scenario.

1183.88 -> Given the earlier emphasis on localized problems, the baseline should look something more like

1189.01 -> this.

1190.01 -> The slight problem here is that the original estimate jutted so far south because of the

1195.99 -> waterway.

1197.13 -> Thus, even a “localized” problem could expand to somewhat affect the Romanian coast.

1203.85 -> Regardless, it is a good bet that any NATO member feeling the radiation is going to be

1209.89 -> tempted to invoke Article 5.

1212.89 -> What happens next is anyone’s guess.

1216.26 -> Despite its vaunted status, Article 5 does not inherently do anything.

1221.37 -> Instead, NATO members will meet to decide whether the Article 5 claim is valid.

1227.61 -> Just imagine it:

1229.02 -> Lawyers asking whether if A attacks B and the consequence is a negative

1232.95 -> externality on C implies that

1235.919 -> A actually attacked C.

1237.58 -> Likewise, lawyers will have questions of quantity.

1242.42 -> If this is the region that has notable radiation increases,

1246.419 -> it is not as if areas further out receive none.

1250.419 -> Does that count toward Article 5?

1253.04 -> But like any other international law, splitting verbal hairs matters less than what

1258.39 -> member states just want to do.

1260.8 -> And it would be surprising if NATO did absolutely nothing.

1265.59 -> Whether that means rushing all sorts of weapons packages to Ukraine

1270.409 -> or engaging in some kinetic response that targets units responsible for the mission

1276.049 -> remains to be seen.

1277.94 -> Certainly the latter action comes with escalation risks that the former does not.

1283.21 -> The final point worth emphasizing is that I call the crying wolf problem problem.

1289.75 -> We are all probably familiar with the original parable.

1293.6 -> A boy in the fields tending his sheep gets lonely, so he cries out

1297.95 -> wolf to draw the attention of the other shepherds.

1301.83 -> And indeed, they come running to him.

1304.84 -> No more loneliness problem.

1307.02 -> The next day, the boy feels lonely again.

1310.71 -> Seeing the success of what happened last time,

1313.62 -> he cries out wolf once more.

1316.13 -> The shepherds remain diligent and rush to him.

1319.22 -> But on the third day, after another cry of wolf,

1323.17 -> only a handful respond.

1325.76 -> On the fourth, wolf cry again,

1328.659 -> and only one comes around.

1331.01 -> Then on the fifth day, a wolf actually attacks his sheep.

1335.87 -> He cries out, but no one responds.

1338.87 -> His flock is eaten.

1340.87 -> The moral of the story?

1342.669 -> Never tell the same lie twice.

1344.45 -> Wait, that’s not it.

1346.62 -> The moral of the story

1347.77 -> is that if you want to get help when it counts, you should not feign problems when in truth

1354.01 -> there are none.

1355.44 -> That is all well and good when the source of the problem is what us fancy social scientists

1360.74 -> call

1361.74 -> “exogenous”—that is, not a function of the intentional actions that people take.

1367.59 -> The construction of the word makes it easy to remember.

1371.626 -> But the logic breaks down when the cause of the problem is endogenous

1375.179 -> —that is, a function of the intentional actions that people take.

1379.919 -> To see what I mean,

1382.01 -> suppose that Russia was actually planning to blow the power plant,

1385.96 -> and Ukrainian intelligence gave Kyiv a forewarning about it.

1390.029 -> Understandably, Zelensky would want to shout this out from the rooftops.

1395.429 -> International pressure now comes bearing down on Russia.

1398.84 -> Perhaps China gets on the phone and threatens to turn its tacit support for Russia to outright

1404.48 -> resistance.

1405.78 -> Maybe the IAEA starts snooping around, thereby eliminating any plausible deniability that

1412.33 -> Russia had hoped for.

1414.49 -> Worried about the consequences, the Kremlin changes plans and keeps the power plant standing.

1420.76 -> From an outsider’s perspective, it appears that Zelensky cried wolf.

1425.75 -> He said that Russia would attack and then … they did not.

1429.83 -> A few weeks later, Ukrainian intelligence picks up a Russian plot to use tactical nuclear

1435.66 -> weapons.

1436.66 -> Zelensky again raises the fire alarm.

1439.88 -> But this time no one pays attention to him because he “wrong” about the prior crisis.

1446.44 -> So Russia goes through with it unimpeded.

1449.99 -> Whoops.

1451.11 -> The point is that no matter how the Zaporizhzhia crisis ends, be careful on how you update

1456.78 -> your information.

1458.51 -> If you want to update your information on how the whole invasion got started using rigorous

1463.049 -> social science, you will love my book that examines its many possible causes.

1468.059 -> Check the video description for more on that.

1471.34 -> And if you enjoyed this video, please like, share, and subscribe, and I will see you next

1476.97 -> time.

1478.12 -> Take care.

1479.12 -> I made a small mistake last time with the #whereseveryone challenge that basically made

1486.549 -> it impossible, and unfortunately I did not realize this until the video went live.

1492.99 -> So here is the still frame.

1494.98 -> All three of them—Prigozhin, Gerasimov, and Surovikin—are there.

1499.61 -> Pause now if you want, because I am about to reveal their locations.

1503.86 -> Where’s Prigozhin?

1504.86 -> Off to the side.

1506.71 -> Where’s Gerasimov?

1508.14 -> Pointing things out over there.

1510.55 -> And where’s Surovikin?

1512.14 -> Front and center.

1513.14 -> They were in today’s video as well, all in the same frame.

1517.14 -> Good luck locating them.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZB0JyEAjdQk